Don’t Give Away Too Much, Too Soon

The cornerstone of a successful summit in Washington between President Clinton and China’s President Jiang Zemin would be an announcement that the U.S. is prepared to implement a controversial 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement. But fear that the administration may be hastily agreeing to too much too soon is growing in Congress because of concern over Chinese exports of weapons of mass destruction. The announcement is far from a done deal, and there are ways in which the U.S. bargaining position can be strengthened.

The 1985 agreement has been suspended because of concerns over Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. To implement the agreement, which would allow U.S. companies to invest in China’s ambitious program for developing civil nuclear power, the president must certify that China is complying with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and U.S. laws on nuclear nonproliferation.

Congress is preparing to review this decision. If the administration cannot make a strong case for it, legislation will be introduced to reverse the certification.

For the past two years, the Clinton administration has been negotiating with the Chinese on concessions to permit certification that China is in full compliance. The administration can point to some real concessions: The Chinese have suspended sale of a uranium conversion facility critical to Iran’s nuclear weapons program; they have announced some nuclear export controls and apparently have ended assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

Under a narrow reading of the legislation, these actions may be enough to announce compliance, but are they sufficient in today’s political environment?

Chinese assistance to the Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs raises deep concern. Beijing ended aid to a secret Algerian nuclear facility several years ago only after it was revealed by U.S. officials. The argument that China ended assistance to Middle East nations hostile to the U.S. only after they were well on their way to developing indigenous weapons production facilities does not reassure those in Congress who want to see confirmation of a change in Chinese behavior. A distinction can be made between Chinese sales of facilities compliant with the nonproliferation treaty and activities that cross that line, as some Chinese cooperation with Pakistan appears to have done. But the administration must demonstrate to Congress and the public that it is not making a “China exception” to our laws and that Beijing is serious about international norms.

The Chinese should pledge in writing to end assistance to the Iranian missile program, especially the C-802 cruise missiles, which destabilize the military balance in the Persian Gulf. We have made ending Russian assistance to Iran’s missile program a critical test of continuing economic aid to Russia. We should press equally as hard with China.

The Chinese record of replicating imported technologies and their clear desire to develop an indigenous nuclear power program for export worries many proliferation experts. The Chinese have not implemented a comprehensive export control regime--rules, regulations and inspectors--for dual use items and ma- terials useful in the development of weapons of mass destruction. They also do not permit U.S. officials to make follow-up inspections of U.S. dual-use technology exports to China.

An initiative worthy of bipartisan congressional support would frame the nuclear cooperation accord in a larger package that included:

* A U.S.-China program to implement and enforce effective export controls for nuclear and dual-use technologies.

* A firm assurance that by the time President Clinton visits Beijing next year, that as part of an export control commitment, Beijing will meet the requirements to be a full member of the Zangger Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group--international bodies that control nuclear technology exports--an important demonstration that China is a responsible major nuclear power.

* An agreement to mutual end use verification on technology exports between the two countries.

Finally, while separate from the 1985 accord, there is growing concern that China still maintains intercontinental missiles targeted at the United States. One small step would be to agree to detarget each other. But still more important would be to form a joint commission with the aim of exploring what limits China would be willing to put on its nuclear weapons modernization if the U.S. were to consider going below START III levels (about 2,000 warheads). This could be the basis for starting multilateral nuclear arms talks among the declared nuclear weapons states by the time of the second Clinton-Jiang summit.

These steps are worthy of two great powers cooperating to further world peace.