Too Dark a Picture Painted of Shadowy ‘Bob’

“Bob from the CIA” is how he is known to the world now, thanks to the flurry of unwanted publicity he has garnered as a result of the campaign fund-raising scandal.

In the Senate’s nationally televised campaign finance hearings earlier this month, “Bob” was vilified as one of the government officials who improperly tried to pressure a White House national security aide to let Roger Tamraz, a Lebanese American oilman and major Democratic donor, meet with President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore.

With his true identity classified, “Bob from the CIA” could not publicly defend himself when he was depicted as a wrongdoer in the Tamraz affair. (The Intelligence Identities Protection Act makes it a crime to publicly disclose the names of undercover CIA officers.)

But a review of a number of CIA and White House documents, along with other sources, indicates that his involvement in the case has been badly distorted.

Ironically, “Bob from the CIA” was actually the whistle-blower who set off the alarms about Tamraz. Indeed, it was “Bob” who brought the Tamraz matter to Congress early last spring, setting off a chain of events that led former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to withdraw his nomination to become CIA director.

“Bob” first came out of the shadows to tell Congress the Tamraz story in March, when Lake’s bid to run the CIA already had run into strong opposition from Senate Republicans. By that time, ‘Bob” had been trying for months to interest the FBI, the CIA’s general counsel’s office and Senate staffers in his tale of Tamraz and the oilman’s use of the Democratic National Committee to penetrate the CIA and the White House.

Finally in March, “Bob” got a congressional aide to listen to his tale, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--then in the midst of the Lake confirmation battle--promptly summoned the CIA officer to a classified session. The Tamraz story soon appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and Lake was forced to withdraw his nomination in the face of questions about whether Democratic fund-raising had tainted Clinton’s foreign policy while Lake served as his national security advisor.

Lake’s political career was torpedoed, but “Bob’s” life hasn’t been the same since, either. After Lake’s withdrawal, the Justice Department and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee investigating campaign funding abuses began to reinvestigate the Tamraz matter. The CIA inspector general launched a probe of how the agency had handled the matter.

But when the governmental affairs panel’s hearings focused on the Tamraz affair, “Bob” had very publicly been transformed into one of the bad guys. Sheila Heslin, the former National Security Council aide who had attempted to block Tamraz’s access to the White House, testified on Sept. 17 that “Bob” had called her repeatedly to discuss Tamraz and his relationship with the CIA. Heslin was convinced “Bob” had been trying to get her to lift her opposition to Tamraz.

In fact, Tamraz had been involved with the CIA on and off for more than 20 years. In the early 1980s, he was cultivated by then-CIA Director William J. Casey. But his relationship with the agency subsequently withered, until he renewed his ties with the CIA as part of a broader effort to win Washington’s support for his plan to build a pipeline that would transport oil from the rich but landlocked Caspian basin fields of Azerbaijan out to Turkey and the Mediterranean.

Tamraz began to push his pipeline plan with the Clinton administration in May and June of 1995, arranging--with the help of former CIA officer Ed Pechous--meetings with policymakers at the departments of State, Energy, Commerce, the Export-Import Bank and the NSC. On June, 2, 1995, Tamraz and Pechous met with Heslin, then the NSC’s point person on Caspian oil policy.

In preparation for that meeting, Heslin had asked the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence for information on Tamraz. The DI relayed her request to the agency’s Directorate of Operations, where it landed on “Bob’s” desk in the Central Eurasian Division, and he asked a subordinate to handle it.

The DI, with access to computerized research databases, provided an in-depth report on Tamraz, including plenty of derogatory information on his past in Lebanon, where he was wanted for allegedly looting a Beirut bank. The DO, without such access, added a more cursory file.

After sending the file to the White House, “Bob” called Heslin to apologize for the poor quality of the DO report. He then made his first mistake: He assumed Heslin wanted more information on Tamraz, when in fact she was already convinced Tamraz was a bad actor who should be denied further White House access. Indeed, she was already wondering why she had gotten a report from the DO, when she had contacted only the DI. Nevertheless, “Bob” went back through the CIA’s files, discovered Tamraz’s old relationship with Casey, and called Heslin three or four times over the coming months with more information.

Heslin testified that “Bob” spoke in reverential tones about Tamraz, relaying only information that seemed designed to ease her concerns about Tamraz. But “Bob,” through his attorney, Victoria Toensing, argues that he relayed derogatory information as well. In fact, Heslin’s own notes of at least one telephone conversation with “Bob” supports his contention that he gave her negative information on Tamraz. The notes, turned over by the White House to the CIA, show that during one conversation, “Bob” told Heslin of a report that Tamraz had bribed the husband of Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller to gain Turkish support for his pipeline.

In July 1995, Tamraz turned to the DNC to try to gain the influence with the Clinton White House that Heslin hoped to deny him. He ultimately contributed $300,000 to the Democratic Party.

Through the DNC, Tamraz gained access, and on Sept. 11, 1995, attended his first group meeting with Clinton. Over the next nine months, he attended five more White House sessions with the president.

But in October 1995, Tamraz was disinvited from a White House “coffee” with Gore after Heslin had passed on what she knew about Tamraz to Leon Fuerth, Gore’s national security advisor. Tamraz quickly met with DNC officials, including DNC Chairman Donald L. Fowler, to figure out how to regain White House access. Tamraz suggested that Fowler contact the CIA to vouch for him, and gave him “Bob’s” name and number.

When Tamraz called “Bob” to alert him to Fowler’s call, he did not say who Fowler was. This led “Bob” to make another mistake: He called Fowler to find out. On Oct. 19, Fowler called “Bob” back, and “Bob” learned that Fowler wanted him to help Tamraz get to Gore.

“Bob” rebuffed Fowler, and sought out a CIA attorney for guidance. According to internal CIA e-mail, the attorney reported to his supervisor that “Bob” had told him on Oct. 20, 1995, that Fowler had talked to “Bob” about Tamraz’s efforts to gain White House access.

In December 1995, “Bob” met Tamraz again. Tamraz told “Bob” that he had just met in Milan with two aides to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, and had offered to pour $100 million into Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection campaign in exchange for Moscow’s support for his pipeline. Tamraz also said he planned to tell Clinton about his offer to Yeltsin--and mentioned that he was no longer having trouble gaining White House access.

Still, Fowler called “Bob” the next day to again ask if he could help clear Tamraz’s name with the White House. “Bob” again rebuffed Fowler, but began to write memos and reports to his superiors about Tamraz, and Fowler’s contacts.

Then, a strange thing happened: After “Bob” began to report what was going on, his reports didn’t reach the senior CIA officials for whom they were intended. Top CIA officials claim that a key report “Bob” wrote on Dec. 28, 1995, didn’t reach their desks. Early this year, after “Bob” learned that his reports had either disappeared or been mislaid, he began to worry that something very wrong was happening inside the CIA. So he took his story to the FBI, the CIA’s general counsel’s office and, ultimately, to Congress.