On Target

While U.S. forces continue to mass in the Persian Gulf, President Bill Clinton is giving diplomacy one last chance. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has gone to Baghdad hoping to avert yet another punishing air attack on Iraq. But unless Annan convinces Saddam Hussein to give U.N. weapons inspectors full and free access, America will soon be at war with Iraq.

Clinton’s Iraq policy is being attacked from both ends of the political spectrum. Allies in Europe and the Middle East complain America is going too far. Hussein needs to be contained, but the international community should cut a deal with him, avoid the use of force and spare the Iraqi people further suffering. Meanwhile, some critics at home complain Clinton is not going far enough. It is time to remove Hussein, they insist, not just punish him. If America again goes to war with Iraq, it should finish the job.

Both critiques are misguided. At least in his dealings with Iraq, Clinton’s tendency to gravitate to the center has put him on just the right course. Tolerating Hussein’s flouting of the international community would be a grievous error; he has repeatedly demonstrated he is a ruthless, untrustworthy aggressor. Yet, sending in U.S. ground forces to nab him would be too costly. Living with Hussein, but neutralizing his military capability, is the only responsible alternative.

Clinton is on target not just in his policy but also in his public diplomacy. The president and his top aides spent much of last week explaining to the American public the need for military action against Iraq. Clinton is finally rising to the challenge of using his office to educate and lead the electorate, not just to follow the polls--of no small importance in an era when American internationalism is being refashioned.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be one of the premier security threats of coming decades. Globalization will bring benefits to many quarters of the world. But it will also make more available the ingredients needed to produce a host of deadly weapons. The prospect that extremist leaders or groups will possess chemical, biological or nuclear weapons--and the missiles to deliver them--is a looming nightmare of the next century.

Hussein is already turning that nightmare into reality. He has long maintained an arsenal of chemical weapons. He used them in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as against his own people. British and U.S. intelligence have reported that he has missile warheads capable of delivering chemical and biological agents. And Hussein made clear during the Gulf War that he enjoys lobbing missiles into Israel’s cities. Were he to use chemical or biological, rather than conventional warheads, he could devastate Tel Aviv. That Israel urged its citizens to head upstairs during missile raids, rather than to basements where gas settles, made it clear that Israeli intelligence thought Hussein willing and able to arm his missiles with chemical and biological agents.

France, Russia and several of America’s main partners in the Middle East contend that the international community should address the threat posed by Iraq through diplomatic means. Ease the economic sanctions against Iraq, the French suggest, in return for Hussein’s willingness to comply with U.N. weapons inspections and destroy his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Don’t fly bombing raids from bases on our territory, the Saudis insist. We do not want to be implicated in the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people.

But what is the basis for believing Hussein will suddenly agree to play by the rules? In this decade alone, he has invaded Kuwait, then subjected his country to the devastation wrought by the coalition formed to counter his aggression. He has repeatedly lied to U.N. inspectors since the end of the Gulf War. Despite his efforts to deceive, these inspectors have found a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and related production facilities. He has assassinated political opponents and persecuted Iraq’s Kurdish minority. And he has repeatedly violated the no-fly zone.

In short, Hussein has given no indication he plans to change course. On the contrary, he has backed down only when coerced by the threat or use of force. It is hard to imagine a case where accommodation will more clearly come back to haunt the international community.

Self-interest unfortunately is behind French and Russian objections. Both are positioning themselves for lucrative business deals when Iraq again is integrated into global markets. The Saudi strategy is simply duck and cover.

Assuming, then, that strategic imperatives necessitate use of force against Iraq, should the United States carry out a limited air attack, as Clinton intends, or go after Hussein, as his critics counsel? Bombardment will seriously degrade Hussein’s ability to attack his neighbors. It will destroy at least some of his weapons of mass destruction and his production capability. And it will weaken his internal security apparatus, making more likely, but by no means assuring, his fall from power.

Even a prolonged campaign, however, will not destroy all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. They are too easy to hide and move. Hussein is likely to survive and remain in control, just as he did after the Gulf War. A year or two down the road, U.S. force may again be needed to cut down his rebuilt military machine. Critics are right that Clinton’s approach will only temporarily counter the symptoms, not get to the source of the problem.

But going after Hussein himself is, for two reasons, not viable. First, it would require a sizable commitment of U.S. ground troops, many engaging in urban combat in Baghdad. Casualties could mount quickly, perhaps to no avail. Hussein has an elaborate system of underground bunkers and other clandestine posts. Even if U.S. troops find Hussein, their mission would not be over. It might take months, of not years, of occupation to restore order. The interests at stake do not warrant running such high risks or making such ambitious commitments.

Second, military force is an excellent instrument for destroying military power, but an often ineffective tool for shaping political outcomes. The United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Israel in Lebanon--these are only a few of many cases in which outside powers tried to use military force to alter the political landscape in target states. Such efforts almost always backfire.

Lasting political change must come from inside states and cannot be imposed from without. U.S. forces might be able to topple Hussein, but the political implications for Iraq and the region will be impossible to control. Especially in the Middle East, a regime installed through U.S. intervention is not likely to last long.

Prudence thus leaves Clinton and the international community no choice but to live with Hussein, while neutralizing, to the extent possible, his military machine and degrading the internal security system he uses to silence opposition and maintain his firm grip on power. A punishing air campaign is far from a perfect solution. But until Hussein’s demise, it is America’s responsibility and obligation, with or without its allies, to contain and defang him. This mix of patience and limited coercive power is what will some day succeed in bringing Hussein down.

At the same time that Clinton has been readying U.S. forces in the Gulf, he has been readying the political groundwork at home. Tuesday, Clinton addressed the nation from the Pentagon. The following day, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger held a town meeting at Ohio State University. The unexpected heckling at the town meeting aside, this public outreach is exactly what has been missing from Clinton’s foreign policy.

Clinton’s Pentagon address was the best foreign-policy speech of his presidency. He was clear, concise and tough. Most important, he shot straight. “A military operation cannot destroy all the weapons of mass destruction capacity,” Clinton warned. “If he seeks to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction we will be prepared to strike him again.” Clinton admitted that air strikes will only reduce, and not remove, the most threatening of Hussein’s weapons. And he acknowledged that Hussein could well rebuild his capability in the near future. Not the best case for going to war, as Clinton’s critics have noted. But very much the truth.

Without the clear definition of vital interest made possible by the Cold War, most of today’s foreign-policy decisions require subtle judgments and nuanced arguments. If the president is to ensure that the electorate is on board, he has no choice but to convey that subtlety and nuance to the American people.

Americans should remain hopeful that Annan’s mission to Baghdad, the buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf and Clinton’s efforts to prepare the public for war help convince Hussein to back down. But if his track record is any indication, it will take more than warnings to cage Hussein.