China Waging War of Words on Taiwan

The rhetoric is bellicose, the images ominous.

Armed conflict between China and Taiwan could erupt “at any moment,” warned the Global Times, a weekly offshoot of the People’s Daily, Beijing’s official mouthpiece. “The mainland has already finished all preparations for any military action against Taiwan,” the tabloid boasted in its latest edition Friday.

Photos of Chinese tanks and choppers have been plastered across the front pages of Beijing-backed papers in Hong Kong. Television footage depicts soldiers lustily singing songs about “liberating” the tiny island that Beijing considers a breakaway province.

China’s war of words, coupled with hints of military action, has been relentless since Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui upset the delicate balance of Sino-Taiwanese ties last month with his surprise demand that the two be treated as equals. Lee’s statement in effect junked the “one China” formula that has undergirded relations between the rivals for 50 years.

But for all Beijing’s ferocious saber-rattling--its noisiest in three years--and Taiwan’s bravado in response, analysts are skeptical of the Chinese government’s declared readiness to retake the island by force.

For military, political and economic reasons, China’s options for real action are limited, extending little beyond the scare tactics and aggressive propaganda warfare it has already been waging against the self-governed island, experts on both sides of the Pacific say.

“We’re seeing a shadow play,” said James R. Lilley, a former U.S. ambassador to China. “What’s going on now is right out of ‘Romance of the Three Kingdoms,’ ” he said, citing an ancient Chinese novel in which Chinese states connive against one another.

Beijing’s vow to reunify Taiwan with China by force if necessary is nothing new: The Communist behemoth has maintained that claim since 1949, when the defeated Chinese Nationalists fled to Taiwan and set up their own government after years of civil war. But Beijing has never carried out its threat.

Analysts say the political and economic costs of a military strike across the narrow Taiwan Strait--only about 100 miles wide--appear no more palatable to China now than at any other time in the last half a century, particularly as the country gears up to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Oct. 1 Communist takeover of the mainland.

The leadership here is fully aware that a military move against Taiwan would bring on international opprobrium and could trigger diplomatic and economic sanctions at a time when China can least afford it.

Conflict Would Further Hurt Economy

The once-booming Chinese economy is stumbling and would be hammered further by a conflict with Taiwan--a worrisome prospect for a regime whose legitimacy increasingly rests on its handling of the economy. Progress on China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, which Beijing reportedly wants to achieve by a WTO summit in November, would almost certainly be derailed.

Equally, Beijing knows that its 2.5-million-strong People’s Liberation Army, albeit superior in its sheer number of troops and ballistic missiles, lags behind Taiwan in key areas, which would make a takeover extremely costly in both human and hardware terms. Taiwan’s air force, for example, owns more than 100 advanced F-16 jet fighters bought from the U.S. that outclass most of the mainland’s planes, except for some newer Russian models that Beijing recently acquired.

One story making the rounds here has it that Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently asked top military leaders if there is some weapon or capability within the PLA arsenal that would ultimately guarantee success in pulling Taiwan back into the motherland’s embrace.

“The PLA regretfully answered, ‘Sorry, no, there isn’t,’ ” said one Chinese defense analyst, who asked not to be identified.

Despite alarmist reports in the Chinese media and Beijing-funded Hong Kong newspapers, security experts in the U.S. and Asia say they have detected no significant military buildup in southern China across from Taiwan--certainly nothing approaching the level of 1996, when China fired missiles into waters off Taiwan to cow the island’s 22 million inhabitants as they voted in their first direct presidential election. The United States responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the region.

Small-Scale Military Action Also Risky

While it is true that some parts of the Chinese military can be mobilized quickly, any large-scale maneuver would probably be detected beforehand by Taiwanese and U.S. intelligence.

Even the limited air sorties now underway by China and Taiwan, which have prompted international concern, are far fewer than during the crisis three years ago.

Short of a full invasion, which would require an amphibious landing difficult to sustain along Taiwan’s shoreline, Beijing has hinted at the possibility of lower-level military action, including a partial blockade or the seizing of one of the sparsely populated islets off the Taiwanese coast.

But these options also come attached with plenty of risk. A blockade by China’s small fleet of submarines might erroneously target ships from other nations such as Japan, drawing outside countries--quite possibly the United States--into the conflict. Even the symbolic taking of an unpopulated islet would be politically damaging for China on the world stage, said one veteran defense expert based in Asia.

“Bottom line: This is not the right time for China to attack Taiwan,” said June Teufel Dreyer, a political scientist and specialist on the Chinese military at the University of Miami. “Meanwhile, of course, some scare tactics need to be carried on.”

In addition to trying to intimidate Taiwan, the saber-rattling could be an attempt to mollify hard-liners within the Chinese inner circle who, afraid that Taiwan is verging on a full declaration of independence, advocate stronger action.

The government also knows that it must appear strong-willed to appease the nationalistic sentiment of many ordinary Chinese, a patriotism that Beijing itself has promoted. After insisting on its primacy over Taiwan for decades, Beijing cannot appear too soft now.

In plotting any strategy for dealing with Taiwan, however, the regime must take into account the X-factor that has long haunted Sino-Taiwanese ties: the potential involvement of the United States.

Just how the U.S. would respond to Chinese military action against Taiwan is unclear--intentionally so, under the doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” pursued by the White House to keep Beijing guessing. In recent days, critics of the Clinton administration have urged the president to abandon such vagueness and make an airtight commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from the mainland.

“Strategic ambiguity will not serve United States interests or values in the current crisis,” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a presidential candidate, said in a recent statement. “We must be very clear with Beijing. The United States will do what it must to help defend freedom and stability in Asia.”

Policy on Taiwan Dates Back 40 Years

Historians point out that the policy of deliberate ambiguity over Taiwan did not originate with the Clinton administration, but rather dates back 40 years to the presidency of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower.

“The principle today is the same,” said Nancy Bernkopf Tucker of Georgetown University. “If you say you will protect Taiwan under any circumstances, you may encourage the independence forces on Taiwan to declare independence. If, on the other hand, you say you won’t defend Taiwan, you may invite China to act. . . . [Ambiguity] keeps each side from taking extreme action.”

Chas W. Freeman Jr., who once served as the No. 2 U.S. official in Beijing, said the current crisis could force the United States to “decide . . . whether we’re bluffing or serious” about defending Taiwan.

“U.S. policy for 30 years has been intended to avoid putting us in a position where we have to answer the question of whether we will go to war over Taiwan or not,” Freeman said. “That policy may be failing.”

Unsettled by comments such as McCain’s, China has warned the U.S. not to interfere with what it regards as a purely internal matter.

But Beijing is unlikely to take any drastic measures, waiting instead for the outcome of next year’s presidential election in Taiwan and equipping the PLA with more modern hardware, analysts say.

“The military folks, being well aware of the risks they face, tend to include quite a few people who don’t want war--yet,” said Dreyer at the University of Miami. “The idea is always that a couple of years down the road, given more time to train, a couple more squadrons of planes and a few more submarines, then they will be ready.”

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Chu reported from Beijing and Mann from Washington.