Say No to North Korea

The word from North Korea is that it is ready to negotiate with “hostile nations”--meaning the United States, Japan and South Korea--about calling off its test of a new long-range missile, a prospect that has heightened tensions in northeast Asia. The unspoken condition in Pyongyang’s offer is that it expects to be suitably rewarded. Once again, North Korea seeks to leverage a strategic threat to extort further concessions from those it views as its primary enemies. That ploy has paid off handsomely in the past. This time it should be unequivocally rejected.

The test of the 3,700-mile Taepodong II missile would be significant evidence of North Korea’s covert progress in missile development. But far more important is how it has been exploiting its achievements. North Korea has helped Iran and Iraq improve their missile arsenals, and is working with Pakistan on its launch vehicles. Pakistan denies that it is swapping its nuclear know-how for North Korean missile technology. But Pakistan also denied it was developing nuclear weapons almost to the day it tested one.

Last May the United States offered North Korea a package of economic and political concessions, including a major expansion of diplomatic and commercial ties, if it would abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The response has been no response, a silence that--as the north’s latest gambit shows--evidences Pyongyang’s belief that it can squeeze still more out of Washington and its allies. That confidence is rooted in experience.

Since 1995 the United States has contributed more than $500 million in food and energy aid to North Korea. Japan and South Korea, which are funding the construction of two light water nuclear reactors in the north, have committed billions more. In return for this largesse, North Korea has shut down its rickety old Soviet-supplied reactors and stopped extracting plutonium from their fuel rods. Beyond that it has done nothing to ease tensions in northeast Asia. In fact, its test-firing of a missile over northern Japan a year ago sent Tokyo rushing to expand its military ties with Washington.

Underlying the costly effort to buy North Korea’s good will is the fear that to do less might push Pyongyang’s unpredictable rulers into acting irrationally. But a policy based on that concern simply encourages unending brinksmanship and blackmail. Washington and its allies have been generous to Pyonyang. It’s time to insist on something in return.