Syria-Israel: Eliminate the Negative

With the long-waited resumption in Washington this week of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations led by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shareh, it is important to understand the legacy of the past negotiations and how it can contribute to this renewed and historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East.

Some important considerations:

On at least two occasions--August 1993 and November 1995--Israel and Syria came very close to but stopped short of an agreement. Those negotiations led to a general expectation about the contours of an agreement on the key issues of land, peace and security.

Those negotiations produced a series of “lessons”--not necessarily positive ones--about the experience. Each of the three parties (Israel, Syria and the United States) was perceived by another to have failed to deliver what was expected at key points in the negotiations. Each party was seen by another to have lacked the requisite political will or determination.

There are differences between the Israeli and Syrian narratives of the past negotiations. Israel asserts that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made a hypothetical and conditional deposition that included the idea to exchange Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan in return for Syria’s accepting Israel’s requirements for security and normalization of relations in the context of peace. In the Israeli view, Rabin’s expression of Israel’s willingness to withdraw to the June 4, 1967, lines was not an absolute and unconditional commitment. Syria interprets this pledge as a firm Israeli commitment to full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines.

While recognizing the essential role of the U.S. as the honest broker, Israelis and Syrians have indicated that the U.S. made a number of mistakes during the negotiations. There was no clear signal of strong U.S. commitment to broker an agreement; consequently, the United States rarely played a role beyond that of facilitator. Both Israel and Syria felt that the U.S. should have been more assertive during critical points of the negotiation process.

While both Syrian President Hafez Assad and Rabin were fully committed to the peace negotiations, hesitancy at key junctures in the negotiations hindered progress toward the consummation of a final agreement. Each party’s perceptions about the other party’s intentions to move the process forward created doubts at various stages of the negotiations.

The suicide bombings against Israeli targets in February and March 1996 had a paralyzing effect on the negotiations and future terrorist attacks could have an equivalent effect. Consequently, the need to move forward in a timely manner is important to marginalize the terrorists.

Nevertheless, much progress in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations was achieved from the time of the Madrid peace conference in 1991 to the Wye River talks in 1996 on the key issues of land, peace, security and water and the interrelationships of these factors. With these considerations in mind, all three parties cannot ignore the fact that a legacy exists that has a strong impact on what direction the current talks will take.

The immediate task is to overcome the negative elements of the legacy while making full use of the positive ones. The Israeli government can take note of the previous negotiations and place major emphasis on security considerations. The Syrians feel that the conclusions reached in the previous negotiations should be the starting point for resuming talks.

Some basic principles should be adhered to:

* The basic foundations to any settlement are U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and the concept of land for peace.

* Progress on the Israeli-Syrian track should not be used as an excuse to forestall progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The reverse is also true.

* Forward movement on the Israeli-Syrian track should lead to parallel movement on the Israeli-Lebanese track and facilitate a settlement. Any Israeli-Syrian peace agreement should not be at the expense of Lebanon’s political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The first stage of negotiations could focus on security arrangements through sustained talks between teams of military and security experts. The United States should reiterate its willingness to help guarantee, at the request of the parties, any security arrangements on the Golan that are agreed upon by all sides. The United States should also coordinate efforts with Russia and the European countries to move the negotiations forward. The Israeli and Syrian leaders should be encouraged to engage in public diplomacy and give press interviews and issue public statements to help increase trust in both countries. To the extent possible, direct negotiation and contacts between the Israelis and the Syrians should be facilitated.

The United States must be ready to assume a decisive and assertive role and be ready to mediate issues at key junctures of the negotiation process itself. At the critical stages of negotiations, direct presidential involvement should be considered. Much depends on the parties themselves. However, it should be noted that the history of the Arab-Israeli peace process has demonstrated that when the president of the United States and his secretary of State have taken a decisive leadership role in the process, including the political will to take the heat resulting from leaning on both the Israeli and Arab parties, there has been progress.