Iraq and U.N.: Here We Go Again

Exactly a year ago, arms inspections in Iraq were terminated and Operation Desert Fox was underway. The stated aim of that American and British military action was to “degrade” Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability. Whether it achieved this, it did not end Iraq’s resistance to United Nations arms control.

On Friday, the U.N. Security Council adopted a new approach to the problem of Iraq, although France, Russia and China abstained. This new inspection system may work if the United States and Britain keep up the pressure, but the abstentions by the majority of the permanent members may lead to another deadlock down the road.

It is worth recalling what led to these circumstances and asking what might happen in the future.

In August 1998, Iraq declared itself disarmed and terminated all further work by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Three months later, when it became clear that a bombing of Iraq was being prepared, an urgent meeting of the Security Council took place. Iraq offered written assurances that it would resume “full cooperation” with the arms inspectors and a dramatic last-minute decision to stop the bombing was made.

The Security Council charged me with reporting on whether Iraq had kept its promise. In mid-December, having received detailed reports from all chief inspectors--in the missile, chemical and biological weapons fields--I reported that Iraq had not provided full cooperation and, indeed, had imposed new restrictions. The next day, Operation Desert Fox began.

Security Council action on Iraq was diverted for several months by events in Kosovo. When it resumed work, the predictable draft resolutions were tabled. A British draft sought to pursue remaining disarmament tasks, establish a new monitoring regime and provide for the suspension of sanctions for specific, renewable periods, if Iraq cooperated with the new arrangements. It was an amended version of this draft that was adopted on Friday.

It cannot be known, precisely, what Iraq has done during the last year, but there were clear indications that when UNSCOM was being ejected from Iraq, it was working toward expanding its missile force. Its knowledge in the fields of chemical and biological weapons makes it foolish not to assume that, absent international scrutiny, Iraq had resumed its prohibited activities.

The new resolution reaffirms Iraq’s disarmament obligations, but the organization it establishes to replace UNSCOM--UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission)--is different in key respects.

Where UNSCOM had a high degree of operational independence, UNMOVIC will be integrated as part of the U.N. bureaucracy. Its executive head will need to submit all policy decisions for consideration by a group of commissioners. His direct access to the Security Council will be reduced. Staff will no longer be recruited, fundamentally, on the basis of their technical qualifications; nationality will be a factor.

The design of this new organization reflects the success of the propaganda campaign waged by Iraq. The major objectives of that campaign were to destroy the independence of the inspectors, subject them to political control and turn them into bureaucrats, not experts.

Will Iraq accept this new resolution? Although its parliament condemned it on Monday, Baghdad’s compliance is required under the U.N. charter. If Iraq sticks to its policy that it will have no further relationship with the Security Council’s arms control mechanism unless sanctions are first ended, then all of this effort to craft a solution will come to naught.

If it does cooperate, the critical points to watch in the year ahead will be the practical ones: How, and under what circumstances, will Iraq be disarmed? And will the monitoring system be credible? An indicator of Iraq’s stance was given just last week when it refused entry to Iraq of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency trying to conduct a routine inventory check of Iraq’s uranium holdings. This breached its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a serious infraction that should have rung all the alarm bells.

It is beyond question that all concerned are thoroughly sick of the problem of Iraq and its ongoing attachment to weapons of mass destruction. Everyone wants a solution, and it is now widely accepted that a solution cannot be found through the recurrent cycle of military attacks on Iraq.

Yet it is equally doubtful that the solution lies in acquiescence. If this were to occur, Saddam Hussein’s major challenge to the very authority of the Security Council will have succeeded and the enforceability of arms control treaties on weapons of mass destruction would have been thrown deeply into question. That is hardly an encouraging way to start the 21st century.