Aim for Realism With Pyongyang

This week’s armed clash at sea between North and South Korea has once again reminded the world that 46 years after the signing of the Korean armistice agreement, there is still no peace on the peninsula. The recent trip to Pyongyang of President Clinton’s special envoy, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, was an attempt to break the decades-long standoff with North Korea. He is the first American to make an official visit representing the U.S. president since the signing of the armistice.

Perry’s eventual recommendations to the president could signal the start of a new policy of engagement based on a comprehensive approach to North Korea. The report also could be a test of the joint effort by the United States and its northeast Asian allies to deal with the regime in Pyongyang through diplomatic means.

In the past, critics of an engagement policy questioned the assumption that it would lead to the North Korean regime’s adoption of fundamental reforms or, failing that, to its ultimate collapse. Today, while fewer experts predict the regime’s imminent collapse, advocates of engagement continue to insist that it would ultimately lead to reforms. Reforms, however, are fundamentally a domestic issue. If the hope for collapse under the guise of engagement is the real motive, then the leadership in Pyongyang would be justified in viewing it as a conspiracy to bring down the North. In any event, whether North Korea adopts political pluralism and a system of free markets--as desirable as that may be--should not be the goal of U.S. policy.

Perhaps the greatest service Perry could render is to offer recommendations that would make U.S. policy goals more tangible and implementation more pragmatic. The primary objective must be to ensure the security and stability of the Korean peninsula and northeast Asia. The most direct threat to that is North Korea’s offensive military capabilities. Rather than squander precious time trying to pressure Pyongyang to undertake internal reforms, the U.S. goal should be to reduce the North’s weapons of mass destruction and its missile program.

As long as North Korea views the U.S. as its implacable foe and retains the goal of reuniting all of Korea under socialism, dealing with Pyongyang will remain an arduous process. What the U.S. needs is a long-term policy carefully implemented to secure legitimacy in the international community. The first step is to induce the North to abide by international standards on weapons of mass destruction.

Pyongyang’s response will reveal its real intentions. If North Korea is forthcoming, the next step should concentrate on reducing the threat posed by its offensive military forces, the bulk of which are deployed near the DMZ, as well as addressing legitimate North Korean security concerns. Normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang and the full implementation of the basic agreement (negotiated by Seoul and Pyongyang in 1991) could be realized in the process.

None of these measures can succeed without North Korean counterparts with the authority to negotiate. No less important would be direct contact with the senior military leadership in future negotiations. While there’s little doubt that Kim Jong Il controls the military, the army’s increasing influence is clear in the buildup of weapons of mass destruction.

Lastly, resolution of the North Korean problem should be undertaken within the broader context of building a new regional order. It is by no means clear that North Korea will soon adopt universal values. The North more likely will continue to work to restore a more favorable regional power balance. It will try to reestablish ties to traditional allies, based on geographical proximity, cultural similarity and ideological bonds.

It is extremely important that all the countries in the region and other interested nations work to resolve latent rivalries. The demilitarized zone is not only an artificial wall dividing Korea but also a line along which potential rivalries in the region can arise and be exploited.

The U.S. is the only power capable of playing the role of outside balancer, preserving peace and stability. Washington should strengthen its efforts to build political trust, military transparency and economic cooperation in the region. The U.S. military presence in Korea is crucial, as it will serve both as a deterrent against the North’s aggression and as a means to prevent a regional arms race.

The crucial point is that the United States should develop a mechanism by which regional states will continue to accept the U.S. presence. As the underwriter of peace and security in northeast Asia, the U.S. should examine the likely nature of a new regional order, one that could either become unstable because of renewed confrontation, or stable, marked by the unification of Korea.