A Last Gasp of the Emigre Old Guard

Here in Miami, the Cold War still rages. The news and images coming out of this city during the Elian Gonzalez crisis must seem baffling and anachronistic to most Americans. More than 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, an intense confrontation with a “communist enemy” is being played out, not in Eastern Europe, but in the streets of a major U.S. metropolis.

Just as we have been expecting the demise of Fidel Castro for several years, we have also been expecting the passing of the generation of exiles that opposed him so vehemently in the early 1960s and that kept alive the anti-Castro struggle in the U.S. Yet, the Elian’s case has highlighted the resiliency of that generation of emigres, even as their numbers dwindle and new arrivals and new generations take their place. Their commitment to having Elian stay in this country may well be, however, one of their last gasps, as well as a costly mistake for their cause.

If one looks at the political landscape of Cuban Miami, its leadership, ideology, organizations and media, one finds it is dominated, almost without exception, by Cubans who left the island from 1960 to 1962. These are the exiles who “lost” Cuba in the Cold War confrontation of those years, a confrontation as much within Cuba as it was international in its dimensions and consequences. The conflict lost them their homeland, their livelihoods and their futures, in short, their lives, in some cases figuratively, in others, literally.

This generation has invented and maintained in Miami a true “exile” discourse, a discourse that clings to the belief that the loss of their homeland is temporary and that the man and regime responsible for that loss will be defeated and the homeland retaken. An integral part of this discourse has been adherence to a strategy of isolating Cuba and attempting to influence other actors, particularly foreign corporations and governments (notably the U.S.), to follow such a strategy.

Just as the Cuban government, and its leader, have shown tremendous resilience, this exile generation has managed to keep its relentless anti-Castro political agenda alive despite the passage of decades and the increasing diversity of the Cuban American population. In the late 1960s, more than two-thirds of all Cubans in the United States arrived in that same decade. By the late 1990s, however, that exile generation of the ‘60s represented slightly less than one-third of all U.S. Cubans. They declined not only through mortality, but because successive waves of migration from Cuba, as well as new generations born in the U.S., greatly diversified the demographics.

Given this diversity, many anticipated that the influence of the earlier exiles would diminish. Newer arrivals, and certainly the younger generations, were not expected to share the intensity of those who took part in, and were alienated by, the conflict that led to the consolidation of the Cuban Revolution. To be sure, that has happened to some extent. The parameters of Cuba discourse in Miami have been somewhat broadened, and there is greater tolerance within the community for alternative views on and approaches to the homeland.

But the growing diversity of Cuban Miami has yet to lead to a replacement of the exile discourse or an end of its traditional hegemony within the community. That is most evident when crises, such as the current one over Elian, erupt. Stridency rules, and alternative voices seem drowned out by echoes of the Cold War. Why?

Intimidation is not an explanation. Rather, it is commitment and emotion. The newer arrivals and younger generations may well have a different take on Cuba, but one thing they probably share is an uninterest in displacing the traditional exiles on the playing field where the Cuba issue is contested. Those who left Cuba after more than 20 years of socialism have little interest in regaining the homeland; they want to shape a new life in this country. The younger generations may or may not agree with their parents, but the Cuba issue cannot be expected to have the same privileged place in their life’s agenda.

Thus, the images of demonstrators in the Miami streets show many gray heads. They also show relatively few people. A demonstration of 5,000 or 7,000 is impressive and can gather much attention. But keep the real numbers in mind: In greater Miami, there are more than 700,000 people of Cuban origin. Clearly not everyone has the same view on this.

More important, not everyone in the community shares the same level of emotion on the Cuba issue exhibited by the earlier exiles. Emotion is key. It is, after all, what has mobilized people in Cuban Miami around the Elian case, for it strikes some chords at the core of this community. One is the view that exile is preferable to living in Cuba, and that most of Cuba would leave if they could. This is the basis for arguing that the young child must stay, rather than being returned to “hell” of Cuba, even if his father is there.

The other chord is more central: Castro cannot be allowed to win this skirmish in a struggle that, at least during the past four decades, he has been winning. For those long frustrated by not attaining the goal of recapturing the homeland, it is vital not to lose what may be a last hurrah.

Emotion, of course, can lead to irrational behavior. In the long run, this crisis may do serious harm to the image of Cuban Americans in the U.S. and specifically to the ability of hard-liners within the community to continue to influence U.S. policy on Cuba. In the past, those hard-liners were successful in getting the U.S. government to do things with respect to Cuba that many in this country considered outrageous. Examples abound: a radio station paid for by U.S. taxpayers that transmits to Cuba; a TV broadcast costing millions that no one on the island can see; legislation in Congress to strengthen the embargo, including attempting to coerce third countries to join in the sanctions, all of which have left the U.S. isolated in world forums and condemned at the United Nations. But largely because no one really cares or pays attention to Cuba policy in this country, except the exile community, these things have all been implemented.

It appears, however, that on this gripping human case, the leaders of the community have exceeded the bounds of what the U.S. government, and U.S. public opinion, may be willing to do. Being tough with Castro is one thing. Keeping a father from his child is quite another. *