Brokers of a Skin-Deep Democracy

In Soviet days, the art of Kremlinology consisted in guessing which political figures were rising or falling in power and influence based on such indicators as where a key figure stood atop Lenin’s mausoleum during May Day parades. When communism collapsed, it seemed for a time as if these old black arts would no longer be necessary: Democracy would bring a new transparency to Russian public life. In fact, Russia remains different. If anything, during the late Yeltsin years, political life in Moscow has become even more opaque. Behind a thin veneer of democracy, the levers of power are being pulled by people almost entirely unknown to the outside world.

The recent resignation of President Boris N. Yeltsin and his replacement asacting president by his latest prime minister, Vladimir V. Putin, represents the culmination of a subterranean political struggle that has been raging behind the scenes for some time. In his first address to the Russian people after becoming acting president, Putin himself admitted that, for the foreseeable future, Russian politics will be shaped by that country’s authoritarian traditions. “Russia is never going to be another U.S.A. or England, where liberal values have deep historic roots,” he stated.

Putin’s meteoric rise to power is the strongest proof of that. His ascent has been engineered by powerful press oligarchs and financiers who have enriched themselves off the pickings of the Soviet economic carcass and therefore have a strong stake in ensuring political continuity. The most important such figure, the shadowy Boris A. Berezovsky, recently boasted that his press empire created Putin and could virtually anoint him as Yeltsin’s successor. Arrogant as this may seem, right now it appears as though he could be right.

The current dramatic political shift has its roots in the events of last summer and fall. At the time, Yeltsin’s government appeared to be reaching a terminal crisis. The president’s health and mental acuity were failing visibly; the Russian economy had never recovered from the collapse of the ruble in August 1998; Yeltsin and his men seemed unable to find a prime minister who could reestablish order in the economy and country; non-Russian ethnic groups, most notably the Chechens, ignored the dictates of the central government with seeming impunity. The government registered less than 5% approval.

Yeltsin’s political rivals were circling. Two of his more prominent contenders for power, Yevgeny M. Primakov and Yuri M. Luzhkov, joined forces to create Fatherland-All Russia, a new political alliance capable of supplanting Yeltsin and his men in the December parliamentary elections, especially since the Yeltsin camp lacked a political party to rally its forces. Fatherland-All Russia received the strong backing of one of Berezovsky’s chief rivals, Vladimir A. Gusinsky, founder and chairman of Media Most Holding Co. According to a recent study of the new Russian media oligarchs by Radio Free Europe, Gusinsky’s company controls the Seven Days publishing corporation, which, in turn, issues several key periodicals, notably the daily newspaper Segodnya. That paper has criticized Yeltsin for failing to defend Russian national interests, both against the Western powers and against non-Russian ethnic groups within the country.

Even more important than Gusinsky’s newspapers and magazines, however, is his stake in the television network NTV, which reaches 60% of Russian households and has been augmented by his recent launching of Russia’s first private television satellite. NTV is the only television voice in Russia independent of state control, giving it the capacity to criticize the sitting president and his government. With his publishing and broadcasting empire, Gusinsky was able to amplify the voice of Fatherland-All Russia.

Yeltsin’s backers were clearly worried. For the people around the president, including those closest to him, referred to as “the family,” the problem was that they had no popular alternative figure behind which they could rally. This is where Putin came in.

Appointed prime minister Aug. 9, Putin, though he had no previous public reputation, had the right kind of connections. A career KGB man, he has apparently been able to carry that critical power center with him. Of all the Soviet-era institutions, the Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB, has undergone the least amount of democratic cleansing; the personnel has remained largely intact, as has the secret-police mind-set.

Putin exudes authoritarianism. He promised a crackdown on crime so long as it’s not, apparently, at the highest levels. (After taking office, he granted Yeltsin lifetime immunity from prosecution.) He also stated that those who don’t want to work will be made to work. This sort of tough talk sells in Russian politics, where people reflexively blame the country’s ills on infirm government and look to authoritarianism for solutions. Most important, just as Fatherland-All Russia received Gusinsky’s backing, Putin was assisted by his own press and financial baron, Berezovsky.

Berezovsky bankrolled and promoted Yeltsin during his last election campaign, in 1996. Since then, his relations with the Yeltsin family appeared to pass through some rocky periods. In the last few months, however, he has returned to the government camp, which owes a great deal to Berezovsky’s bitter rivalry with Gusinsky. The two power-brokers geared up their respective media empires to attack one another in an increasingly public feud. Berezovsky even came out of his customary political shadowlands to attack his rival by name on his television channel, ORT. Although the state owns the majority of shares in ORT, Berezovsky is the largest private holder of shares, and he has used this control not only to attack his rivals but also to advance his favored man, Putin.

Besides bringing a more energetic style to politics, Putin has benefited from events and from the spin that these events have received at the hands of Berezovsky’s press empire. The most significant element in Putin’s rapid success has been his conduct of the Chechen war, which to this point has enjoyed widespread public support. Russian national pride was wounded by the rebuff the Russian army suffered at the hands of the Chechens in 1994-96, and Putin’s promises, amplified by Berezovsky, to smash Chechen resistance this time round resonate with the Russian public.

With Putin’s popularity soaring, Yeltsin stepped down, when he could also be assured of guaranteeing his handpicked successor. At this point, it is not even clear whether Yeltsin himself made the decision: Some claim that “the family” and people such as Berezovsky chose the moment; Putin’s rivals see the hand of the FSB and accuse him of conducting a secret-police creeping coup. Putin’s dismissal of Tatyana Dyachenko, Yeltsin’s daughter, also serves to cloud the issue.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Putin seems assured that the political deck will be stacked in his favor. If presidential elections proceed as scheduled March 26, this will leave his opponents only 90 days to organize their campaigns and raise money, while he enjoys the benefit of incumbency and Berezovsky’s media spotlight and financial backing. Putin may be aware that his popularity could be evanescent, and so he has appealed to Russia’s Supreme Court to shorten the constitutionally mandated 90-day period.

Barring some surprise development, Putin will translate these advantages into a resounding presidential victory. While the outward appearances of democracy will be maintained, and no doubt foreign leaders will hail the latest electoral exercise in Russia, if one delves not too far beneath the surface, Russian politics remain authoritarian and very rough indeed. Putin was correct: Russia is still far from creating the established democratic institutions and traditions enjoyed by its Western neighbors.