The Costs of a Ridiculous ‘Defense’

Everyone who has visited the exclusive, tree-lined foreign-embassy section of Beijing knows that there is something odd about the priorities of the U.S. political establishment. For this neighborhood, policed by special units of the People’s Liberation Army, has on display one sprawling mansion after another, all of them resplendent diplomatic frontages. That is, until one spots a standout eyesore of a dump--the Embassy of the United States of America.

What a glaring commentary is this claptrap relic of a building. For decades, successive American ambassadors, appalled not only by the sheer decrepit appearance but also by the wretched working conditions for embassy employees in a building with inadequate everything, including air conditioning, have beseeched Congress for at least a first-class remodeling and safety job. They have gotten nowhere. There’s no money for such a project, Congress says.

But somehow in Congress there is money--a whole lot of it--for construction of a new U.S. missile defense system. If the large-scale missile defense project goes forward to completion, at least $60 billion of your money will be spent on behalf of the technologically challenging and probably illusive goal of absolute security from foreign missile attack. And so last week, I recalled the image of the forlorn, ramshackle U.S. Embassy when yet another U.S. missile test went awry. For when it went astray, shortly after takeoff, so did about $100 million in taxpayer money for just this one test alone--more than enough to refurbish a whole bunch of embassies.

The Chinese observe our spending habits. They recall that the administration of Ronald Reagan wanted to bring the Soviet Union to its knees with an expensive U.S. military buildup. That’s how the grandiose vision of Star Wars arose. Back then, not very many serious U.S. scientists believed it could work. Even today, when, presumably, our missile technology is supposed to be so much better, it’s tough to believe in what amounts to a bullet hitting a bullet. Certainly, last week’s test was a debacle of monumental proportions. Almost nothing of importance worked as it should have. Sheer military prudence and wise fiscal restraint would dictate that the entire project go back to the drawing board. And yet it is said that this project might still go forward to construction. The Chinese, the Russians and others notice this seeming compulsion and wonder.

On the face of it, the stated goal of a large-scale missile defense, which is to render the American people immune to foreign nuclear missiles, is hard to knock. And, well, how much would that be worth? One possible answer: Whatever we have to spend. But what if the goal of an overall defensive umbrella is little more than an unachievable dream?

That, in fact, has been the unwavering assessment of many in the American scientific community since the 1970s, when this vexing national-security question first surfaced. Many of the smartest scientists in the U.S. have consistently made the point that any such system contains a fatal flaw--the inherent, overwhelming advantage of offensive missile systems, no matter how unsophisticated, against almost any conceivable defense, no matter how sophisticated.

Three decades ago, Wolfgang Panofsky, the genius Stanford University physicist, first raised the issue of the logical hitch in any missile defense in a secret briefing to Pentagon officials. The topic was the so-called Nixon Safeguard ABM. Panofsky famously demonstrated that even a technologically superb defense (which, judging from last week’s spectacular failed test, we obviously still don’t possess) is inherently vulnerable to meltdown through any combination of simple surprise, a flurry of decoys, computer-generated deceits and, of course, sheer numbers of incoming warheads. In the thermonuclear age, if a defense is anything less than perfect, if but one or two offensive missiles get through, then you’ve got a very serious problem. The Panofsky paradigm--that, in the nuclear game, almost any offense can at least partially penetrate any defense, and thus explode a thermonuclear weapon in your face--still has met no satisfying rebuttal.

The Star Wars II decision will probably rest with the next president of the United States. The current one will not have the courage to kill off the project, for fear of leaving his vice president vulnerable to an offensive political attack from Republican challenger George W. Bush. But a president truly concerned about nuclear stability in Asia and the rest of the world should never approve a project that will do little to make the U.S. any safer but that, on the contrary, will make the world less safe by offering military establishments in Asia and elsewhere new justification for arms buildups.

Before he left office, President Dwight D. Eisenhower memorably warned the nation about the excessive influence of the U.S. “military-industrial complex.” Before leaving office, President Bill Clinton too could leave behind a similar invaluable legacy by spiking the missile defense project (and, while he’s at it, finding the money for a new embassy in China). The symbolism of that decision--diplomacy over military might--would indeed resonate tellingly throughout the world, especially in Asia.