When Can-Do Doesn’t: The Pitfalls of U.S. Power

The summit at Camp David had all the makings of success. Forces of moderation in the Middle East were on the rise, strengthened by the new regime in Syria and Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel’s courageous leader, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, was bent on striking a deal and had already begun to prepare his electorate for painful compromise. Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat had a sense of urgency because of his own frailty and his people’s growing impatience for statehood. And President Bill Clinton was tangibly eager for a breakthrough that would secure him a place in history and provide an enviable closing to his tarnished presidency. Clinton spared none of America’s enormous diplomatic clout in pressing the parties toward an agreement.

But it was not to be. Despite promises that the United States would stand behind the agreement with its full economic and military might, Clinton, Barak and Arafat left Camp David exhausted and empty-handed Tuesday. They had apparently reached agreement on a substantial number of issues, including the basic territorial outlines of a Palestinian state. But the status of Jerusalem proved an insurmountable obstacle. And no deal on Jerusalem meant no deal on anything. The negotiating and posturing now move back to the Middle East, with palpable urgency.

Whether or not Barak and Arafat eventually succeed in striking a deal, the United States should draw important lessons from the disappointment of Camp David. The stalemate reveals that U.S. power and influence, though second to none, can only go so far, and that potent political and cultural obstacles still stand in the way of America’s ambitions abroad. The setback at Camp David should send a sobering message that there are immutable forces out there that remain well beyond America’s reach, even beyond Clinton’s legendary powers of persuasion.

Not that the United States should give up. Rather, awareness of these obstacles will help prevent temporary setbacks from becoming permanent failures. An America that knows its bounds, keeps its expectations in check and stays the course will not guarantee peace in the Middle East, or anywhere else. But the next weeks of diplomacy and U.S. arm-twisting may well demonstrate that determination, patience and recognition of the limits of U.S. power ultimately pay off.

The first lesson of Camp David is that domestic politics is making it increasingly difficult for governments to conduct foreign policy. The negotiations between Barak and Arafat are nothing compared with the deal-making required of them at home. Barak’s governing coalition has already unraveled, with remaining partners threatening to jump ship almost daily. Arafat has to worry not just about the nearly 3 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, but the millions of refugees in neighboring states. On top of that, he is regularly fielding calls from Arab leaders worried their own domestic support would be threatened by too much compromise on Jerusalem.

The domestic quicksands that sank the deal at Camp David are by no means unique to the Middle East. Even here in the United States, statecraft is mired in domestic politics. Congress has been treating the foreign-policy agenda as little more than a playpen for partisan politics. This is new. During the Cold War, and its immediate aftermath, foreign policy usually took precedence. When national security was on the line, political parties set aside partisan spats. Now, foreign policy is fair game for the politicos.

Just about everywhere else, domestic forces are in full command. Japan desperately needs to liberalize its economy, a move that would speed its recovery from recession and improve its trade relations with other countries. A sclerotic political system and powerful interest groups, however, are blocking the needed reforms. The Russian government focuses primarily on making it through the day; foreign policy is an afterthought. And most European countries are fixated on the European Union and where their experiment in political integration is headed.

That countries are turning inward, with their diplomacy held hostage by domestic infighting, is bad news for a preponderant America, still trying hard to fashion a stable and open global order. Hampered at home by their own Congress and abroad by distracted and fragmented governments, U.S. diplomats are justifiably a frustrated breed.

They now have their work cut out for them in the Middle East. Only so much can be achieved by leaning on Barak and Arafat. Whether Israelis and Palestinians are about to sign a peace deal or fire weapons will ultimately ride on Barak’s ability to navigate the shoals of Israeli politics and Arafat’s skill in managing the politics of compromise within the Arab world.

The second lesson of Camp David is that globalization is Janus-faced in its consequences for U.S. power and purpose. On one hand, the allure of prosperity that comes with integration into the global economy is motivating countries to settle disputes, get their houses in order and get on the bandwagon of open markets. On the other, globalization is increasing economic inequalities both within and between countries, creating powerful constituencies that oppose it.

The peace process in the Middle East is running head-on into the political consequences. A significant segment of the Israeli population is fully plugged into the Internet. Indeed, Israel is becoming one of the world’s high-tech centers. This more cosmopolitan wing of the Israeli population supports the peace process. A deal with the Palestinians is the ticket to a more lucrative business environment.

But other sectors of the Israeli population are being left behind by globalization. The ultra-Orthodox and many immigrants from Jewish communities in North Africa do not have access to, or choose not to participate in, the advanced sectors of the economy. They only grow more resentful as the income gap widens. A peace deal with the Palestinians holds little allure, especially if it means uprooting Israelis from homes in the West Bank.

The same goes for the Palestinian community. The population in the West Bank and Gaza has a small economic elite. Many Palestinians have no ties to the global economy. They see the normalization of relations with Israel as a recipe for Israel’s economic domination of the region: First, they occupy our territory; next, they occupy the region by more subtle means.

The U.S. is the leading proponent of globalization, but its effect on the exercise of U.S. power is anything but clear. The inequities exacerbated by globalization have complicated the task of governing in the Middle East by creating multiple economies in a single country. Russia and China suffer the same problem. The growing clout of a rising middle class may well enable peace to prevail in the Middle East. But economically divided societies will make that peace a fragile one.

A final lesson from Camp David is that history, religion and ethnicity are alive and well in the Middle East, and in much of the rest of the world as well. Americans are therefore wrong to assume that the habits we take for granted at home also shape politics elsewhere. Societies outside North America and Western Europe generally play by different rules.

Unlike in the United States, where centuries of liberal democracy have succeeded in nurturing pluralism and multiethnic tolerance, Israel is in the midst of crafting its national identity and democratic institutions. When new immigrants enter the United States, they are drawn into a vast national melting pot. When new immigrants come to Israel, they fundamentally transform the nation. In a country of only 6 million, the arrival of nearly 1 million Russians changes the essential character of state. And given that immigrants from places like Russia, North Africa and Iraq have little democratic experience, it is no wonder that Israeli politics resemble professional wrestling.

The Palestinians have had even less experience with pluralist politics, contributing to the difficulty Arafat is having in erecting functioning government institutions. That’s only the beginning. Almost 1 million Arabs are Israeli citizens, but still have influence over Palestinian politics. More than 2 million Palestinian refugees reside just across Israel’s borders in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Arafat has no choice but to take regular soundings in major Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A tall order. But these are the challenges facing leaders in many parts of the world. Officials in Washington and the American people need to keep these realities in mind as their patience begins to wear thin.

All these obstacles to U.S. diplomacy are to blame for last week’s setback at Camp David. Whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, however, these roadblocks should not cause the United States to give up on bringing peace and democracy to regions wracked by violent conflict. On the contrary, awareness of the limits of U.S. power and of the presence of major obstacles are crucial to finding the patience and creativity needed to work through them.

A truly great power is not a state that always gets its way, but one that keeps trying even when it does not. Clinton is anything but a quitter. If his record is any indication, he will be using the final days of his presidency, his unlimited energy and America’s bounded but still robust influence to help guide the Israeli and Palestinian peoples to the lasting peace they fell just short of at Camp David.