His Stand on Milosevic Can Define Putin

Is the new president of Russia a democrat or an autocrat? The recent crackdown in Serbia provides a vital opportunity for President Clinton to find out during the summit with Vladimir V. Putin.

Facing a third major internal challenge to his rule, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has responded with unprecedented ruthlessness. Media have been crippled, universities shut down and journalists and members of the opposition arrested. The strategy appears to be working. In April, more than 100,000 Serbs protested the regime, and a student-led resistance seemed poised to evolve into a mass movement. In late May, barely 20,000 turned out.

Nevertheless, Milosevic is by no means assured of remaining in power. Political parties, opposition municipal governments and independent media survive, even in weakened form. The treasury reportedly is again thin on foreign reserves, which Milosevic depends on to buy police loyalty and to shore up the currency. And his indictment by the Hague tribunal guarantees his international isolation.

Milosevic needs friends, and his most reliable one these days is Putin. Before he put his foot down on dissent, Milosevic dispatched two top ministers to Moscow. Buoyed by pledges from Putin’s government, the crackdown began shortly after their return to Belgrade. The timing of the visit was no coincidence. (Russia later apologized for failing to arrest the Yugoslav defense minister, who also is indicted for war crimes.) The next week, Russia boycotted a major meeting of states overseeing the Bosnia peace agreement in solidarity with banned Yugoslavia.

Throughout the Yugoslav drama, Russia has played apologist and protector of “misunderstood” or endangered Serbs locked in ethnic conflicts. But no such pretext exists for Moscow’s current shilling for Milosevic. His conflict this time is not with Bosnian or Albanian Muslims, but with his own people--fellow Orthodox Slavs. And Russia’s support for Serbia, unlike its policy in Chechnya, is not an “internal matter” insulated from scrutiny. Bereft of cover, Putin must either stand with the Serb people or with their disastrous dictator.

Clinton should ask him to choose. The decision is hard for Putin, but not because of any sentiment of “Slavic brotherhood.” Moscow backs Milosevic precisely because he is a thorn in the side of Washington. He keeps NATO off-balance. Keen to control the pace and extent of further NATO expansion, Moscow leverages its influence over Belgrade to get its voice heard.

Not even Milosevic can last forever, and Putin is shrewd enough to hedge his bets. He did the minimum for visiting Serb opposition leaders last week, permitting them a modest reception. But the minimum is not good enough. Moscow must insist that Milosevic cease all intimidation of independent media and opposition figures, as well as hold fair elections. If Russia “was, is and will remain a European country,” as Putin stated to European Union leaders, then it should take a firm stand against Serbian repression.

Doing so neither weakens Russia’s role as protector of Orthodox Yugoslavs nor turns it into a servant of the West. Ironically, backing the forces of democratic change could heighten Moscow’s influence in post-Milosevic Yugoslavia. Politically, Putin can afford it. Russia’s pro-Serb Duma overwhelmingly voted him sweeping new powers. Further, standing with the Serbian opposition would define Putin as the Russian leader determined to join in defense of fundamental freedoms agreed to in the 1975 Helsinki accords on human rights. This would be a bonus for Putin, who is suspect for his own centralizing and anti-democratic tendencies.

Confronting Putin squarely on Serbia also will serve notice of Washington’s determination at a time when Putin and Milosevic may doubt NATO consensus and EU toughness. Indeed, failing to press Putin on the issue could reinforce the perception of hesitancy, encouraging Milosevic to try out his options. He could go on “good behavior” to try and bamboozle Europe into easing sanctions and letting him continue to rule. Or he may resort to his favorite ploy: provoking a crisis so as to turn all internal opponents into “traitors.”

Clinton should disabuse Putin--and through him, his client--of any question about our resolve or our willingness to entertain any option but Milosevic’s departure, preferably through fair, constitutional elections. The two leaders may come to an impasse over Serbia, but that is no reason to skirt the issue. Better a clear statement of difference than a fuzzy compromise. A healthy U.S.-Russian relationship can only develop if unclouded by illusions. And the more transparent Russian intentions toward the Balkans become, the less effective Russian advocacy for Milosevic’s cause will be.

At the summit, Clinton should let Putin choose what his Russia stands for: dictatorship or democracy.