Strike Now to Prevent War in the Taiwan Strait

Three decades of relative calm across the Taiwan Strait now may be coming to an end. We are rapidly approaching a decision period in which choices made in Beijing, Taipei and Washington will shape the nature of cross-strait relations--and the security environment in East Asia--for decades to come.

Taipei’s new leader, Chen Shui-bian, is exhibiting remarkable pragmatism. Beijing, for all its bellicose rhetoric, is pulling its punches. Washington is in that policy-reassessing mode that precedes a presidential election. This confluence of circumstances should prompt serious consideration of cross-strait issues in all three capitals. Yet the outcome is much in doubt. And with the Chinese Communist Party leadership set to meet in August to decide new policy, the time frame for action is short.

What for more than two decades has been a win-win-win situation is on the verge of becoming a losing proposition for all concerned. At stake is nothing less than the repolarization of Northeast Asia.

Two developments in May, however, may offer a short-lived opportunity for leaders in Washington, Beijing and Taipei to move toward breaking the action-reaction cycle that is remilitarizing the Taiwan Strait: the inauguration of Chen as Taiwan’s new president, and the House of Representatives vote in support of permanent normal trade relations for China and, with it, the likelihood of World Trade Organization membership for both China and Taiwan.

Despite Chen’s history as an advocate of an independent Taiwan, his tenuous hold on political power has impelled him to form a broad-based coalition government. In the interest of stabilizing cross-strait relations, he has disavowed moves toward independence and expressed a willingness to discuss “a future one China” with Beijing. His inaugural speech expressed commitment to “four no’s”--no declaration of independence, no changing the name of the island’s government, no changing the constitution to refer to “state-to-state” relations and no popular referendum on self-determination--on the condition that the mainland does not attack the island.

Will Beijing respond positively? Will Chinese leaders see in Chen the potential for a Nixon-like move toward a process of accommodation based on his ability to hold the support of independence-oriented elements in Taiwan’s political spectrum? Or will Beijing further polarize the strait with military threats, more missile deployments and efforts to destabilize Chen’s still-fragile government by playing the fragmented Kuomintang leadership against him? Beijing’s current wait-and-see approach to Chen is likely to shift as Communist Party leaders debate their Taiwan policy in the coming weeks.

A military solution to the dispute across the Taiwan Strait would be a lose-lose-lose situation. Alternatively, the “wise diplomacy” that Chen called for in his inaugural address could spawn a process of gradual confidence-building initiatives and eventual accommodation. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s aphorism when crafting the historic Shanghai Communique in 1972, statesmanship requires knowledge of what cannot be changed as well as an understanding of the scope available for creativity. The current predicament clamors for creative statecraft to prevent a return to hostile confrontation.

The United States has serious interests at stake here, and we have an opportunity to exert significant influence on the evolution toward a political process that would benefit all parties. In its recent dealings with Beijing, the United States has established the outermost parameters of a process of accommodation: President Clinton’s “three no’s” with respect to Taiwan (no U.S. support for independence, no U.N. membership and no “two Chinas”) and now support for permanent trade status for China. As we affirm the fourth “no” of our China policy--no use of force by Beijing in resolving Taiwan’s fate--as was validated in 1996 by the dispatch of U.S. 7th Fleet carriers to the strait, we can also put forth “four yeses.”

The elements of a more positive orientation in our China policy should include: support for Taiwan’s continuing self-rule as a political entity; expanded “space” for the island in international economic and social forums that don’t require state sovereignty; parity with Beijing in cross-strait talks; and support for the growth of Taiwan’s already multibillion-dollar economic interchanges with the mainland.

There is a window of opportunity of perhaps a few months (before Beijing sets new policies in concrete, or Chen’s “fundamentalists” take hold and accuse him of apostasy) to stimulate a return to cross-strait dialogue. To this end, the United States should:

* Privately encourage Beijing and Taipei to commence private “talks about talks.” Such dialogue might be based on the 1992 agreement to disagree about the meaning of “one China,” during a phase in which political overtures would take the place of military maneuvers.

* Actively support further attempts to advance practical cooperation in the areas of most salient common interest across the strait. Examples might include gradual implementation of direct communication and transport channels across the strait, enhanced cooperation as a result of WTO membership for both parties and modest security steps, such as the establishment of a hotline and prior notification of military exercises.

* Quietly facilitate “track II” encounters among officials and relevant experts from both sides of the strait. This should be done until an official dialogue gains traction. Thereafter, support the formal process.

* Urge all parties to adhere to a period of military restraint in which no party would unilaterally change the military balance. The U.S. should avoid provocative arms sales at this delicate time while maintaining its support for Taiwan’s security. Beijing should have no doubt about the support in Congress for Taiwan’s defense.

These moves may not succeed in activating a cross-strait political process. Yet the effort to exploit the current window of opportunity is well worth the risk of failure, for the alternative is further movement toward a remilitarized strait. In a cross-strait arms race, all sides would lose. China’s drive for modernization would constrict amid tensions that would arrest foreign investment and trade. And it would leave the United States caught in the middle, bearing the costs of an open-ended military confrontation--if not war--with China.

Richard H. Solomon, president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, served as assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and worked on the National Security Council staff under Henry Kissinger from 1971 to 1976. He was part of the U.S. delegation at the inauguration of Chen Shui-bian. Patrick M. Cronin is director of research and studies at the institute, an independent federal agency promoting research, education and training on international conflict prevention and management. Views represented here are their own.