Sierra Leone a Nadir for Once-Proud Peacekeepers

Just 12 years after it was judged worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize, U.N. peacekeeping has hit rock bottom in Sierra Leone, with troops so badly equipped and poorly led that they are unable even to protect themselves, let alone a highly vulnerable civilian population.

Although U.N. officials in the West African nation’s capital, Freetown, insist that they will not turn tail and run despite the humiliation of a rebel maneuver that cut off about 500 U.N. troops a little more than a week ago, supporters and critics of the world organization in the United States are grumbling that the United Nations seems incapable of stopping conflict.

For the U.S. government and its allies in the West, the U.N.’s loss of credibility presents a stark dilemma: to either put up with atrocities that mock their democratic ideals or send in their own troops to punish the world’s brutal thugs, probably suffering casualties in the process.

Hoping to avoid just such a choice, President Clinton late last week conferred with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, offering U.S. air transport and logistical support to the beleaguered U.N. force. But Washington also hedged its bet, offering encouragement to Nigeria to restore a Nigerian-led West African military force that was replaced by the U.N. last month.

Military and political strategists say there is blame enough to go around in the U.N.’s Sierra Leone fiasco. Member countries contributed troops that were too few in number and lacked adequate training, arms and leadership. Annan and his staff sent the force to Sierra Leone even though they knew, or should have known, that it was inadequate. And the United States and other major powers didn’t follow through on their implied promise to use as much force as necessary to punish any group that threatened the peacekeepers.

“Peacekeepers are always lightly armed forces, but there used to be an understanding that if they were attacked, there would be backup,” said Edward Luck, a U.N. supporter and author of the book “Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919-1999.” “They sent the peacekeepers off with antiquated maps, no artillery, little firepower and no backup.”

Luck said Annan and his aides must do a better job of evaluating potential peacekeeping operations and taking on only those that offer a chance of success, even if that requires resisting the directives of the U.N. Security Council.

“I know it’s very hard for U.N. officials to say no to the Security Council, but there could have been a more public effort to resist this badly prepared mission,” he said. “The U.N. staff is required to put forward a plan for operations. In this plan there should be a built-in standard of what kinds of forces and what kinds of training and what kinds of equipment are needed.

“If the international community comes up with less than that, the secretary-general has the obligation to tell the Security Council and the world that this is not doable.”

In Sierra Leone, U.N. planning was corrupted by wishful thinking. If the rebels of Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front had abided by a peace agreement they signed in July, the U.N. force could have been effective in keeping the peace. But all of the evidence pointed the other way.

Over the years, successful U.N. operations have almost always involved conflicts where the combatants were tired of fighting but didn’t trust their opponents to abide by a peace agreement.

In such disputes, the U.N. can offer needed stability without having to fight. There has been a 1,000-strong U.N. force deployed between Israeli and Syrian positions in the Golan Heights since 1974, without having to engage in combat. About 2,100 U.N. troops in Cyprus have been put to similar use since 1964 separating ethnic Greeks and Turks.

But that was clearly not the case in Sierra Leone. And in the wake of the Sierra Leone disaster, the U.N. and its member states may be reluctant to commit troops to Congo, where a peacekeeping operation is under discussion, or to other African countries.

“It is a black eye to the U.N. peacekeeping initiative, no question about that,” said Walter Kansteiner, an Africa expert for the Scowcroft Group, a Washington think tank headed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. “When you get 400 to 500 men captured, something went wrong. It makes all other Africa peacekeeping a tougher sell.”

Kansteiner said it may be time to abandon U.N. operations in favor of ad hoc coalitions of regional powers, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo province, the former Australian-led contingent in East Timor and the Nigerian-led force that was in Sierra Leone until it was replaced by U.N. forces.

“The U.N. doesn’t have the stomach for it,” Kansteiner said. “The best outcome would be for the Nigerians to agree to go back in with international support.”

Defense ministers and military chiefs of the Economic Community of West African States will meet in Nigeria on Wednesday to consider sending a Nigerian-led force back to Sierra Leone, either independently or as part of the U.N. deployment.

Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, elected last year, made the withdrawal of his country’s troops from Sierra Leone a major campaign promise. But U.S. officials believe that he would relent if the United States and the rest of the international community agreed to put up most of the money. Clinton has indicated that he is willing to do that.

“It is clear that the Nigerians are asking for U.S. logistical support and air transport support,” said Rep. Ed Royce (R-Fullerton), chairman of the House Africa subcommittee. He said Congress is ready to provide that kind of assistance.

The alternative, he said, is to reward Sankoh and his rebels for their brutal terror tactics.

“If this kind of terror proves successful in Sierra Leone, it will spread to [the rest of] West Africa,” Royce said. “Thugs around the world will say, ‘Foday Sankoh has the tactic for terror--we need to maim the children.’ ”

Nevertheless, turning to ad hoc coalitions is at best an expedient approach. The U.N. process forms a legal basis for intervention, one that the United States and its allies would prefer to preserve.

“I think it is too soon to announce this as a failure,” David Welch, assistant secretary of State for international organization affairs, said recently. But he acknowledged that Sierra Leone is “a grievous setback” for the U.N. system.

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LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

The U.N. said it probably will be in Sierra Leone for the long run, raising residents’ hopes. A11