A Myopic Focus Has Led to Barak’s Failing Vision

Inside his inner sanctum, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak tries to keep up the appearance of business as usual.

It is scarcely hours since Barak ordered airstrikes against key political offices belonging to Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. But secretaries are serving coffee, and a high-level German delegation waits patiently on upholstered sofas. The air of urgency comes only from the uniformed military commanders who rush in and out.

Business is far from usual, of course. Barak, who rose decisively to power last year with a dazzling vow to make peace, now heads a country rapidly descending into a protracted guerrilla war.

His vision is crumbling. His legacy is evaporating. His future looks bleak.

Yet he rarely shows the strain publicly, and those who work closely with him say Barak clings to a gossamer of hope that he can somehow reverse the military and political deterioration around him.

Such is his absolute--some would say arrogant--conviction that he is right. The same determination pushed him headlong into the pursuit of a settlement with Arafat, whether or not the Palestinian leader, or the Israeli public, was ready.

Barak’s landslide election in May 1999 was greeted in much of Israel and the rest of the world with euphoria and hope that a long-stalemated peace process would finally be revived. He cultivated the image of warrior dove, a man of legendary military abilities who would lead his people to a definitive end to the conflict like Moses leading his people to the promised land.

His vision of peace, however, turned out to be very different from that of his mentor, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister assassinated in 1995 for embarking on a landmark dialogue with Arafat. Where the process launched by the so-called Oslo accords in 1993 involved the gradual building of confidence while exchanging land for peace--and dragged on for seven years without conclusion--Barak contemplated resolving all of the last and most complicated issues dividing Israelis and Palestinians within 15 months.

Despite the high expectations invested in him, Barak never achieved a relationship of trust with his Palestinian interlocutors; in fact, the rapport was based on mistrust and long-held pessimistic perceptions hatched in Barak’s army days. The give and take of negotiation was anathema to him, say several people who have worked with Barak.

Now many of the same Israelis who led the cheers predict that Barak will go down in history as the shortest-serving prime minister in the history of the Jewish state.

It has become a cliche to explain Barak through his history as a highly decorated army commander who led dangerous operations into enemy territory. Yet it is a background that explains both his intensity and myopic focus on goals, as well as his lack of political knack and diplomatic agility.

“Of all Israel’s prime ministers, Barak is the most controlled, most disciplined and least panicky,” said Yaron Ezrahi, a political analyst and writer who has known Barak for years. “He has nerves of iron.”

Crisis does not fluster Barak. But he does make political mistakes that are sometimes surprising in their scope and preventability, especially given his keen mind.

For example, he has neglected to show even minimal respect for Israeli Arabs, who voted overwhelmingly for him after he campaigned on an end to endemic discrimination against the 1-million-strong community. Squandered as a constituency by Barak, many Israeli Arabs have instead lent support to the Palestinian uprising.

Another mistake, in the eyes of many here: By barreling ahead to a final settlement, Barak was trying to impose a political logic, complete with artificial deadlines, on a historical process, one that needed decades to be fully realized.

In the meantime, Barak’s political strength has been sapped.

To stay in power, in a country where parliament regularly threatens to oust the prime minister, Barak has chosen to sacrifice many of his basic campaign pledges, or to bounce from one promise to another. No Israeli prime minister has much room to maneuver, because the system endows the tiniest special-interest parties with inordinate influence. But a more deft politician can manage.

Responding to opinion polls, Barak lost many of the very people who elected him. The secular Jewish Israeli public was dismayed to see him go back on a promise to limit the power of the ultra-Orthodox. And while Barak spoke of pursuing peace, his government allowed the building of illicit Jewish settlements in the West Bank at a swift pace to appease the right wing.

That disconnect angered and confused not only many of his Israeli supporters but also the Palestinians.

“Barak is extremely decisive and clear about what he is saying and planning,” Ezrahi said. “But in his actions he has been very shifty. It is based on military doctrine [that values] improvisation on the battlefield. He has no qualms about changing course.”

Barak and his aides put the blame for their unraveling mission squarely on Arafat, who they argue refused to accept the best deal he could expect from an Israeli leader, including roughly 95% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and some control over parts of Jerusalem.

“At the moment of truth, Arafat could not overcome his inherent inclination to squeeze the lemon more and more,” Barak’s head of office, Gilead Sher, said in an interview. “Of course we are frustrated. Especially since everything is happening in one man’s [Arafat’s] head.”

Sher, who is also one of Barak’s principal negotiators, bristled with indignation when he described a dinner that Barak hosted for Arafat at the prime minister’s home exactly one week before violence began to sweep the region.

Arafat “sat in Barak’s home,” Sher said, “ate his food” and was “served by his wife”--only to leave that night and dispatch negotiators to Washington, where they would reject a final best offer being drafted by President Clinton.

As far as the Palestinians were concerned, however, the package was far from sufficient. In their view, the Israelis were ignoring the Palestinian belief that they had already sacrificed most of their claim to historical Palestine. And the Palestinians resented the favorable press and fawning attention that Barak received in the U.S. and especially at the White House. The Barak they were sitting down with was not the Barak they saw portrayed.

Israelis who know Barak say that his view of “negotiations” is to offer a proposal and to expect his adversary to take it or leave it. Supporters say his single-minded forcefulness is necessary to cinch a deal; his critics say it makes real compromise impossible. It certainly did not sit well with the Palestinians.

“Do you know how Barak spoke with Arafat?” senior Palestinian official Yasser Abed-Rabbo told the Israeli daily Maariv last week. “He spoke in a manner which would not have succeeded in convincing my grandmother, to whom I am a good grandson. There was the kind of talk there which did not persuade anybody, like: ‘We want peace,’ ‘Peace is important for everybody.’ Empty slogans.”

Ahmed Tibi, formerly a senior advisor to Arafat and now a member of the Israeli parliament, said Barak’s disdain for Arafat has never been concealed.

“He didn’t create an atmosphere of partnership,” Tibi said. “He tried to dictate solutions and impose them on the Palestinians. He never related to Arafat as a partner.”

One of Barak’s basic flaws, according to people who know him, is that he doesn’t consult with experts or others who are knowledgeable about the matter at hand--or, as one associate put it, he consults with many but listens to no one.

Barak has been soundly criticized for failing to incorporate into his peace mission those who have been its godfathers, such as Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, sidelined from any negotiations, and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, relegated to a meaningless Cabinet position until this past week. Finally, with violence spiraling out of control, Barak consented to Peres’ demands to be allowed to broker a truce with Arafat.

The disappointment in Barak is highlighted now against the backdrop of the fifth anniversary of Rabin’s assassination, which Israelis began commemorating over the weekend. Barak had been cast as the heir to the Rabin vision, even though he was no fan of the Oslo process that is Rabin’s legacy. And so, not surprisingly, it is Rabin’s family that is most critical in assessing Barak’s abilities.

“One of the things that bothers me the most is that I still can’t figure out if he is in favor of the peace process or against it,” Rabin’s son, Yuval, told the Yerushalayim weekly magazine. “If all along the way you use every possible delay tactic and drag your feet as much as possible, and display obvious lack of will, then the other side reads you well.”

And Rabin’s widow, Leah, after writing a letter to Barak last week to insist he take advantage of Peres’ expertise, went on national radio to scold Barak for his dismissive attitude toward Arafat.

“I would turn to Barak, me personally, and ask him, ‘Ehud, for once, put your political disgust aside because peace is bigger,’ ” Leah Rabin said. “ ‘And if you cooperate, and if you delve into the making of peace, I believe that your political status will also be saved, because this is what we are waiting for.’ ”

Barak’s inner circle insists that he hasn’t given up on settling with Arafat. Despite the animosity between them, Barak ultimately won’t let any contempt for the Palestinian leader get in the way, say those who know him.

“Ehud will be offended if it serves a purpose,” said Barak’s brother Avinoam Brog. “But if it doesn’t serve a purpose, it doesn’t influence his modus operandi. . . . He’s a pragmatist.”