Sub Skipper Is Forced Into Retirement

The skipper of the U.S. submarine that sank a Japanese fishing vessel was forced into retirement Monday by the Pacific Fleet’s top admiral, who accused him of dereliction of duty in the collision that killed nine crew members and students on the trawler.

Adm. Thomas Fargo told Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle that he could either retire--with full pension benefits--or face a “show-cause” hearing in which he would have to explain why he should not be booted out of the Navy because of the Feb. 9 collision with the Ehime Maru.

Waddle, 41, a Naval Academy graduate, said he would submit his retirement. After the hourlong meeting in Fargo’s office at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Waddle issued a statement saying that Fargo had treated him “fairly and with dignity and respect.”

“While I regret that my Navy career has ended in this way,” Waddle’s statement said, “I know that I am one of the lucky ones because I survived the accident. My heart aches for the losses suffered by the families killed aboard the Ehime Maru. . . . I think about those lost at sea every day and I grieve for their families.”

Fargo, a former submarine captain, could have ordered Waddle to face criminal charges at a court-martial, with the possibility that a conviction could have led to a prison sentence. Instead, he accepted the unanimous recommendation of a three-admiral court of inquiry to hold an “admiral’s mast” for Waddle.

“For a Naval officer who has served his country for 20 years,” Fargo told a news conference, “I would tell you that this is devastating. He [Waddle] has paid dearly.”

Bringing an end to the official inquiry, Fargo also ordered Petty Officer 1st Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest, a sonar analyst, to a “captain’s mast” for punishment for having failed to inform Waddle that the 190-foot trawler was closing rapidly.

He also ordered that three other officers and two enlisted sailors be reprimanded and that changes be made in the Navy’s Distinguished Visitors public relations program.

Fargo said that civilians aboard the nuclear attack sub Greeneville that day did not cause the accident but they did “prove to be a distraction to the commanding officer [and] hindered the normal flow of [sonar] information.”

In addressing Fargo, Waddle took full responsibility for the accident, which occurred when the 6,500-ton submarine was executing a “rapid surfacing maneuver” to impress 16 civilians. The sub smashed into the trawler, which sank in 10 minutes in 2,000 feet of water.

Fargo ordered reprimands for Capt. Robert L. Brandhuber, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, and senior enlisted sailors Douglas Coffman and Edward McGibboney. He decided against a recommendation from the court of inquiry to admonish Lt. Cmdr. Dave Werner, the public affairs officer who arranged the VIP cruise.

Brandhuber, Pfeifer and Coen were cited for not taking action when they felt Waddle was cutting corners on safety. Coffman and McGibboney were cited for allowing inexperienced sailors to work without proper supervision at sonar stations.

Fargo said that fleet commanders should keep close tabs on the Navy’s Distinguished Visitors public relations program so that submarines are not set to sea solely to accommodate civilians. Also, he said civilians should not be allowed at control stations, as they were on the Greeneville.

As a commander with 20 years of service, Waddle will immediately receive a pension of $34,741 a year, with medical benefits, annual cost of living increases, survivor benefits, and commissary and base exchange privileges.

Waddle’s attorney, Charles Gittins, said his client has several job offers. Officers and enlisted personnel from the Navy’s submarine fleet--considered an elite within the Navy--are highly prized by private industry.

In his statement, Waddle said he continues to endorse the concept that a captain at sea is responsible for any mistakes or problems.

“This hearing and the punishment imposed reaffirm that bedrock principle of command accountability,” the statement said.

Waddle said he hopes the U.S. government “will promptly and fairly settle all claims made by the families against the U.S. as a result of this accident.” Negotiations concerning such claims have hit an apparent snag because of attempts by the U.S. to limit damages to $1 million per family.

Fargo indicated that he will put a punitive letter into Waddle’s personnel file. He also will dock him the equivalent of one month’s pay, although that punishment will be delayed six months and left open to review.

Waddle said his retirement will be effective by Oct. 1, although he is expected to spend his final months using up accumulated vacation time.

Before the collision, Waddle, a broad-shouldered, gregarious officer revered by many of the enlisted personnel on his submarine, had been tentatively selected for promotion to captain.

He was highly rated by his bosses; the Greeneville, a nuclear-powered attack submarine designed to hunt down and kill enemy subs or launch Tomahawk missiles at land targets, was considered one of the best in the Navy. When the Navy wanted to “show off” its submarine fleet for civilians or journalists, it turned to Waddle and the Greeneville.

The court of inquiry faulted Waddle for a series of mistakes that kept the Greeneville from realizing the Ehime Maru was moving rapidly toward the location where the sub planned to rocket to the surface.

Among Waddle’s mistakes were doing a risky maneuver such as a rapid ascent while an important display monitor giving the location of surface ships was broken. Waddle also only did an 80-second periscope search--rather than the standard three-minute search--and did not allow sufficient time for sonar technicians to take further readings before he ordered the “emergency blow.”

Fargo said Waddle created “an artificial sense of urgency” because he was eager to get the civilians back to Pearl Harbor.

The court criticized Waddle for creating a “command climate” in which officers and enlisted personnel were reluctant to provide backup data such as information about surface contacts.

While Fargo’s decision not to order a court-martial angered many family members of those killed, it is squarely within U.S. Navy tradition. Few captains are charged criminally for collisions at sea, even those in which people are killed.

In attempting to explain to the Japanese families the decision not to order a court-martial, Navy officials stressed that punishment under an admiral’s mast would be swift and certain but that a court-martial might lead to acquittal.

Retired Vice Adm. Bernard Kauderer, former commander of the Pacific and Atlantic submarine fleets, said he thought Fargo’s decision to force Waddle into retirement was “severe but appropriate,” and would not hurt morale among submariners.

Fargo said a case study will be made of the incident to be studied by all sub captains and prospective captains. “It will serve to remind all that, no matter how apparently routine the mission, there is nothing about going to sea that is forgiving.”

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

A Series of Mistakes, Then Tragedy

From the start of the Feb. 9 voyage of the Greeneville, there were ominous signs. A video display system wasn’t working. Trainees were manning stations without supervision. The executive officer didn’t speak up when he saw a problem. But the most striking testimony implicated Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle and Petty Officer Patrick Thomas Seacrest, the sonar analyst. While Waddle put the 6,500-ton nuclear submarine through a series of swift turns, Seacrest missed signs that the Japanese fishing trawler was closing in, leaving the sub crew unaware of the dangers above. A look at the final minutes before the collison with the 190-foot Ehime Maru that left nine people dead:

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Sources: Staff reports; U.S. Navy; National Transportation Safety Board; the Honolulu Advertiser

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Special correspondent Susan Essoyan in Honolulu contributed to this story.