Ousting Hussein: Reality Check

Saddam Hussein’s iron grip on Iraq remains as firm as ever, while across much of the Arab world admiration for him has grown as a result of his decade-long defiance of U.N. Security Council sanctions and especially of U.S. efforts to bring him down. All this has left Washington frustrated and casting about for some means, short of direct American military action, to overthrow the dictator, whose imperial ambitions assure that Iraq will remain a threat to regional security.

Almost four years ago Congress let itself be persuaded that Iraqi opposition forces operating from outside the country could become the vehicle for ending Hussein’s rule. In 1998 Congress authorized $97 million to train and equip forces that would be provided by the anti-Hussein Iraqi National Congress (INC), an organization lacking any discernible base of support in Iraq. The result of this effort has been more of an embarrassment to the United States than a danger to Hussein.

None of Iraq’s neighbors, except possibly Iran, takes the INC seriously. Part of the problem is Ahmad Chalabi, the INC’s front man, who is regarded with derision by other Arab leaders. Chalabi has refused to share power in the INC with Kurds and other major Iraqi groups, with the result that the organization has splintered. But Chalabi still commands some support in Congress. The Bush administration, while denying it is ready to give up on Chalabi and the INC, is nonetheless looking for alternatives.

Frustration seldom gives birth to sound policy ideas, and hoping that Hussein can be gotten rid of by financing and training an outside group to energize domestic opposition is self-deluding. Iraq is one of the world’s most intensive police states, where the slightest suspicion of disloyalty can lead to imprisonment and death. If Saddam Hussein is ever deposed it almost certainly will be by elements of his own security services or military, and even that is highly problematical given the pervasiveness of Hussein’s internal spy network. The Bush administration is rightly looking for new approaches to an Iraq policy. It should begin with understanding what is realistically achievable.