The Consequences of ‘Afghanistan Fatigue’

The Afghan people have not had an easy couple of decades. They suffered through a brutal war against the invading Soviets during the 1980s. Then came the internecine tribal battles of the early 1990s. Now they are prisoners of the cult-like Taliban. And although the United States owes the Afghans a debt of gratitude for delivering a decisive blow in the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have been sadly oblivious to their plight until now.

In 1996, in an attempt to get policymakers and the American public to engage with the ongoing issues facing Afghanistan, I helped form and then headed a nonprofit policy group called the Afghanistan Foundation (now called the Afghanistan-America Foundation). I wish I could say our mission was successful. By the time we formed, the United States had virtually washed its hands of the region--perhaps you could call it Afghanistan fatigue. That disengagement was a very big mistake.

The Afghanistan Foundation tried over five years to sound the alarm. We held meetings and forums bringing Afghans together with ambassadors, members of Congress, scholars and the press. We also embarked on a “white paper” project to lay out clearly in a single document both the present situation and strategies for the future. The goal was to spur dormant bureaucracies--the departments of State and Defense, the CIA, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the White House--into involvement and action. The project was led by Afghanistan-born Zalmay M. Khalilzad, currently on the National Security Council and formerly a Rand Corp. strategist and official in the Reagan and Bush administrations. A group of us traveled to Afghanistan to observe the situation firsthand.

After many discussions over more than a year, we produced in the summer of 1999 a document emphasizing the need for greater U.S. involvement in the region with a primary focus on Afghanistan. First and foremost, the paper urged Washington policymakers to “develop a coherent, effective and sustainable policy to reduce the problems in Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” It further argued for a large increase in the commitment of intelligence, diplomatic and economic resources to the region. (See sidebar for excerpts from the final report.)

In retrospect, with the knowledge of what happened on Sept. 11, these seem like obvious ideas, small investments that might have had a real impact. But at the time, they were viewed--when we could get people to listen--as unnecessary, too difficult or too costly. The U.S. State Department was not particularly focused on Afghanistan--indeed the whole South Asia desk at State was woefully understaffed. Although it should have been clear that Afghanistan was a catastrophe waiting to happen, and we knew that India and Pakistan were busy testing nuclear weapons and fighting a war over Kashmir, the nation’s diplomatic resources were spread far too thin. There was no coordination to speak of between State, Defense, the NSC and the DEA.

The Clinton administration, too, seemed aloof to the region’s troubles. Osama bin Laden was a priority, but his Afghan support base was not, something the white paper noted with alarm. “Although the threat from Bin Laden has drawn high-level attention,” it stated, “Afghanistan itself must stop being a minor foreign policy concern and become an administration priority.”

The report further warned that the Taliban “actively supported groups that use violence against the United States and its allies” and advised that “Washington should work to reverse this trend.” It warned that Taliban-like Islamic fundamentalism was spreading to other countries.

Those engaged in the white-paper process considered several U.S. policy alternatives for dealing with the Taliban, finally concluding that we should adopt a strategy of “weakening and transformation.” It suggested that the U.S. would first need to “weaken the Taliban through military stalemate.” It suggested that we should “pressure Pakistan and others to end support for the Taliban” and “explore ways to assist foes of the Taliban in their struggle.” It encouraged U.S. support of “new leaders who are not tied to warring factions” as well as “King [Mohammad Zaher] Shah’s recent initiative to bring together Afghan moderates.”

The report was well-received by some 30 Afghanistan experts--from Congress, the White House and academia--who convened to review the work and offer suggestions. After revisions prompted by the outside experts’ suggestions, the report was distributed to some 400 policymakers. High-level officials read and said they agreed with the report. But nothing changed. Why? Afghanistan policy is complicated. The recommendations would have taken personnel and money. Bureaucracies are tough to nudge out of inertia. The Clinton administration failed to lead. In other words, the usual reasons.

Today, the U.S. is finally pursuing many of our recommendations. It’s unfortunate it took a tragedy of epic proportions to provide the impetus.