Germany Can Fill the Peacemaker Vacuum

Since the United States is unwilling or unable to get involved in the Middle East crisis, can the European Union step in and fill the diplomatic vacuum? It cannot and should not. But Germany can and should.

There is no one reason why Germany, Europe’s largest power, can succeed where so many others have failed. Some have to do with the U.S. withdrawal from the activist role it played during the Clinton years; other reasons have to do with Israel’s longtime antipathy toward and distrust of European positions. Germany, however, possesses some positive attributes. It may seem ironic, but German-Israeli relations in the post-Holocaust era have succeeded in winning the confidence of many Israelis. For the Palestinians, who have grown weary of the Americans and have long contended that Europe should be more involved in the Middle East, Germany is the quintessential European power.

Before Germany’s potential role can be appreciated, it is critical to understand where the Middle East peace process is. As the attempt by Arab countries to equate Zionism and racism at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, and the collapse of the peace movement in Israel demonstrate, the Middle East has returned to the dark days of the 1970s. Both sides are convinced that the other does not want peace; what’s more, this attitude permeates almost all levels of society in Israel and the Arab world. To restart negotiations and shatter the new pessimistic tone in the region, new ideas and a great deal of symbolism are needed.

The United States has run out of ideas. It’s not that the Bush administration isn’t interested in finding a way out of the current impasse. Rather, its priorities lie elsewhere. It may even be that some in the administration think that the two sides have not suffered enough to really want a solution. Whatever the reason, the reality is that if former President Bill Clinton, with his tremendous persuasive powers and ability to master complex problems, could not push through a compromise at Camp David, it’s unlikely that President Bush can similarly pull out all the stops and succeed.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has produced an unintended benefit to the Bush administration, though. The Iraq issue has lost its primacy for the governments and peoples of the region. Saddam Hussein no longer captivates the attention or even the imagination of Arabs on the street. The Palestinian issue has displaced him. This may make him more adventurous and reckless, but, in the meantime, it relieves the pressure on the administration to come up with an Iraq policy quickly.

The European Union may have an idea or two, but its decision-making structure, which has been incapable of building a meaningful consensus among its 15 constituent governments, lacks the creativity and agility to be a credible player in the Middle East. Furthermore, the European Union, as a whole, has alienated the Israelis to the point that it can no longer act as a viable candidate to conduct or initiate negotiations.

True, Norway played a critical role in getting the peace process going in the 1990s. This time, however, the Middle East needs a country with far greater clout than Norway’s, one willing to expend energy and bring a new approach to the table.

Germany is the ideal candidate, not because it has a spotless record, but because it has a checkered past. The weight of history means that it is unlikely to rush to judgment. Under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s government and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Germany has eschewed a muscular foreign policy and will not be seen internationally as having strategic ambitions in the Middle East. The Germans have debated such divisive issues as their participation in the Balkans and produced reasoned policies. Helping resolve the crisis in the Middle East would be a decisive way for the current German generation to turn the tables on its parents’ sins. Israel, on the other hand, cannot dismiss German concerns and, indirectly, European ones easily: Even with complete U.S. support, Israel’s complex links to Europe, including its free-trade agreement, make it vulnerable to European pressure.

For Palestinians, an activist Germany, even if acting alone, would bring with it an unmistakable European imprimatur. Palestinians cannot complain, especially if the EU continues to be an ineffective secondary player. In the 1990s, Palestinians received a tremendous flow of resources from Europe. Even if most of this money was squandered, the fact remains that their Arab brothers have been good on the rhetorical front but have delivered little of substance over the years. Germany’s central role in European integration and prosperity is likely to increase as the European Union migrates to the new currency, the euro, in January.

But for Germany to take to the stage, it needs either a more activist foreign policy, which it has shied away from, or an activist leader, which it does have. Fischer has demonstrated on two occasions that if given an opportunity, he is willing to push for results in ways hitherto uncharacteristic of German foreign policy. For example, in the aftermath of a devastating suicide bombing at a Tel Aviv disco, Fischer, who was in Israel at the time, single-handedly persuaded Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat to declare a cease-fire. More recently, he convinced Shimon Peres, the Israeli foreign minister, and Arafat to commit to a face-to-face dialogue in Berlin. No date has been set.

Fischer, just like Germany, does not have a spotless record. What qualifies him for a role in the Middle East is that he has traveled the political spectrum, changed his ideas and has come to embrace non-violence in a passionate, yet principled fashion.

If Fischer and Germany can introduce fresh faces and venues to the Middle East peace process, what’s still needed are some new ideas to jump-start negotiations. The contours of the ultimate solution are known to most: Israel will ultimately withdraw, Palestinians will get their state. The debate is really about what kind of territorial and symbolic compromises will make this possible. The United States can support a German-initiated endeavor knowing that the final push and the signatures on the dotted line cannot realistically be accomplished without Washington’s presence and influence. But we are a long way off from that moment.