Coalition of Exceptional Depth Is Forming

Britain contributed crack commandos for advance reconnaissance. Tajikistan opened its military bases, while New Zealand offered naval patrol vessels. The Czech Republic increased security at nuclear power plants, while St. Croix heightened protection of its giant oil refinery.

Mexico tracked hotel registrations for “unusual” visitors. Cambodia ordered banks to freeze accounts of suspected terrorists. And little Grenada introduced parcel checks at St. George’s University to protect its students from the U.S.

Almost every nation is doing something in response to America’s call for a war on terrorism--in some cases, even if it hasn’t been asked. But unlike the Persian Gulf War coalition that united 38 nations to liberate Kuwait, the new global alliance is bringing together more than 100 countries in what amounts to four coalitions with distinct but overlapping missions.

And for all the rhetoric about retaliation, the smallest part of the coalition’s activities may well involve military action. If all goes as planned, the military’s role in the war against terrorism could be as little as 10% to 15% of the campaign, administration officials contend.

What happens outside Afghanistan’s borders also will be more important than whatever the United States does inside the war-ravaged country to track down Osama bin Laden and his allies in Al Qaeda. The new coalition’s long-term cohesion in pursuing a wide array of other assignments will, in the end, be more important than the magnitude of short-term military action, according to military analysts, counter-terrorism experts and diplomats.

“We’ve used cruise missiles before, said retired Gen. Wesley K. Clark, the former supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “They’re effective in hitting targets and they might disrupt ongoing planning and activities of terrorists. But a military strike or two will not resolve the problem. The key to winning this war is maintaining strong coalition support, strong enough that countries can take action inside their own borders to help us. And that’s going to be harder than military action.”

The alliance behind Operation Enduring Freedom starts out large and diverse--and the sign-up isn’t over. But the scope of its ambition and membership makes it highly vulnerable to defections and eventual disintegration.

The alliance’s strength may be its unique structure. In essence, it consists of four circles within its larger circle. And while the Persian Gulf War coalition had a single grand military strategy to evict Iraq, the new coalition has four strategies.

At the center of the coalition is a small circle of countries around Afghanistan that are central to most aspects of the war on terrorism--such as providing intelligence in tracking extremists and their plots, military and legal assistance in nabbing them and bringing them to justice, locating and cutting off financial assets and unraveling the wide network of cells that has penetrated an estimated 60 to 70 countries. And that’s the agenda just for phase one of the war: dealing with Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, a deadly and widespread terrorist organization.

The critical countries in the first circle are Pakistan, Russia and most of the Central Asian “stans”--Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan--on the Afghan border. Pakistan has the most influence on the Taliban government and, in turn, on Bin Laden and his operatives in Afghanistan; Russia and the other “stans” have military and air bases, intelligence and access routes for military operations.

But the participation of Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin offer microcosms of the coalition’s vulnerabilities, for each has his own agenda.

In a recent speech to his nation, Musharraf justified aiding the United States not on grounds of fighting terrorism, but for reasons involving Pakistan’s economy and the country’s “national survival” in its rivalry with India, with which Washington increasingly had been siding. And Putin’s biggest internal threat is the Chechen war, which Russia views as terrorism but which the U.S. has seen as a struggle for autonomy, to the point of criticizing Moscow for serious human rights violations in the conflict.

To keep both on board, the Bush administration now is paying more attention to Pakistan’s military regime, while President Bush last week for the first time criticized aspects of the Chechen rebellion as extremist and said some rebels had links to Al Qaeda.

“We know that countries will not play unless they feel it’s also in their national interests,” conceded a senior administration official who asked to remain anonymous. “As time passes, some of the costs are going to be hard to justify to keep leaders on board. The president and secretary of State have their work cut out for them.”

Efforts to strengthen ties with Russia in the anti-terrorism effort proceeded Saturday on two fronts in Moscow. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton met with Russian Foreign Ministry officials, while a delegation from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov.

The alliance’s second circle is made up of U.S. allies in NATO, the European Union, Australia and Japan. Some countries have offered elite troops for commando operations, according to European envoys and U.S. officials. Most have promised landing rights for military planes, overflight rights and logistical support.

But the more important contribution in each country will come at home. While the Persian Gulf War coalition drew a single “line in the sand” against one visible army in the distant Arabian desert, the new coalition has no front line--and the Hydra-headed enemy lives in the shadows, a few maybe even down the street. So the primary mission for the nations in the second circle will be providing intelligence about Al Qaeda and extremists in Europe and unraveling the financial networks.

“The Arabs all say the Bin Laden network is much stronger in Britain or France than anywhere in the Arab world, because no Arab state will tolerate them,” the senior administration official said.

In this context, the European Union’s move to create a common arrest warrant for terrorist suspects and commit new manpower to probe everything from money laundering to cyber-terrorism may be more useful than military assistance, U.S. officials say. Even the historically neutral Swiss have imposed financial regulations on companies associated with the Taliban.

The coalition’s third circle consists of Islamic and Arab countries, which are more pivotal to the United States than they were during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Their stamp of approval is critical in showing that this war is not against Islam and does not herald a “clash of civilizations” that once again could divide the world into camps.

Support from Islamic and Arab countries is not just a matter of providing political cover, as was the case in 1990-91. “During the Gulf War no one ever really thought that anyone but the Americans, Brits and French would do the heavy lifting,” said Milt Bearden, a former intelligence specialist who spent years in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. “This time, many Muslims and Muslim states will be important operationally.”

For the war’s first phase, several countries--including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman along the Persian Gulf--have promised access to ports for U.S. warships or military bases for warplanes. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the only two countries besides Pakistan to have had diplomatic relations with the Taliban, have cut off relations and quietly have exerted pressure on the Afghan government.

Yet the Islamic bloc is the most fragile part of the coalition because of the high potential for domestic backlash. Virtually every Muslim country has an Islamist movement, and many have militant wings. With support already precarious, pictures of civilian deaths from U.S. strikes could ignite the streets of the Islamic world.

To aid Jordan’s ability to stay on board, the White House finally won congressional approval of the long-delayed U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.

The third circle’s role down the road will be even more important when the United States tackles the broader issue of other terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and other state sponsors, such as Libya, Syria and Iran.

The alliance’s final circle is the vast array of countries with disparate secondary roles. They range from the Philippines reopening old naval bases for U.S. warships to Cyprus monitoring traffic at airports and seaports for extremists in transit.

Many are crucial to tracing the terrorists’ financial assets. The Cayman Islands is probing its offshore banks; Brazil and Venezuela are checking onshore accounts. Guatemala put a money-laundering bill with tools to track terrorist funds on a legislative fast track; Hong Kong is drafting laws to seize assets linked to Al Qaeda.

For now, commitment within the four circles remains high. But the longer the war goes on, the greater the danger that they gradually will unravel, U.S. officials admit.

In a mere six weeks, the Persian Gulf War coalition swiftly achieved its limited objective and then began to disintegrate because of differences concerning postwar policy. In contrast, the new coalition may take years to make a serious dent in its sweeping goal--and is much more vulnerable to disintegration or defections long before it gets there.

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Times staff writer Maura Reynolds in Moscow and researcher Robin Cochran in Washington contributed to this report.