Acts of Desperation

Al Qaeda leaders have recently unleashed a new campaign of psychological warfare. Hardly a week goes by without the terror network issuing threats against Westerners, particularly Americans.

At times the Bush administration appears to fall prey to this campaign by sending ambiguous messages to the American people about the efficacy of its efforts to eradicate terror and ensure their security. Fearing the worst, an FBI internal assessment two weeks ago warned the nation to brace itself for “spectacular” attacks by Al Qaeda.

Critics of the administration swiftly expressed their dismay that it has failed to locate Osama bin Laden or to eliminate him. They also accused the administration of a lack of focus in the fight against Al Qaeda and of being distracted by its potential military plans for Iraq.

Administration aides offered quick rebuttals and marshaled facts and figures to show that their effort against Al Qaeda has made considerable progress.

If the war against terrorism has gone well, why then is Al Qaeda still capable of launching “spectacular” operations?

This ambiguity stems from the fact that the administration is legitimately concerned about declaring victory against Al Qaeda lest future attacks play into Al Qaeda’s hands. Washington also seems to have little appreciation of the terror group’s shifting tactics and strategy.

In the last few weeks, Al Qaeda seems to have been waging a propaganda and psychological struggle to sow fear and inflict economic damage.

The post-9/11 terror, relying on decentralized operations and aiming mainly at “soft” civilian targets, is designed to defy the U.S. and to indicate that Al Qaeda’s reach is global.

Al Qaeda has shown itself to be highly adaptable and resourceful by scattering its surviving fighters, estimated in the low hundreds, from Afghanistan into various destinations, and by building alliances with other fringe Islamic groups.

But these recent attacks, bloody and costly as they are, should not blind us to the fact that Al Qaeda is a shadow of its former self.

Despite the pontifications of its leaders that it will deliver faster, harder strikes against the most vital American centers, it no longer possesses the means to plan, organize and launch strategic operations of the scale of Sept. 11. The war has slowly but steadily dismantled the group’s infrastructure.

The network lost its vital operational base in Afghanistan. Its partner, the Taliban regime, is history. Its financial and military infrastructure in Europe, particularly in Germany, France and England, was dismantled.

Moreover, hardly any state, regardless of its political orientation, could afford to aid or harbor Al Qaeda’s fugitives, a testament to the effectiveness of the global anti-terror coalition. The deepening of regional cooperation has netted scores of Al Qaeda operatives worldwide.

Bin Laden’s surviving foot soldiers are forced to operate underground in a hostile world with no official refuge.

As a result of the tightening of the international noose around Al Qaeda’s neck, the network, or what is left of it, acts like a serial criminal band, killing at random. This is a sign of weakness and desperation, not strength.

Though the Bush administration should not lower its guard or be complacent, it must avoid falling into the trap of fear and panic laid down by Bin Laden’s men. It is true that Bin Laden and his chief lieutenant remain in hiding. But their resurfacing will make them vulnerable.

The one remaining real danger lies in Al Qaeda’s effort to reinvent itself as a defender of Palestinians and Iraqis and thus expand its pool of recruits. One of Bin Laden’s major failures since 9/11 revolves around the lack of new recruits.

The U.S. must find ways to frustrate the network’s tactics and limit the pool of recruits available for jihadi, or holy war causes. Working closely with allies and friends is the most effective way of putting Bin Laden and his organization out of business once and for all.

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Fawaz A. Gerges, professor in international affairs and Middle Eastern studies at Sarah Lawrence College, is author of the forthcoming “The Islamists and the West” (Cambridge University Press).