Mideast Parties Are at a Crossroads

It’s crunch time in the Middle East. In the next few days and weeks, each of the major players in the Arab-Israeli conflict must make difficult decisions that will determine whether peace is actually possible.

Three new variables in the Middle East equation--a pivotal Arab League summit this week to debate a new peace plan, the stunning increase in bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians, and U.S. hopes to foment a regime change in Iraq--are coming together to force the key parties to wrestle with tough choices.

Since the breakthrough Oslo accords in 1993, the stakes have rarely been greater, because the regional dynamics are changing so rapidly and the alternatives--including full-blown war and the long-term Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian land--are so stark, U.S. officials and regional experts say.

“We’re certainly on a steep downward path. Never have I seen anger and a sense of grievance so deeply embedded among both Palestinians and Israelis,” said Dennis B. Ross, former U.S. special envoy to the Middle East for the Clinton and first Bush administrations. “Both sides now believe that force is the only thing the other side understands.”

But to generate new movement toward an enduring cease-fire and peace talks, analysts warn, each side will have to pick the tougher or more controversial of its options.

Appearing Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Vice President Dick Cheney said the current crossroads of an “enormously complex set of problems and issues that are all sort of interrelated” provided both “a sense of opportunity and danger.”

For the United States, the decision centers on broad strategy: Is its goal to manage the crisis in a way that will diminish or eliminate the violence? Or is it committed to a full-court diplomatic press that leads Israelis and Arabs toward a final settlement--an effort requiring high-level engagement and unprecedented pressure but one that would also clear the slate to deal with other issues?

“The dilemma for the United States is deciding whether its management of the peace process is an interim step that is necessary to be able to deal with Iraq, or whether it is a priority that stands on its own,” said Shibley Telhami, holder of the Anwar Sadat chair in peace and development at the University of Maryland.

In mid-2001, the Bush administration concluded that no peace agreement was likely as long as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat were both in power. At least one side would have to change its leadership before serious negotiations could get back on track, U.S. officials said. Meanwhile, State Department officials would try to mediate a reduction in the violence.

“Up until now, the administration had concluded that the peace process was not ripe for resolution, and the best they could do was manage it in a way that allowed the United States to go ahead and deal with Iraq,” Telhami said.

But the daily killings on both sides, which are beginning to resemble the opening stage of a conventional war, have proved that this is no longer an effective strategy, analysts and an increasing number of U.S. officials say.

The growing momentum behind President Bush’s commitment to confront Iraq has added to the pressure to be more aggressive. Despite administration claims that there is no link between the Arab-Israeli crisis and any possible U.S.-Iraq showdown, U.S. intelligence analysts warn that President Saddam Hussein is likely to respond to any U.S. military action by firing missiles at Israel to lure Arabs to his side. That could convert Iraq into a regionwide crisis--intertwined with the Arab-Israeli conflict--that could complicate the U.S. goal of a regime change in Baghdad.

Deeper involvement, however, carries serious risks of deeper frustration--and even failure.

“If the United States elevates the mediation to the level of the vice president and puts its name behind ideas that have a chance of not being accepted, and then fails, then there are far fewer alternatives,” Telhami said.

For the Arab world, the big decision involves a sweeping principle: At the Arab League summit beginning Wednesday in Beirut, the 22 members are scheduled to vote on whether to adopt or adapt a Saudi proposal offering full recognition of Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from all lands occupied since the 1967 Middle East War.

The idea is not new, but the timing and the formalization of the proposal could well put the parties back on the track of peace, U.S. officials say. Adding specifics, as some Arab nations propose, could dilute the plan or bog down the effort, however.

The Saudi proposal, if taken literally, would call for the return of more land than Israel has ever been willing to consider. Ross warned that it would amount to a “straitjacket” if some Arabs insist that the idea preclude any flexibility in mediating less than the 1967 borders.

The White House is urging the Arabs to deal with the Saudi vision--which lacks specifics on such thorny issues as the status of Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian refugees to return--as a principle and to not tack on conditions.

Cheney warned Sunday against “hanging a lot of bells and whistles” on the Saudi idea. “The more detail you add, the more people have an opportunity to find something they disagree with,” he said.

And some Arab states may hold out, the vice president conceded. “I would not expect that necessarily everyone in the Arab world will sign up” because of the stipulation of full normalization of relations, he added.

Finally, Arafat and Sharon both must make tactical decisions about stepping back from confrontation--moves that will be far more complicated because of recent shifts in the balance of power on the ground and the reaction among their own constituents.

The Palestinian leadership feels it has an edge over Israel for the first time, due to the impact of suicide attacks on Israelis and the growing fury in the Arab world over Israel’s airstrikes, its reoccupation of land and its assassinations of militants.

“Many Palestinians think they have more to gain by continuing the uprising until there’s a real, acceptable political solution on the horizon,” said Robert Malley, a Clinton administration National Security Council staff member who was involved in the peace process.

Added Ross, “There’s one area of asymmetry that is worrisome: On the Israeli side, there’s a growing desire to be done with all this, but on the Palestinian side, there’s a sense that things are breaking their way.”

Although Arafat has pledged to rein in the violence, following through could be personally and politically costly--and difficult, U.S. officials concede.

Sharon faces a similar dilemma. With his core support coming from the Israeli right wing and settlers, who do not want any concessions on the occupied territories, he will have to decide how to respond to the Arab League offer--and even whether to let Arafat go to the summit. The Israeli leader asked to be allowed to attend the summit but was rebuffed.

Sharon could preempt the debate by refusing to let Arafat leave the West Bank, a move that could sabotage the Saudi overture, Arab leaders warn.

At a more basic level, however, the bloodletting is showing Sharon’s strategy of harsh military reprisals to be ineffective. “Sharon is under increasing pressure, as his current posture has never left Israelis less secure,” Ross said. “He’s got to find some pathway that offers more promise than the one he’s on.”