Pro-West Putin Snubs His Public

Ordinary Russians and much of the country’s top military and political echelon regard the United States as an arrogant, aggressive power and remain deeply suspicious of NATO, an outlook shaped during the Cold War and little changed since, many analysts here say.

Yet President Vladimir V. Putin this week took two bold strokes designed to move his nation closer to the West. As he awaits the arrival of President Bush next week for a summit, Putin has agreed to a tighter relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to a two-thirds reduction in the two nations’ offensive nuclear warheads.

What makes Putin pursue an aggressively pro-Western policy at a time when most of his people do not want anything of the kind? Political experts here say Putin is banking on the general disinterest toward the outside world now, as most Russians’ priorities are fixed instead on domestic questions and their own pocketbooks.

Putin hopes that his friendly overtures to the West will lead to concrete financial and strategic benefits that will rebuild Russia in the long run and firmly secure its place among the world’s most powerful and respected states.

“His ratings among the Russians do not really depend that much on his foreign policies,” observed Dmitri V. Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank. “His popularity depends more on the skill of implementing economic reforms and making people’s lives better.”

It is true that some political opponents are trying to capitalize on Putin’s alleged softness toward the West.

“An unprecedented surrender of Russia’s national interests,” Communist Party chief Gennady A. Zyuganov thundered Wednesday at a news conference here, referring to the arms control agreement.

Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov, anticipating the criticism, went out of his way to argue that Russia had not sacrificed its national interests in the accord, which is to be signed when Bush comes to Moscow. Ivanov called the pact “pragmatic and realistic.”

But such attacks on Putin from the left, represented by the Communists, or from the right, including the many nationalistic-minded members of parliament, are not likely to reach a critical level for the popular president any time soon, said Ivan Safranchuk of Moscow’s Center for Defense Information.

“I think Putin can parry these attacks quite easily,” Safranchuk said, “in part by adopting some of the nationalists’ own language.”

According to Safranchuk, Putin’s strategy will be to try not to draw too much attention domestically to his pro-Western steps. As long as the president moves quietly, the political cost of his actions will be minimal.

And the gains for Russia’s standing in the world from Putin’s policies could be immense.

“Russia has to prove to the international community why Russia is still important,” Safranchuk said. “Russia has to state why Russia is Russia, and not merely Cote d’Ivoire with weapons.”

By drawing the U.S. into arms treaties and by proving that Russia can influence U.S. policies, he said, Moscow proves its weight in the world. Developing countries will get the following message about Russia: “If you have problems, call our toll-free international number,” Safranchuk said.

Even more important, he said, is the message sent out to U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere: “Look, we are now friends with the United States. That is why you have all rights to cooperate with us.”

So for Putin, Safranchuk concluded, closer “Russian-U.S. relations are not the goal but the tool. It is an instrument of access to U.S. allies,” with whom Russia hopes to wield influence and increase commerce.

Opposition From Elites

But Alexei G. Arbatov, a deputy from the liberal faction Yabloko in the Duma, or lower house of parliament, is not so sure that Putin will be able to maintain his pro-Western stance in the face of opposition from political elites.

Putin might pay a price in popularity for going so directly against the mood of anti-Western opinion, Arbatov said.

“Foreign policy is a subject of interest to a minority of the people and influenced by a minority,” Arbatov said. “Putin’s policies since Sept. 11 have created greater mistrust and counterpressure for change among this minority.”

So far, Arbatov said, there is little reason to believe that the U.S. is going to reciprocate for Russia’s moves toward the West. In the agreement this week to set up the new joint Russia-NATO council, for instance, it is still uncertain what questions will be referred to this body and whether it will just be a “talking shop” while important decisions are made elsewhere.

In the sphere of arms control, there is little clarity on how quickly the United States will pull warheads out of service and how many will be destroyed rather than simply stored. And Russian elites are still irked about the U.S. decision to pull out of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and about plans to expand NATO this year by asking the former Soviet Baltic states to join.

Those Russians interested in foreign affairs “believe the West is not responding accordingly to all of Russia’s efforts to cooperate,” Arbatov said.

Suspicions of the West

The conclusion that Russians remain suspicious of the West was partly borne out Wednesday in a report by the Public Opinion Foundation, which surveyed 1,500 respondents from 100 locations nationwide about attitudes toward NATO. The poll found that 52% of respondents considered the alliance still a security threat to Russia, while only 24% did not.

But Trenin is among analysts who believe that Putin’s position is so unassailable that he can weather any anti-Western backlash. “Since there is no real opposition to President Putin in Russia today,” he said, “it is very unlikely that this criticism will mean anything.”

Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times’ Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.