Bush May Have Won the Battle but Lost the War Over an Iraq Invasion

President Bush’s speech to the United Nations last week didn’t end the domestic debate on whether to invade Iraq. But it put Bush in a much stronger position to carry the argument. Now he has to guard against the danger that Saddam Hussein will adapt the tactics Bush employed in the speech to his own advantage.

The key to Bush’s speech was his recognition that in a tug of war, sometimes there’s leverage in letting go. Bush accepted demands from his critics at home and abroad that he involve the U.N. before acting against Iraq. In so doing, he defused a central argument against war without materially shifting his course. Bush did the same thing a few days earlier when he agreed to seek congressional approval before shots are fired.

In both cases, Bush strengthened his hand by giving ground on process without conceding anything of substance. The danger in this strategy is that it leaves Hussein an opportunity to try the same thing: accepting a process of weapon inspections and U.N. intervention that preempts military action without truly eliminating the threat he poses.

At home, the U.N. speech sharply tilted the terms of debate over Iraq in Bush’s direction. As the war drums have grown louder, skeptics in both parties have relied most heavily on procedural objections: Bush shouldn’t go to war without asking Congress, without asking the U.N. or without giving international arms inspections one last chance.

In wartime, it’s common for critics to focus on such process questions. The reason isn’t complicated--when the commander in chief presents military action as essential to national security, opponents usually find it safer politically to challenge his means than his goals.

While polls show support for moving against Hussein, for instance, they also indicate most Americans would strongly prefer the U.S. to act with allies. Thus, even those officials who aren’t sure an invasion is a good idea under any circumstance have felt more comfortable talking about the danger of acting alone.

“The [opponents] ... didn’t want to say ‘no’ ” to an invasion, says Gary Schmitt, executive director of the Project for the New American Century, a hawkish think tank. “When you don’t want to say ‘no,’ you come up with all kind of debate about the means.”

But Bush has stripped away that fig leaf by accepting the procedural steps his critics demanded. That will force opponents to more directly debate the underlying substantive question: whether military action against Iraq makes sense.

Those skeptical of war still have valid arguments on that front. Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under President Clinton, and Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) last week raised what may be the best argument against attacking Iraq: the risk that it will divert attention and resources from the pursuit of Al Qaeda. Others have raised the possibility that Hussein, faced with overthrow, might precipitate a wider war, preemptively attacking Israel or even Saudi Arabia. These are legitimate questions Bush hasn’t really begun to answer.

But the cold political fact is that fewer politicians are likely to feel comfortable substituting their judgment for the commander in chief on these substantive issues than on procedural decisions, like whether to act without the U.N.

Even before last week’s speech, both chambers in Congress were likely to approve resolutions supporting military intervention. But the decision to work through the U.N. virtually guarantees Bush a bigger margin--even if he ultimately decides he has to act against Iraq without U.N. sanction. An aide to a leading liberal senator predicts that half of Democrats (and virtually all Republicans) would support an American invasion of Iraq if Bush makes a good-faith effort to pass a new U.N. resolution with teeth but is blocked by other nations.

That prospect explains why success at the U.N. may be a greater danger for Bush than failure. Failure at the U.N. would come if the United States isn’t able to sell other nations, particularly Russia, on a new regime of weapon inspections and human rights monitoring that Bush considers strong enough to subdue Hussein. But if such a U.S. proposal is blocked, Bush would almost certainly attract more support, not only at home but also abroad, for invading Iraq on his own.

More dangerous for Bush may be success: U.N. approval of a resolution that locks the United States into a new round of weapon inspections, and perhaps even broader efforts to reshape Iraq. The administration is dubious that any inspection regime can really deter Hussein, and will surely propose a much more intrusive approach than the U.N. imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War.

But any system designed by human hands will still allow room for Iraqi mischief and conflicts between the United States and other nations (France and Russia first on the list) about whether Hussein is complying. If a resolution passes, Bush, no matter how much he resists, could still find himself constrained by the system he creates. “Are you going to be able to go to war because inspectors were kept in a parking lot for 15 minutes?” worries one administration official.

That’s why for Hussein, accepting a new inspection regime might be the equivalent of Bush’s decision to ask the U.N. for one: A concession on process that doesn’t change his substantive goals (in Hussein’s case, of surviving and developing weapons of mass destruction).

The odds are greater that inspectors never return to Baghdad; any inspection regime acceptable to Bush is likely to be unacceptable to Hussein, and vice versa. Which is why the White House is willing to risk initiating a U.N. process few in the administration believe will ultimately extinguish the danger. But having begun that process, there’s no guarantee Bush can conclude it without accepting another round of negotiations and inspections that delay and complicate the military action he clearly believes is the only viable solution.

Bush should recognize that problem. By asking the U.N. to act, the president faces a situation much like the critics who demanded he consult before any attack: He may get what he’s asked for, and not like it very much.

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Ronald Brownstein’s column appears every Monday. See current and past Brownstein columns on The Times’ Web site: www.latimes.com/brownstein.