Congress’ Wartime Quandary

Democratic Sen. John F. Kerry criticizes the conduct of the war in Iraq and he calls for “regime change” in Washington as well as in Baghdad. In response, Republicans verbally trample him. Meanwhile, a bipartisan collection of deficit hawks on Capitol Hill answers the White House’s request for $74.7 billion to finance the war by trimming nearly half of the president’s proposed $725-billion tax cut. Determined to deploy the political capital he amassed as wartime leader, President Bush travels to Ohio, where he presses Sen. George Voinovich, a moderate Republican and critic of the tax-cut proposal, to approve his domestic program.

Modern war and its costly, complex consequences present vexing dilemmas for the legislative branch. The Constitution grants Congress specific powers to declare war, to raise and support armies and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Moreover, war normally poses enduring economic, diplomatic and social challenges that responsible lawmakers cannot ignore. Opponents of administration policy -- and fervent supporters as well -- have a responsibility to keep the White House honest, to ensure that the public interest is not swept away in the heady tonic of military victory. But few members of Congress want to challenge a triumphant president, to appear unpatriotic or divisive while U.S. forces remain in harm’s way.

What, then, are the people’s representatives to do? How can they voice their concerns, even offer constructive criticism, without endangering their political futures -- or, worse, sabotaging plans for postwar reconstruction and weakening the battle against international terrorism? History suggests models to emulate and avoid.

Presidents usually resist congressional oversight during wartime, remembering the stern example of Abraham Lincoln and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Established to investigate Union setbacks early in the Civil War, the committee never passed up an opportunity to be a thorn in Lincoln’s side. Led by radical members of the president’s Republican Party, the committee practically accused Gen. George Meade of treason for not sending his exhausted army after Gen. Robert E. Lee’s retreating troops at Gettysburg, and it chided Lincoln for his slowness to embrace emancipation. The committee’s chairman, Sen. Benjamin Wade, accused the president of “murdering your country by inches in consequence of the inactivity of the military and the want of a distinct policy in regard to slavery.”

Nearly 80 years later, with Wade’s example firmly in mind, an obscure machine politician from Missouri rose on the floor of the Senate and called for a committee to investigate the national defense program. Sen. Harry S. Truman pointed to favoritism and cronyism in the mobilization for war, poor planning by the military and absurd cost overruns. He promised that no one would profit unfairly from the military buildup or use the cover of war to advance selfish aims.

Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell denounced the committee as a publicity stunt, “formed in iniquity for political purposes.” But President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that the panel, under Truman’s guidance, would pose fewer threats than another body and would not meddle with military strategy or high diplomacy as the Civil War committee had.

The Truman committee uncovered profiteering in the construction of bases and training camps, abuses in defense contracts and use of inferior materials like the steel plating that caused a Liberty ship to crack in half. Without attacking FDR, the investigation saved taxpayers nearly $15 billion.

Congressional oversight during World War II also advanced Truman’s career; it was no coincidence that the panel’s letterhead touted the “Truman Committee” rather than the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.

Understanding that similarly ambitious senators might intrude in war-making, Truman, as president, initially resisted the formation of a similar congressional committee after he led the nation into the Korean War. He denounced the special subcommittee chaired by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson and warned Congress against interfering with military operations and foreign policy. But in a private meeting with the president, Johnson promised that his panel would not become “a Monday-morning quarterback club, second-guessing battlefront strategy” and pointed out that his committee might head off unfriendly investigations, such as one by the Government Operations Committee, which included Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

Johnson’s committee blasted the Truman administration for its “makeshift mobilization” and “siesta psychology,” charging that “we have thrown up a chicken-wire fence, not a wall of armed might.” Still, it reduced waste, improved the efficiency of wartime agencies and reaffirmed the patriotism of administration officials -- no trivial matter at a time when McCarthy and his allies saw every small mishap as evidence of disloyalty and subversion.

But Johnson, as president, didn’t learn from his own leadership of a wartime inquiry. In 1966, Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, convened nationally televised hearings on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. In criticizing Johnson and the war, the Arkansas senator gradually became the darling of the antiwar movement for his eloquent warnings against the arrogance of U.S. power. LBJ did his utmost to frustrate Fulbright’s investigation. As soon as Fulbright scheduled hearings, Johnson set off for Honolulu, taking all the officials summoned to testify before the committee. Yet, Fulbright’s committee eventually cast doubt on the alleged attack on U.S. naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin that was the basis for Johnson’s escalation of the war.

Bush might follow Truman’s example and seek counsel from his allies in the Republican-controlled Congress. As the military conflict in Iraq gives way to a long, twilight struggle against terrorists and the regimes that support them, the president might find such a committee more congenial than the criticism of his Democratic opponents or investigation by a dissident Republican like Sen. John McCain of Arizona. Moreover, as the nation commits itself to far-flung nation-building projects in Iraq and Afghanistan and stepped-up security at home, Americans need public watchdogs to make sure that leaders don’t misuse their power to pad their pockets, reward their friends or ram through a partisan domestic agenda. Only the Congress can fulfill this desperately needed role.