Reports Appraise Response to Fire

As it battled the most destructive fire in city history, the San Diego Fire Department was hampered by a lack of adequate manpower, equipment and training, as well as problems with communication, planning and coordination, according to “after action” reports released Wednesday by the city manager.

The city’s firefighters and police officers did an outstanding job, said City Manager Michael Uberuaga, adding quickly, “with the resources available to them.”

Those resources were inadequate in several key categories, according to reports by Uberuaga, Assistant Fire Chief August Ghio, Police Chief Bill Landsdowne and the city’s director of homeland security, D.P. Lee. The four reports total 42 pages and will be followed by additional reviews and recommendations.

Mayor Dick Murphy and the City Council had ordered Uberuaga to detail what went right and what went wrong during the Cedar fire last month, which destroyed 335 homes in the upscale San Diego neighborhoods of Scripps Ranch and Tierrasanta -- and thousands more countywide.

Both neighborhoods had long been considered vulnerable to wildfires because of their proximity to brushy rural areas and because of the city’s frugal approach to fire protection.

While much of the controversy has centered on the city’s lack of a fire helicopter -- and the lack of an agreement to use Navy and Marine Corps fire helicopters -- the Fire Department’s problems are much more extensive.

The city has fewer firefighters than most big cities, a fleet of aging fire engines and fire stations that have not kept pace with residential growth.

Fire officials have warned repeatedly over the last two decades that the city was flirting with disaster by skimping on fire protection.

The reports released Wednesday represent the most comprehensive, candid analysis ever compiled on the effects that years of tight budgets punctuated by cutbacks have had on fire protection in San Diego.

According to the reports:

There were not enough firefighters to confront the fast-moving blaze as it swept south on the morning of Oct. 26, a Sunday, from a grassy rural area toward expensive homes inside the city limits.

Firefighters rushed in private cars that were often too small to carry enough equipment.

Only two supply vehicles were available, “which caused a critical slowdown in equipment, and supply acquisition and delivery.”

Without enough radios, batteries, axes and shovels, firefighters rushed to shopping centers, only to find the stores closed. “Some supplies were acquired but not enough to meet the need,” the reports said.

Firefighters raced to various hotspots in buses and cars, only to find there were no fire engines available.

There was no system to track where firefighters and engines had been sent, and commanders were unclear on where their forces and equipment had been deployed.

Safety regulations were violated repeatedly. Firefighters rode in open-cab engines, risking their lives, because the city lacked enough closed-cab vehicles.

Many firefighters were sent to the front without canteens or fire protective gear.

Police officers did not have dust masks, leading to concerns about long-term health damage.

Because of inadequate training and lack of on-site supervision, firefighters spent valuable time trying to save homes that were beyond saving.

“Those firefighting resources could have been better deployed on viable structures. More aggressive use of backfiring operations could have been deployed in an attempt to save more structures,” the reports said.

Because the city has no “multi-casualty” vehicles, it could not have responded if large numbers of serious injuries had been suffered by firefighters, residents or other public safety employees. (Although 14 people died in rural areas, there were no deaths inside the city.)

The city’s horse patrol officers went to Ramona in rural northern San Diego County to help with evacuations of residents but were unable to communicate with their superiors in the Police Department when the fire swept close to Tierrasanta and Scripps Ranch.

Under the city’s mutual aid agreements, San Diego officers went to the adjacent suburb of Santee. They were then unable to communicate with the county Sheriff’s Department, which has responsibility for that city.

The Police Department “needs a radio system that can communicate with all county agencies and disciplines,” Landsdowne said.

The city’s homeland security director, assigned specifically to monitor incidents of mass destruction, heard about the fires by watching television. No one thought to call him.

Fire Department and Water Department employees had trouble communicating, hampering the coordination of water supplies to ensure adequate water pressure.

Various public agencies failed to coordinate and update their Web pages, so information was often incomplete or outdated.

Firefighting was hampered because crews had to confer with Park and Recreation Department workers about which trees could be chopped down to deprive the fire of fuel.

No planning had been done on the issue of trees, though Scripps Ranch’s tall eucalyptuses had long been seen as potential torches during fires.

“It is recommended that department park forestry staff, which includes a certified arborist, be engaged early on in the identification stage of trees requiring removal, especially in urban areas,” the reports said.

Communications between the Fire Department and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection -- the lead agency in battling the Cedar and Paradise blazes -- were undercut by the lack of a Forestry Department liaison at the Fire Department’s operations center.

Also, the center became so crowded and loud with officials, reporters, residents and others that supervisors had trouble concentrating on how to cope with a fire that was consuming as much as 6,000 acres an hour.

“Accurate information concerning the boundaries of the fire and deployment of resources was not readily available,” the reports said.

Among other mistakes, no one requested that the city’s computerized Geographic Information System be used, which “could have greatly assisted decision-makers during the first three days of this incident by providing maps showing the progression of the fire, where operations were happening and other data,” the reports said.

Two weeks ago City Manager Uberuaga issued a gloomy report predicting deep reductions in funding for public safety and possible layoffs of firefighters because of reductions in state aid to cities.

The Cedar fire destroyed more than 3,200 homes countywide.