Effects of an Attack on Iran Nuclear Facility

Re “Iran May Hide Its Nuclear Ambitions From Some, but Not Israel,” Commentary, Dec. 10: Bennett Ramberg’s analysis of Israel’s military options on Iran’s nuclear program furthers the misleading proposition that such a possibility will be analogous to Israel’s 1981 Osirak reactor strike in Iraq. Iran sits astride a nuclear fuel cycle with multiple routes of generating bomb-grade fuel. Launching an attack on the Russian-built Bushehr power plant would be like sacking a quarterback after he’s already thrown a pass -- the crunch would be satisfying, the defensive utility minimal and the probability of penalties high.

Tehran has signaled its ability to conceal and harden its uranium enrichment infrastructure, protecting it from a lightning-fast raid. Israel is unlikely to find any military options as simple as those available to it in Iraq two decades ago, when a single bombing mission severely disrupted Iraq’s nuclear intentions.

Michael Roston

Washington

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Ramberg is quite correct in his description of Israel’s method of dealing with Iraq’s nuclear program. And Israel was right to do what it did. But in the end, Palestinian conventional bombs will probably do more to harm Israel than Iran’s possible atomic bombs. Israel should, at the very least, take the first step toward Middle Eastern disarmament. It should acknowledge its nuclear weapons program and agree to dismantle it.

In doing this, Israel would be taking the moral high ground. At the same time it would not damage its conventional military power, which most people acknowledge to be far superior to any other Middle East nation’s.

Carl W. Goss

Los Angeles