Hong Kong’s Struggle

While leading a mission in 1994 to study prospects for the rule of law in Hong Kong after its return to mainland control, I addressed the American Chamber of Commerce at a luncheon in the old Hilton Hotel there. After my remarks, one questioner, a lawyer from a U.S. firm, insisted that although he was a “card-carrying member of the ACLU,” the rights and freedoms he embraced at home didn’t apply in Asia. Democracy and the rule of law, I disagreed, are immutable principles, desired and deserved by people everywhere.

Later that day, a fax was slipped under the door of my hotel room. It was from another member of the audience, an American businessman. He thanked me for defending democratic values and was worried that the Hong Kong waiters attending to the expatriate luncheon crowd might think that Americans only cared about making money in Hong Kong. He asked that I keep his identity confidential -- or he would be out of a job.

The lawyer’s and businessman’s divergent views echo America’s conflicted attitude toward Hong Kong. The U.S. says it firmly supports Hong Kong’s autonomy, wants the rule of law and civil liberties to prevail there, and that the march toward full democracy should continue. As Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright promised in 1997, when Beijing took control, “America cares about Hong Kong and will continue to care long after this week’s fireworks are finished, the cameras are turned off and the partying is done.” Indeed, the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 formally commits the U.S. to support Hong Kong’s autonomy.

Yet, keen to avoid disagreement with China, the U.S. has tacitly accepted Beijing’s terms for the governance of Hong Kong. U.S. officials have largely ignored Hong Kong’s slow, steady political deterioration. Reports required by the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act dispassionately recount serious blows to the region’s freedoms and institutions, maintaining that Hong Kong has “continued to develop in a positive direction.”

This contradiction, however, has become untenable. The debates and protests over new internal security laws, which Beijing planned to have enacted by the undemocratic pro-Beijing majority in the Hong Kong legislature, have put the U.S. on a collision course with Beijing over Hong Kong. After more than 500,000 people peacefully protested the proposed laws in early July, the legislation was postponed, leaving the Hong Kong government in disarray. Speculation mounts that the days of Beijing’s chosen chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, are numbered.

The problem runs much deeper than Tung. Yeung Sum, chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, said the protests over the security laws showed that the people of Hong Kong wanted to “open up the political system to free elections for the chief executive and the Legislative Council.” People in Hong Kong can see that the problem isn’t just with an individual but with the structure. Less than half the council is elected by the people of Hong Kong.

Beijing recognizes that the problem is serious. Last week, members of China’s Politburo reportedly met in an emergency session to discuss events in Hong Kong. For years, Beijing had felt comfortable with the system it put in place for governing Hong Kong. By design, Hong Kong would be autonomous with civil liberties, judicial independence and, eventually, democracy. In truth, however, China gave itself control over the region’s most important matters. China appoints its chief executive. There is an undemocratic majority in the legislature, and Beijing is able to limit the independence of the judiciary.

All these provisions are contained in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s “constitution,” which was written by mainland officials and adopted by the mainland’s National People’s Congress in 1990 without the consent of the people of Hong Kong. The constitution cannot be amended by Hong Kong’s people, nor can they hold Hong Kong officials accountable for poor performance or questionable actions. Among the consequences of the lack of accountability was the inadequate and politicized response of officials to the deadly spread of sudden acute respiratory syndrome.

No one should be surprised by this. Deng Xiaoping made clear well before the handover that “those who can be entrusted to administer Hong Kong must be local residents who love mother China and Hong Kong” and that democratic elections could not be relied upon to select such people. Beijing claims that democracy is the ultimate goal, but how could that be possible? Beijing’s appointed chief executive and the undemocratic legislature would have to approve any new system for choosing the top official and the legislature.

New security laws, required by the Basic Law’s Article 23, would further strengthen Beijing’s hand. The laws remain dangerous even though some of the more notorious provisions were jettisoned under pressure. The New York City Bar Assn., Human Rights Watch and the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong have all criticized them.

The greatest problem is not their content, however. It is the manner in which the proposed security laws would be enacted and the context in which they would be enforced -- by an undemocratic legislature at the behest of a dictatorial sovereign.

Chinese leaders understand the implications of Hong Kong’s battle for civil liberties and a democratic system that would secure them. Beijing sees a link between events in Hong Kong and the mainland, regarding the former as a base of subversion for the latter. That was why it censored CNN’s broadcast to the mainland of Hong Kong’s protests.

The U.S. doesn’t seem to comprehend Beijing’s views on Hong Kong. It still treats Hong Kong as a separate issue, without any attention to the broader implications it has for the future of China or for U.S. policy there. In the past, with each successive blow to Hong Kong, U.S. officials have consoled themselves that it could have been worse. There is a real danger that in coming weeks and months, the U.S. might welcome security laws shorn of their most egregious provisions and a new, more pleasing chief executive chosen by Beijing.

The U.S. hoped it could reconcile Beijing’s wishes for Hong Kong with real autonomy, freedom and progress toward democracy. It cannot. Accordingly, it should offer an alternative to Beijing’s blueprint. The U.S. House of Representatives has shown the way by endorsing elections for the people of Hong Kong. On June 26, members voted 426 to 1 to support a democratic legislature in Hong Kong.

The Bush administration should follow the House’s lead and support Hong Kong’s democrats and rights activists. It could endorse a constitutional convention that would draw up plans for Hong Kong’s people to choose their system of government. That would be a Hong Kong policy worthy of a democratic nation.