U.S. Soldiers Building Loyalty in Afghanistan

After two years of airstrikes and bombing campaigns, U.S. soldiers have a new, more subtle weapon in their Afghanistan arsenal: money.

They have a budget of $40 million to build schools, wells and roads, or what is known in military parlance as “combat marketing.” But sometimes the balancing act of military and marketing can backfire.

After Army Capt. Chuck Brooks of the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment finished having tea with locals in this village near the Pakistan border recently, he signaled to one of his soldiers to play a message on the loudspeaker of the Humvee.

Suddenly, a voice in the Pashto language blared: “Lie on the ground and put your hands up. We will search your houses.”

Red-faced, Brooks shouted: “Wrong message -- sorry! Wrong message!”

A minute later, the correct script was played, to the amusement of the villagers: “Dear citizens of Afghanistan. The national elections are due to be held this summer. It is the right of every citizen to vote.”

Glitches aside, the U.S. Army believes that the key to securing the border is winning the loyalty of the Pushtun tribes by building infrastructure and sharing a cup of tea in exchange for information on extremists.

As Sgt. Maj. David Turnbull bluntly put it: “We can outspend Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”

He added: “We are not bribing them, but making them realize that the Afghan government and American government are legitimate and we are the ones building wells, and schools for children. Their loyalties will shift, and hopefully they will come out and talk.”

The task is difficult because of Al Qaeda’s strong links to the lawless Khowst province, where Masi Kalay is located. Khowst was the base for at least four Al Qaeda training camps, and it was from this region that Osama bin Laden is believed to have escaped after the defeat of the Taliban in 2001.

“Bin Laden has a lot of support in this area because he spent a lot of money on buildings, like the local mosque here,” said a U.S. intelligence official who did not want to be named.

“He is a savior to a lot of people.”

But to others here, the Americans -- and their dollars -- are the saviors.

“We won’t let Al Qaeda in here,” one village elder, Haji Atlas, told a group of U.S. soldiers without any prompting. “If we have problems, we will come to you. We support the Americans, not the Taliban, because they were only for destruction, not construction.”

The source of their appreciation lay a few yards away: a $46,000 well paid for by the U.S. Army to provide clean water for the residents of Masi Kalay.

Brooks nodded approvingly.

“I know we are good neighbors,” he said. “If you see any foreigners or strangers around here, I want you to tell me.”

“Foreigners or strangers” is another way of referring to Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters looking for hiding spots in the remote scrub and rock valleys in the province. The top local prize is a senior Taliban commander with links to Al Qaeda who is believed to be organizing attacks against the U.S.-led coalition forces.

It has proved difficult to find him because of strong local support and intelligence reports suggesting that the guerrilla leader moves around the province as a woman clad in a burka, the head-to-toe covering.

At Camp Salerno in Khowst province, the 501st’s barracks are expanding, a staging area has been added and a new mess hall has been named the Hard Rock Cafe.

The camp also opened a school for 67 local children.

The thinking goes that while pupils learn the English alphabet at the camp school, their parents, who may be afraid to be seen speaking with Americans in the villages, might feel more comfortable talking at the camp about anyone seen purchasing weapons or recruiting fighters.

So far, Lt. Col. Harry Glenn, the Salerno task force commander, said he was confident the new tactics were working.

“We have been on the ground for five months and are seeing people on a daily basis giving information about Al Qaeda and Taliban,” he said. “Kids stop us on patrols and say, ‘There are rockets aimed at your base,’ and people will tell us, ‘Don’t go on that road because of an explosive device.’ ”

The fight against the insurgency is a dirty campaign.

The rough border terrain is advantageous to hostile tribesmen who ambush patrolling soldiers from the craggy cliff tops and hills.

It is fraught with land mines, and the old Russian mine maps are only partially helpful because new mines have been laid in recent years.

The challenge was illustrated just half a mile from the border.

Brooks spoke to a few residents in a house overlooking the Pakistani mountains about their need for a school -- they had never had one -- and the platoon set up camp for the night.

The following morning, a Humvee carrying three soldiers on a routine patrol was just about to turn a corner on a nearby hill when an explosion sent a mushroom cloud of dust and rock 35 feet in the air.

The Humvee was less than 200 yards from the blast, and no one was hurt. The crude explosive, three rockets strung together and detonated by a remote-controlled radio, had been set out the previous night.

Someone knew that American soldiers had set up camp in the area.

Despite an extensive search, the culprits were not found. Who did it?

One officer provided a quick answer: “Probably the same guys who served us the tea the night before.”