Act Now or a Civil War May Hit Iraq

A year into the “war after the war,” far too many U.S. officials are still in a state of denial.

They ignore the ABC poll conducted in February that found roughly two-thirds of Sunnis and one-third of Shiites to be opposed to the U.S. and British invasion and “humiliated” by it.

They ignore the fact that roughly one-third of Sunnis and two-thirds of Shiites support violence against the coalition and want coalition forces to leave Iraq immediately.

They talk about the insurgents as a “small minority” because only a small minority so far have been violent -- a reality in virtually every insurgent campaign and one that in no way is a measure of support for violence.

They do not see just how much the perceived U.S. tilt toward Israel and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon alienates Iraqis and Arabs in general. They do not admit the near total failure of U.S. information operations, and the fact that Iraqis watch hostile Arab satellite TV stations and rely on newspapers filled with misinformation and conspiracy theories.

They measure success in aid programs in terms of contracts signed, fiscal obligations and gross measures of performance like megawatts, not in terms of progress on the ground, the kind that can really win hearts and minds. They fail to understand that U.S. calls for liberty, democracy and reform have become coupled with images of American interference in Arab regimes, the broad resentment of careless negative U.S. references to Islam and Arab culture, and conspiracy theories about control of Iraqi oil, neoimperialism and serving “Zionist” interests.

These were among my observations during a recent trip to the region. I returned to the United States last week after finding the situation more disturbing than ever.

One of my biggest concerns is that American officials simply don’t seem to recognize that U.S. tactical military “victories” are often, in fact, political defeats. The Iraqi insurgents do not have to win battles in a tactical sense; they merely have to put up a determined, courageous resistance against the world’s only superpower.

The last few weeks of resistance also have sharply undercut the already low political legitimacy of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority and interim Iraqi Governing Council. Pro-American Iraqis have been divided and weak, and U.S. ties to some particularly unpopular members of the council are becoming steadily more damaging -- particularly ties to Ahmad Chalabi. The end result is that the U.S. ability to convey legitimacy has been sharply undercut at precisely the time the U.S. needs legitimacy for its June 30 turnover of power.

In the weeks and months ahead, the United States must set realistic objectives to minimize the risk of civil war and help Iraqis take charge. This means turning the political and security effort over to Iraqis as soon as possible and supporting U.N. efforts to create Iraqi political legitimacy.

Key steps are:

* Accept the fact that there is no way to “drain the swamp.” At this point, there simply is no way to eliminate cadres of insurgents or to disarm the most threatening areas. Fallouja and similar areas have too much popular support for the insurgents, there are too many arms that can be hidden and too many points of vulnerability. This does not mean the U.S. should give up fighting the insurgents. It does mean the U.S. must accept that it cannot win in the sense of eliminating them. Instead, it must rely on containment.

* Continue expanding the role of the Iraqi security forces and rush aid to them as quickly as possible. Understand that their loyalties will be divided, that putting them in charge of hostile areas does not mean that they can be expected to do more than work out a modus vivendi with the insurgents.

* Walk firmly and openly away from the losers in the interim Governing Council, such as Chalabi. Open up the political structure and deal with Shiite oppositionists, Sunni insurgents and ex-Baathists.

* Focus on all of the Shiites, not just the friendly ones. Quietly reach out to Iran to create whatever kind of dialogue is possible.

* Put an Iraqi on the stage with the U.S. spokesmen. Lower the U.S. profile in shaping the political future of Iraq.

* Revitalize the “road map” and the so-called quartet.

* Abandon the Greater Middle East Initiative in its present form. Stop talking about regionwide democracy and liberty before there are responsible political parties and other reforms necessary to make democracy work.

The United States should be ready to help an Iraq that will help itself, and must support a true transfer of sovereignty. It should make it clear, however, that the U.S. has a clear exit strategy. It has no interest in bases or control over Iraqi oil. It has no reason to stay if Iraq becomes unstable, devolves into civil war or ends up under a strongman.

The U.S. can live with a weak or unstable Iraq, and the threat of withdrawal must be used as leverage to find an effective solution.

*

Anthony H. Cordesman is a defense and intelligence expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and is the author of “The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons” (CSIS, 2004).