The New Team

In naming a new team of negotiators for the coming nuclear arms-reduction talks with the Soviet Union, President Reagan came up with a reasonable mix of experience and political acceptability. Whether the new negotiating group is successful, however, depends on the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate flexibly and seriously, and on the President’s ability and determination to end the internecine warfare within the Administration over the appropriate U.S. negotiating position.

Washington and Moscow have agreed to resume nuclear arms-control talks, probably in March. The negotiations will be conducted in three arenas devoted to strategic arms, space weapons and medium-range missiles in Europe.

The President announced Friday that Max M. Kampelman, a Hubert H. Humphrey Democrat with a strong pro-defense record and impressive diplomatic credentials, will be overall head of the U.S. delegation, besides heading the subgroup discussing space weapons. Maynard W. Glitman, a career Foreign Service officer who served as deputy to Paul H. Nitze, the U.S. negotiator in the Euromissile talks that were collapsed by the Soviets in late 1983, was named to succeed Nitze in the top post. And retired Sen. John G. Tower, Texas Republican and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, will replace Gen. Edward L. Rowny as head of the U.S. team in the strategic-arms portion of the negotiations.

Nitze had to be replaced because, for personal reasons, he can no longer accept prolonged assignments abroad. In the case of Rowny, Shultz apparently decided that he would be better served by someone with a less rigid, hard-line reputation.

In terms of experience the new team certainly is no improvement on the old. Glitman has considerable experience in arms-control negotiations. But, while Tower is well versed in military affairs and should be helpful in winning Senate ratification if an agreement is reached, he has no diplomatic track record. Kampelman, though experienced in dealing with the Soviets in other areas, is a newcomer to the arms-control field, butis experienced in dealing with the Soviets in other areas.

Reagan’s selections of Kampelman and Glitman appear to represent victories for Shultz in his continuing tug-of-war with hard-liners in the Pentagon and elsewhere, while the selection of Tower is intended to mollify the same elements.

The truth is, however, that the qualifications of the negotiators will be almost irrelevant unless the President can get his own house in order. This means arriving at a negotiating position that makes sense from the standpoint of U.S. national security and possible negotiability with the Soviets. It also means cracking heads, if necessary, to get the State Department and the Pentagon on the same wavelength. There is still no good evidence that either has occurred.