Pressure on Pretoria

There is little doubt now that the United States will approve sanctions against South Africa. Events in South Africa have left no alternative.

The House vote, 380 to 48, demonstrated the overwhelming bipartisan support for the legislation. Senate action, delayed only by the stalling tactics of a handful of right-wing Republicans, is expected to follow in September. The supporters are far in excess of the numbers needed to override a presidential veto should there be one.

Sanctions, as embraced in the congressional action, are more likely to be effective than the divestiture approach adopted by the City of Los Angeles. The legislation adopted by the Senate-House conference is measured, modest and narrowly targeted, and it includes incentives for reform. The measure is written to avoid the risk of doing more harm than good for the black majority. But it also includes provisions for tougher measures in a year if there is no response. That is appropriate as an initial reaction to the crisis that Pretoria has brought on itself. The divestiture approach adopted by the city makes no distinction between American companies and banks that are reinforcing apartheid and those working to reform South African policies. It imposes almost impossible requirements on pension investors who will be hard pressed to find investments with no link whatsoever to South Africa.

The consensus in Congress has not impressed President Reagan. He confounded the issue at his most recent press conference, reversing course on earlier White House pronouncements that had, most accurately, blamed apartheid for the chaos and called for an end to the state of emergency. Reagan seems determined to pursue the policy of “constructive engagement” with South Africa, despite the stark evidence that the policy has failed and, worse, almost certainly contributed to the belligerent stubbornness of the white-minority rulers and their rejection of every significant form of conciliation and compromise.

Opponents of sanctions can argue with good reason that sanctions are not a proven tool for addressing problems of this sort, and have never achieved by themselves a reversal of government policy. But that argument ignores the evidence from South Africa itself that these measures are having a profound effect on the government of South Africa, shown by its near-panic efforts to head off the legislation, while they are also encouraging those still working for a nonviolent end to apartheid--witness the welcoming words of Bishop Desmond Tutu of Johannesburg.

Some of the opposition to sanctions is ideological. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), leader of the move to stall action in the Senate, argues that sanctions would help the Soviet Union undermine the government of South Africa. Another right-wing Republican had the correct answer to that. Rep. Mickey Edwards (R-Okla.), urging support for the sanctions, said: “Communist revolutions do not come from granting of basic human freedom.”

South Africa has failed to respond to 4 1/2 years of the quiet diplomacy of the Reagan Administration. The situation has worsened. Something stronger has become necessary. The congressional formula is appropriate for this time.