U.S. Criticizes Soviet Arms Plan, Warns of Allied Split

The Reagan Administration, detailing its most specific objections to the latest Soviet arms proposal, said Tuesday that the offer is “a place to start” but is unacceptable because it could strengthen Moscow’s capability to launch a surprise attack and split the United States from its European allies.

President Reagan “finds the very fact that the Soviets have made a counterproposal a promising development,” a senior Administration official told reporters at a White House briefing.

Nonetheless, the official then set out to put the worst possible face on the Soviet offer to agree to a cut in both sides’ nuclear weapons by 50% in exchange for a halt to U.S. space defense work.

The briefing--together with hasty trips to European capitals by chief arms adviser Paul H. Nitze and Assistant Defense Secretary Richard N. Perle--suggested a determined U.S. effort to dampen enthusiasm for the Soviet offer as it now stands.

One Pentagon official conceded later that the Administration, which for nearly five years has called for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, finds it awkward that the Soviets have put forward a similar scheme that the United States cannot accept.

The senior Administration official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, elaborated on some points in the Soviet offer that had not previously been made public.

Moscow’s proposed 50% cut in the missiles and bombers that carry weapons that could strike the other superpower would set a ceiling of 1,680 such “delivery vehicles” for each country, he said. He added that these vehicles would be limited to carrying a total of 6,000 warheads or bombs--also about 50% of the current number of those weapons.

A key provision also specified that no single basing mode--whether land-based missiles, sea-based missiles or bombers--could carry more than 60% of the total weapons of either side, the official said.

Under the Soviet proposal, the number of U.S. intermediate-range missiles and fighter-bombers in Europe and Asia--which can reach Soviet territory--would be constrained by the 1,680-vehicle limit.

The United States already has 1,149 such systems, he said, and if it retained all of them it would be forced to slash its U.S.-based intercontinental missiles and bombers to only 531 from the current total of more than 1,900--a far greater cut than 50%.

Under the proposal, the United States could face “two extreme choices” on how to achieve the limit of 1,680, the official contended. In one case, he explained, it could withdraw the necessary missiles and aircraft from Europe and Asia--thereby destroying its alliances.

But on the other hand, he said, it could keep those missiles and planes abroad but reduce its intercontinental missile and bomber force to 531--thereby making a Soviet surprise attack on the United States easier by offering fewer targets.

However, it was not clear that the United States would in fact have to choose one or the other drastic alternatives outlined by the official. In the past, such offers would have allowed each side to decide how to divide up its permitted weapons among different basing modes.

Some Moscow Forces Exempted

The official also noted that Moscow would not be required to count its 2,000 intermediate-range missiles and bombers among the nuclear arsenal that had to be reduced. Thus, the Soviets would not be faced with a comparable choice and could retain their most powerful system--multiple-warhead, land-based intercontinental missiles, he said.

Moreover, he added, the capability of these missiles to destroy most of the American arsenal in a surprise attack, or “first strike,” would be increased if the United States sharply cut its intercontinental force. For example, he said, each U.S. land-based missile--now threatened by three Soviet warheads--would in a smaller force be threatened by six Soviet warheads.

The official also charged that the offer:

--Could increase Moscow’s present advantage in numbers of intercontinental weapons, warheads and the payloads they carry.

--Could prevent the United States from deploying weapons currently being developed, such as the Stealth bomber and the Trident D-5 submarine missile.

--Could decrease the security of U.S. allies.

--Would not be verifiable.

--Would continue to tie cuts in offensive arsenals to curtailment of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as “Star Wars.” President Reagan has repeatedly insisted that such a curb on the space defense research program is unacceptable.

Although the senior Administration official said the Soviet offer is a good place to start, he added that “the time has come to bargain seriously” for an agreement that would give neither side a first-strike capability and would focus on reducing ballistic missiles.

“The President’s highest priority is deep, stabilizing and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear warheads,” he said.