Latin Americans Do <i> Not</i> Back Contra Aid

The debate on U.S. aid to the contras in Nicaragua clearly has more to do with the political winds in the United States than in Central America. Likewise, whatever decision Congress reaches on President Reagan’s request for $100 million in military and “non-lethal” aid, its deliberations will not be greatly influenced by other nations’ views.

Thus it is surprising to hear Administration spokesmen referring to Latin American support for such aid--particularly since there is no such support in Latin America, as the Administration knows.

Indeed, no Latin American leader not directly involved in the Central American conflict has been willing to publicly support Reagan on this issue. Even leaders in the area, such as newly elected President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, have unequivocally stated their opposition. Nor has any Latin American head of state or foreign minister been willing to meet publicly--and few privately--with contra military leaders, although political figures like Arturo Cruz have been received by South American leaders such as President Belisario Betancur of Colombia.

No Latin American government has extended the contras recognition of any sort, despite recent precedents: The Andean Group of Nations recognized the Sandinistas as a “belligerent force” in 1979, and the French-Mexican declaration of 1981 recognized the Salvadoran insurgents as “a representative political force.” Other than Honduras, the last Latin government to support the contras was the Argentine military in 1982--the government that brought us the Malvinas adventure, and thousands of missing, dead and tortured during the “Dirty War” from 1976 to 1982.

But Latin America’s views on aid to the contras are not only implicit or passive. In January the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group--Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Venezuela--and those of the Contadora Support Group--Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay (the “new democracies”)--met in Caraballeda, Venezuela. They reaffirmed their support for the Contadora process, but, more important, they specifically called for new, unconditional talks between the United States and the government of Nicaragua.

When the foreign ministers met with Secretary of State George P. Shultz last month, their message was clear: Latin America is firmly opposed to continuing U.S. aid to the contras, and considers it a major obstacle to peace in Central America. Any discrepancies between their public and private statements can be attributed to traditional Latin discretion; they did not want to underline U.S.-Latin disagreements, but simply to state them unambiguously.

In fact, one might have expected that, given the economic difficulties of the “Caraballeda 8,” they would no longer state their views on the Central American crisis at all, much less with such vigor. Peru, which has practically suspended payments on its foreign debt and is facing a complete credit cutoff, is a case in point. Another, perhaps more relevant one, is Mexico.

With the price of oil below $15 a barrel, little or no sympathy in Washington or on Wall Street for its new predicament, and faced with large debt-service payments on March 31 that it cannot, should not and quite possibly will not meet, Mexico could easily have remained silent on the issue of aid to the contras. It has muted many of its other past criticisms of U.S.-Central American policy, and certainly has cut back on its previous support to the Sandinistas. But the contras are another matter--for Mexico and for the rest of Latin America.

The reason is simple. Since independence in the 19th Century, Latin American nations have been meddling in each other’s affairs. But they also have denounced American (and previously French and British) intervention. A double standard? U.S. power, wealth and influence are in a different league with local conspiracies, guerrillas and coups d’etats. What is tolerated among weak Latin nations (except for those directly affected) is not welcome when issued by the overwhelming power to the north.

No Latin government can afford to legitimize a U.S. policy based on encouraging and arming a local opposition. In Latin America’s perception, U.S. administrations change--and change their minds--too often. Yesterday’s friend is today’s problem and tomorrow’s enemy. Most Latin leaders know that they would be hard-pressed to withstand a U.S.-sponsored domestic military attempt to unseat them. Every Latin leader understands that this is Reagan’s goal with the Sandinistas. Few in Latin America may like the Sandinistas, but fewer still would want to one day find themselves in the same shoes.

Latin American opposition to aid for the contras is strictly a matter of self-interest. While the leaders’ objections may not have been expressed as clearly as they could be, they are still very real. And Congress should have no doubt about it.