State Democrats, the Presidency: A Losing Cause

During a recent visit to California, a Democratic U.S. senator from the East mused about how different American electoral politics might be if only the Democrats could carry California in presidential elections.

His was not an idle thought, although there is a quantum leap from daydreams about California’s 45 electoral votes to winning them--a full one-sixth of the 270 needed to capture the presidency.

But consider: If Democrats could count on California, the party could, in effect, ignore Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, thus offsetting any Republican electoral sweep of the Rockies such as has occurred in recent years.

Or, a lock on California could counter a loss of the Deep South. California’s electoral vote is only one shy of being equal to Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina combined.

Winning California should not be an insurmountable problem for Democrats, although Lyndon B. Johnson is the only Democrat to carry the state since 1948, when Harry S. Truman narrowly defeated Thomas E. Dewey. Republicans have made inroads in recent years into the Democratic voter registration margin, but party loyalty has not been an accurate guide to California voting in presidential elections.

While Californians were supporting Republicans for President, they elected Democratic majorities to the state Legislature and the House of Representatives, rotated the governorship between the parties and maintained at least one Democratic U.S. senator since 1958. So why do they fare so miserably in presidential elections and what can they do about it?

One reason may be that a Californian has been on the GOP ticket seven times in the past nine presidential elections--Richard M. Nixon in 1952, 1956, 1960, 1968 and 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984. Republicans carried California each of those years, including 1960 when Nixon won the state with 50.1% of the vote while John F. Kennedy won the White House.

Rather than being a trend-setter, California has generally been a follower in presidential elections. Other than 1960, California has failed to back the national winner only once since 1912. In 1976, Gerald R. Ford carried the state over Jimmy Carter with less than 50% of the California vote. In 1912, the state went with the Progressive-Republican ticket of Theodore Roosevelt and Californian Hiram Johnson by 174 votes over the Woodrow Wilson ticket.

And the Democrats? The last Democrat from California to enjoy more than a long-shot bid for the presidential nomination was William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson’s son-in-law, who lasted 99 ballots in 1924 but finally lost to John W. Davis.

Nelson W. Polsby, an electoral expert at the University of California in Berkeley, believes California politics are like politics elsewhere--except for the weakness of the party system in California, a throwback to the early-century reforms of Hiram Johnson and other Progressives.

Californians tend to rally around candidates and causes rather than party structure and leadership. This is an advantage to Republicans who are generally more cohesive and loyal to the party label, up to and including election day.

But disunity has been the hallmark of Democrats in presidential politics. The recent history of friction and faction began in 1968, when anti-Vietnam War forces challenged President Johnson early on and led a plurality of California Democrats to a June primary victory for Robert F. Kennedy, who was slain minutes after declaring victory at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. Hubert H. Humphrey eventually won the nomination but could not quite close the gap in California, losing to Nixon by 223,346 votes out of 7.3 million cast.

Division festered through the 1972 nominating season and the struggle between George McGovern and Humphrey forces for control of the delegation. Against McGovern, Nixon did not do as well in California, collecting 55% of the vote, as he did nationwide, 60.7%, but it would have taken far more than party unity for McGovern to have won the Golden State that year.

In 1976, it was Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. against Carter and a host of others. In the old days, Brown would have been a favorite son and most likely would have frozen out all other candidates, avoiding a contested primary. In 1980, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy brought his losing challenge to President Carter to a high point with a California victory that did little more than put salt in the wounds. Colorado Sen. Gary Hart defeated former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in 1984, but Mondale virtually cinched the nomination on the same day with a victory in New Jersey. The Mondale-Ferraro ticket never got off the ground in California that fall.

What can California Democrats do about their dilemma? For starters, they can feel relief: No California Republican will be on the 1988 ticket, barring the possibility of Gov. George Deukmejian being someone’s running mate.

Democrats can remember that while Republicans have been consistent winners, California is still not necessarily a presidential one-party state. The margins of victory have often been narrow. Even Reagan’s 57.5% vote in 1984 was not as big as his victories in Texas, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Ohio.

Charles T. Manatt, the former state and national Democratic chairman, believes California Democrats must move their June primary to an earlier date in order to make it more relevant to the nomination process. His argument may be reinforced by the southern states’ “Super Tuesday” decision--to conduct a regional primary the second Tuesday in March, 1988.

Clearly, candidates would have to pay more attention to California than they do now. A side benefit would be more time to heal the wounds of a divisive primary and organize an effective fall campaign on behalf of the nominee. Another effect would be to discourage candidates from milking California financial sources to pay for their early primary election campaigns in the Northeast, South and Midwest. By the time candidates of either party reach California in June, they are often exhausted--physically, financially--and the California money tree is barren.

California Democrats, with the proper leadership, could develop the ability to forge some discipline and unity within the party structure, with an eye on the presidency as well as statewide offices. The key to that may be the enhanced ability to raise and dispense money.

Even without such changes, events may require the national party to rethink its traditional east-of-the-Mississippi electoral mind-set: that the Northeast and Midwest industrial regions and the South hold the key to victory. Sun Belt and high-tech candidacies like those of Gary Hart or some of the potential Southerners might speed this reassessment of the national electoral map.

Finally, of course, all California Democrats need to do is to produce their equivalent of a John F. Kennedy or Ronald Reagan and the focus of the national party would certainly shift westward.