Saudi Arms Sale: Messy Ado About Little

“Timing,” the adage advises, “is everything.” By that standard, the Reagan Administration picked the worst moment to try selling advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia. Last week the Senate voted to forbid the sale of anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons by 73 to 22, and the House followed suit by 356 to 62. Both votes exceeded the two-thirds margin needed to override a presidential veto.

Timing was bad because of other events in the Middle East. With the rise of terrorism--magnified by media and government overreaction--Arab-bashing is now Washington’s favorite sport. Also, world oil prices are down, minimizing the threat that Arabs will use an “oil weapon” against the United States because of its support for Israel. Most members of Congress thus feel as much sympathy for Arab oil states as New England does for Texas.

Because the President was bound to veto a bill denying the Saudi arms sale, members of Congress had a free vote. They could symbolically sock it to the Arabs or please Israel’s supporters without taking any responsibility. Meanwhile, the White House was looking ahead to the veto fight, and so lobbied both little and late. Now Reagan must try changing an embarrassingly large number of votes--at least 7 in the Senate or 67 in the House--to sustain his veto.

In substance, the political struggle is much ado about very little. The missiles are not very important to either side. Proponents argue that Saudi Arabia needs them to defend against a possible Iranian attack. But they wouldn’t be delivered until 1989, and the Saudis are already in a position to attack every Iranian ship and plane a dozen times over.

Opponents say that the missiles would pose a special threat to Israel, or would fall into the hands of terrorists. Yet Saudi Arabia already has many of them in inventory. And if the United States won’t sell, a host of arms merchants from other countries are waiting in the anteroom.

As often happens, symbols dominate substance. The Administration argues that the arms sale must go through to show the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security. But the bombing of Libya sent that message much more clearly. Despite the Saudis’ public misgivings, they must now know that the United States will use force to defend its Middle East interests.

Saudi Arabia will still demand that the United States show its friendship through weapons sales. Indeed, cynics believe that Riyadh tests Washington by choosing weapons that are particularly obnoxious to Israel. Of course, Israel competes for U.S. loyalty by often objecting even to the sale of weapons that could be purchased from other countries, without U.S. controls on their use.

This Administration is not the first to lack imagination in the way it shows friendly Arab states that we care about them. It is tempting to provide the latest military gizmo, often too complex to be used or in numbers far exceeding needs, as a substitute for thoughtful diplomacy.

On the other side, it’s logic that’s lacking. Opponents of the arms sale argue that Saudi Arabia hasn’t helped promote peace between Israel and its neighbors. No debate there. Yet it is peculiar to view weapons sales as a reward for good behavior. By this logic, even a bad or unnecessary arms sale (like the missiles) would be acceptable if Saudi Arabia were behaving itself, as it usually does in its relations with the United States.

The test is simple: We should sell weapons to moderate Arab states, as to other countries, only when that increases American security and promotes American interests--including our concern for Israel.

It’s too late now to apply that test to the Saudi sale and thus seek some other way to promote U.S. relations with Riyadh. Now that the political struggle in Washington is joined, it will either feed resentment of Arabs or further erode U.S. credibility with moderate Arab states--perhaps both. Neither is in American or Israeli interests. Israel would clearly suffer if the United States were isolated; without a U.S. bridge to Arab states, Israel’s hopes for peace and acceptance would wither.

Reagan and his advisers have only themselves to blame. Congressional opposition to the Saudi missile sale has outpaced Israel’s largely because, for the first time, an Administration wants to sell weapons without a broader Middle East policy to make sense of the whole. There is no Arab-Israeli peace process, no U.S. leadership in trying to bring the contending parties together. Thoughtful members of Congress can’t see how the pieces fit together; thus they discount even legitimate security needs in the Persian Gulf. Fence sitters can’t be convinced that arms sales can play any role, however indirect, in helping produce peace.

This lesson is lost on the Administration. The politics of winning, for its own sake, are everything. Promoting U.S. interests, making sense of Middle East policy, convincing friend and foe alike that America will lead--these must wait for another day.