China’s Anger Rises on U.S. Aid for Taiwan

Growing tensions over Taiwan pose the most serious dilemma in Sino-American relations since the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China seven years ago.

Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang, flanked by Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen, made an unprecedented attack on American policies concerning Taiwan in a recent meeting with me in Peking. Zhu’s Washington visit last week marked the start of a determined Chinese attempt to compel reduced American military support for Taipei as part of a broader shift in U.S. policy.

Sharply questioning U.S. good faith in honoring a major agreement with China limiting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Hu warned that the United States is “not friendly to China regarding Taiwan, and if you remain unfriendly over a long period of time, we would not tolerate that.” Hu charged that “some people” in the Reagan Administration “want to use Taiwan as a pawn so that we will become a faithful ally of the United States. But we have stated repeatedly that China will not become an ally. We want to be friendly, but not an ally.”

The Reagan Administration is trapped between two conflicting commitments: one to the U.S. Congress and another to China. The United States insisted on retaining the right to sell arms to Taiwan when it opened relations with the People’s Republic. But Congress went a step further, enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires U.S. sales of weaponry to Taiwan “sufficient” for its defense. This has provoked continuing tensions with Peking that were temporarily papered over when U.S. and Chinese leaders signed the Second Shanghai Communique on Aug. 17, 1982, in which the United States pledged that arms sales to Taiwan “will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms,” the level supplied since 1979. In deliberately ambiguous language, the communique said that the United States “intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”

The United States has reduced its arms sales by $20 million per year since the 1982 communique. But Sino-American tensions over Taiwan were rekindled last year when Peking learned that the United States had begun to license exports of sophisticated technology to Taiwan for the manufacture of weaponry more advanced than its existing military hardware. China views the new U.S. licensing policy as a clear violation of the communique. The United States responds that the 1982 accord does not cover transfers of technology.

Chinese anger has mounted in recent months as U.S. defense publications have reported hush-hush details of Taiwan’s $1-billion program to make an “Indigenous Defensive Fighter Aircraft” that will contain late-model U.S. engine and avionics technology. About 35 U.S. companies, orchestrated by General Dynamics, are providing designs, know-how and components and are training technicians from Taiwan in the United States.

Washington has refused to sell Taipei the F-20 or the F-16, since these would clearly represent an overt qualitative increase over the F-5E, currently the most advanced plane in Taiwan’s air force. But informed sources in Taipei, Washington and participating companies say that the projected plane will “approach” the F-20 in some of its key technology and will look like a “small version of the F-16.” Comparing it with the F-5E, Defense Minister Soong Chang-chih told me in Taipei last month that the new plane will “of course represent a qualitative improvement over the F-5E or we wouldn’t be spending a billion dollars on it.”

Even though they are “not mentioned directly,” Hu said, “technology transfers are clearly covered. What is the difference between arms sales and the transfer of technology for the manufacture of armaments? ‘Transfer of technology’ sounds better, but it is the same thing as arms sales. We are not clear about the exact level of technology being licensed by the United States for the airplane. But if it is a fact that the U.S. is using technology transfers to circumvent the limits on quantitative and qualitative increases, it would constitute bad faith. China would take a stern position and would give serious consideration to the proper measures of response.”

Since China is also getting military help for its air force from the United States and says that it wants to reunite China peacefully, why does Peking object so strongly to U.S. arms sales to Taipei?

Apart from its concern with the military balance as such, China views U.S. arms sales as a symbol of American intentions concerning the future of Taiwan. Peking envisages a gradual increase in China-Taiwan contacts and trade during the years ahead, leading eventually to negotiations under which Taiwan could contain a “high degree of autonomy” in accordance with Peking’s “One Country, Two Systems” concept. The United States has so far declined to endorse this concept, arguing that it wants to leave the destiny of Taiwan up to the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. But Peking contends that the United States is already deeply involved in the Taiwan issue and will continue to be so long as it sustains high levels of weapons sales to Taiwan, together with sales of sophisticated military-related technology ($150 million in 1987).

China recognizes that unification will take time, Hu indicated, but wants to know “whether we are going in the same direction. We don’t find unanimity of views among the present leadership in the United States concerning Taiwan. Do they want to see China unified, or do they want some form of independence for Taiwan? At least some people in Washington consider Taiwan an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Others seem to have a wait-and-see attitude. If the U.S. would make up its mind it would make possible a gradual process of peaceful unification . . . .” In Peking’s perspective, a more rapid reduction of U.S. arms sales would signify a more neutral U.S. attitude toward unification, while the present policy suggests a U.S. desire to perpetuate a de facto independent Taiwan for as long as possible.

The issue of arms to Taiwan produced a tense and inconclusive exchange between Vice Foreign Minister Zhu and Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost last week. Zhu attempted unsuccessfully to exact U.S. acknowledgement that the 1982 communique prohibits qualitative increases in Taiwan’s military capabilities through U.S. technology transfers as well as through direct arms sales.

Many American officials argue that China doesn’t really care about the Taiwan issue as much as it says it does but merely uses it to keep the United States on the defensive in order to extract concessions on other issues. All that China really cares about now is economic modernization, they argue, and Peking needs cooperation with the United States to obtain vitally needed industrial technology. But this assessment dangerously underrates the profound significance of the unification objective in Chinese politics.

Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895 when China was weak and disunited. Now, as a strong China emerges as a world power, “One China” is an emotional rallying cry. When Deng Xiao Peng dies, the Taiwan issue could quickly become a weapon in the hands of domestic critics of Deng’s close economic, military and intelligence-sharing ties with the United States.

The United States should act quickly to stabilize relations with Peking by demonstrating its respect for the 1982 communique. Since the communique links reductions in arms sales with a decline in tensions between Taiwan and the mainland, the United States should begin by acknowledging that tensions have in fact eased since 1982. While avoiding a commitment to any specific timetable, the Administration could then justify a more rapid pace of disengagement from military aid to Taiwan, including stricter limits on transfers of technology. More important, Washington should encourage contacts and economic interchange between Taiwan and the mainland, which it has hitherto refrained from doing for fear of antagonizing hard-liners in Taipei.

The Administration should not become directly involved in promoting a political dialogue across the strait. But it should make clear that the United States would welcome the peaceful unification of China under the “One Country, Two Systems” concept if Peking and Taipei can agree on mutually acceptable terms.