Cohabitation in Government Turns Into a French Minuet

PARIS — Whether in New York, where he represented France at the Statue of Liberty centennial ceremonies, or in Moscow, where he completed a summit session with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, French President Francois Mitterrand has had ample opportunity to demonstrate his control over his country’s foreign policy. More than 100 days after their so-called cohabitation government began, does this mean that Mitterrand preempts Premier Jacques Chirac in the realm of foreign affairs?

Two lessons can be drawn from the cohabitation experience so far: Foreign policy under a divided executive is no longer the clear domain of a single leader. And continuity of policy prevails even if differences are visible, largely because domestic politics impinge much more than in the past on foreign policy.

In their respective stands the president and the premier, representing opposing political parties, have different advantages. The president is still the highest authority in constitutional terms, a pre-eminence symbolized by his ultimate control over the nuclear trigger and foreign affairs. Since public opinion supports these roles for the president, and Chirac’s ultimate ambition is to be president, the presidential pre-eminence over foreign policy is not being seriously contested but rather carefully circumvented. The premier has not only reinforced his diplomatic cell, he has also partly dismantled the foreign ministry. African affairs are handled with greater autonomy by the ministry of corporation, while South Pacific affairs are under the responsibility of the ministry of overseas territories.

Furthermore, a new secretary of human rights has been created to underscore the fact that human rights are not only the domain of the left.

Such a diffusion of power is accompanied by a subtle war of position between the two leaders. Each side has staked its territory. So far this gentlemanly war of attrition has not led to a paralysis of the French diplomatic system. However, it can only make diplomatic initiatives more difficult, and this will be especially felt in European affairs. At the Tokyo summit as well as in Brussels at the European council, Mitterrand and Chirac were eager, beyond a subtle game of musical chairs, to present a united front. France spoke with one voice even if through two mouths.

But continuity prevails. The best example so far has been the consensus between the two leaders in their refusal to allow American planes to fly over France during the Libyan raid. A strong sense of national independence and a refusal to permit French subordination to a foreign will united the two men.

Franco-Soviet relations are also dominated by continuity. France’s dialogue is firm and without illusions. Gorbachev’s new diplomatic dynamism in arms control can only stimulate French unity against the specter of disarmament by obsolescence. Differences between Chirac and Mitterrand over the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative have been largely exaggerated for domestic reasons. Chirac gives the impression of using dissenting foreign-policy declarations as a weapon to force Mitterrand to acquiesce on domestic measures. Mitterrand and Chirac have in fact concentrated on different aspects of SDI in their respective comments. The president’s reservations stem from the strategic implications of SDI, whereas Chirac’s more favorable comments are aimed at the industrial and technological fallouts of the U.S. program.

On regional matters differences are more substantial. Chirac’s government is proud of its progress in the Middle East, where two kidnaped Frenchmen recently were released in Lebanon. The pro-Arab, not just pro-Iraqi, image of Chirac has been helpful against those who have wanted to punish Mitterrand’s France for its policy of rapprochement with Israel. It was also easier for Chirac, given his longstanding relationship with Iraq, to explain to the Iraqis that a more balanced policy was crucial for France. Mitterrand and Chirac want to minimize France’s vulnerability in the Middle East, and so they both seek to maintain a low-profile policy concerning the Lebanese quagmire or the Arab-Israeli conflict.

So far cohabitation, as shown in French opinion polls, has benefited Mitterrand more than Chirac--a process that should not be altered by France and New Zealand settling their dispute over French agents’ blowing up the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior. Mitterrand has managed to combine the advantages of a greater distance from daily domestic politics with a continued strong presence in world affairs, where consensus predominates. Chirac has had to face the reverse, bearing the brunt of governing without the advantages of international limelight. Will this pattern endure? Will the Socialists, with or without Mitterrand, be able to cash in on his current advantage? Or will third-party leader Raymond Barre reap the benefits and spoil the carefully orchestrated minuet of opposites? So far the game is entirely open.