Fewer Missiles, Riskier World? : U.S. Deep-Cut Proposal Could Create Dangerous Imbalances

The flurry of diplomatic activity suggests that there may yet be a summit meeting late this year between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. And, despite all the setbacks, the prospects for a new strategic arms reduction agreement still look alive.

That being the case, it’s important for the Administration to get its act together--not just on the crucial question of strategic defenses but also on the issue of how deeply the offensive missile forces on each side should be cut and how those cuts should be made.

As some critics keep warning, an agreement on missile reduction would not necessarily translate into a more stable nuclear balance and, therefore, a safer world. If not carefully drawn and implemented, such an agreement could have the opposite effect.

Some highly respected experts--including Brent Scowcroft, who headed the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces three years ago--urge the Administration to alter its current deep-cut proposal to take better account of this danger.

Public discussion of arms control has been dominated in recent months by the “Star Wars” issue. And understandably so.

The Soviet Union has made it clear that its chief goal in the strategic arms reduction talks at Geneva is to stop Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. The chief American goal is to negotiate reductions in the Soviet offensive missile force, particularly in the number of warheads aboard the Soviet fleet of superheavy land-based missiles. But the Soviets say that they won’t agree to deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces unless the U.S. President’s Star Wars program is confined by treaty to laboratory experiments.

The Soviet demand is extreme, but a compromise allowing some development work might be negotiable. Reagan, however, has refused so far to put SDI squarely on the bargaining table, and this refusal is generally seen as the biggest obstacle to serious negotiations.

But what if this obstacle is overcome? What kind of deep cuts in offensive strategic nuclear forces should we be shooting for?

As things stand, the Soviets have more than 2,300 land- and sea-based missiles of intercontinental range--at least 700 more than we have. But when you throw bombers and cruise missiles into the equation the two sides come out about even on warheads, with around 10,000 each.

Reagan and Gorbachev agreed at their summit meeting last November on a negotiating goal of 50% reductions in long-range offensive weapons. In the ensuing exchange of proposals the two governments proved to be far apart on how and where cuts would be made. But both sides offered formulas that would leave each with about 6,000 missile-borne warheads.

Under the American proposal, only 4,500 warheads could be put aboard ballistic missiles. Of these, no more than 3,000 could be deployed on land-based ICBMs. There was also a formula intended to cause a reduction in the number of Soviet heavy missiles that are considered especially threatening to the survivability of land-based U.S. missiles.

Seven weeks ago Gorbachev unveiled a more modest proposal that would only cut each side to 8,000 warheads on strategic weapons but seemed to narrow the definitional differences and to be more flexible on the Star Wars issue. Washington is in the process of putting together a response that probably will be disclosed before the Geneva negotiations reopen in September.

Scowcroft, among others, is urging that the modified American proposal take greater account of the vulnerability problem that could arise from a combination of deep cuts in offensive nuclear weapons and the Pentagon’s weapons preferences.

The critics point out that, even with fewer nuclear warheads on each side, nuclear stability could be threatened if one side’s nuclear deterrent is significantly more vulnerable than the other’s to destruction in a surprise attack. A nation feeling itself vulnerable is forced into a hair-trigger posture of response, which is the opposite of good war-avoidance strategy. And, the critics warn, the existing U.S. proposal for deep cuts could, if accepted by the Soviets, make American nuclear forces more vulnerable than they are now.

The U.S. proposal, if accepted by Moscow as it stands, would leave the Soviets with fewer warheads and delivery vehicles aimed at U.S. targets, just as we would have fewer aimed at them. But there would also be fewer missiles on each side to be targeted. Thus the ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. missile silos, and to our missile-firing submarines, could actually increase.

Such a result could be avoided by a careful structuring of the deep cuts in warheads to spread the allowable number of warheads among the maximum number of missile launchers allowed under an agreement. This would confront the Soviets with a maximum number of targets, thereby enhancing the survivability of the U.S. force. Unfortunately, the Administration is going in precisely the opposite direction.

The Reagan team, for example, wants to deploy at least 100 silo-launched MX missiles able to carry 10 warheads each. Research and development are proceeding on the Midgetman--a single-warhead, small mobile missile. But Reagan’s current proposal would ban mobile missiles.

To stay within the warhead limit, there would be pressures to speed the retirement of Poseidon submarines and hold down the number of Trident subs ultimately deployed; each Trident carries 24 missiles armed with probably eight warheads each. The smaller the number of subs, the easier they are to find and destroy.

At the very least, the new U.S. proposal should abandon the call for a ban on mobile ICBMs in order to leave room for an armada of several hundred highly survivable, single-warhead Midgetmen. It should also reemphasize the goal of causing the Soviets to reduce their force of superheavy, multi-warhead missiles.

The Geneva talks on strategic arms are not going anywhere anyway unless the impasse over Star Wars is resolved. But if that hurdle can be overcome, it is vital to remember that deep cuts in the offensive nuclear forces on each side are desirable, and may be achievable--but should not be sought at the cost of creating imbalances that would make the world more dangerous than it already is.