Sharing the Blame

To the list of U.S. foreign-policy disasters in Latin America--Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Chile in 1973--add Nicaragua in 1986. All were U.S.-sponsored military adventures that seriously harmed U.S. interests, not to mention the countries in which they were undertaken. The same goes for Nicaragua; the difference now is that, in voting to send $100 million to the contras , Congress has joined President Reagan in his war on the Sandinistas, his inability to tolerate diversity and his simplistic view of world events. Before, the war in Nicaragua was still Reagan’s. Now, it is Congress’ war as well.

In funding the latest installment of the Reagan Doctrine, Congress concurred in a number of the Administration’s most extreme assumptions. One is that the Sandinistas threaten the security of the United States. But Nicaragua poses no conceivable threat to this country--the Defense Department nearly outnumbers the entire population of Nicaragua. Any Nicaraguan threat to the United States is a potential one that could be removed in a regional peace treaty--the kind that the Contadora Group has been pushing and that the Administration, and now Congress, ignores.

Another assumption that Congress so placidly accepted is that military force is the only course. For the Administration, force has been not the last resort but the first. Reagan has used force in Nicaragua not as an instrument of policy but as a substitute for it. He has flouted diplomatic solutions like the Contadora process, which calls for a reduction of forces, respect for frontiers and the advancement of democracy. Reagan does not want to compromise with the Sandinistas; he wants to destroy them. Now, it seems, so does Congress.

A third and equally flawed assumption is that the contras can win. Since 1981, when this sordid venture began, the contras have captured neither towns nor public support--only the hatred of their own people. Indeed, the contras are not an army at all, but a ragtag gang of mercenaries, many of whom seek a return to the old order. Rather than driving the Sandinistas out of power, the contras have provided the principal pretext for Sandinista repression. Reagan’s policies have militarized all of Central America, polarized politics and threatened what little democracy exists. Now Congress is at his side.

What “winning” in Nicaragua means remains vague, beyond making the Sandinistas “say uncle.” But the question is important, and Congress may yet be forced to answer it. What if the contras are defeated? And what if the Sandinistas mellow? Before, Congress could blame the President. Now, it will have to define “winning” for itself.

For five years Reagan has pursued the war in Nicaragua, dragging a reluctant Congress behind him. The potential for disaster remains. Only this time the blame will be shared.