The Real Mideast Scandal Is the Chances We Missed

In the wake of revelations about the U.S. arms deals with Iran, there is a tendency to blame participants on the fringes--especially Israel--for mistakes made in Washington. This draws attention away from the key issue: What is wrong with U.S. policy in the Middle East?

The fundamental problem is not that key people in the U.S. government listened to foreigners’ advice; it is the Reagan Administration’s reliance on military power, including arms deals, in place of diplomacy based on moral principles. As happened before in Lebanon, the U.S. preference for a military approach toward Iran compounded the fundamental problems in the Middle East.

The legitimate goals of the U.S. initiatives toward Iran--the release of hostages, the reduction of terrorism, regional stability--all would be served by resolution of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where U.S. influence is much greater than it is in Iran. And yet in several instances in recent years the Reagan Administration ignored or rejected advice by important Arab and Israeli leaders that would have enhanced prospects for peace.

In the fall of 1981, in response to the assassination of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat, there were urgent appeals by Egyptians and Israelis for the United States to press for progress in negotiations toward the wider peace that was envisioned at Camp David. Former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald R. Ford urged the Reagan Administration to open a dialogue with the Palestinians, observing that the United States eventually would have to talk with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In contrast to this advice but consistent with its own priorities, the Reagan Administration instead signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Israel, announced joint military exercises with Egypt and worked hard to win congressional approval for the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia.

In September, 1982, President Reagan announced a new U.S. initiative for peace. It received encouragingly positive responses from leaders in Jordan and Egypt and within the PLO, and from Shimon Peres, the leader of the opposition Labor alignment in Israel. In the following months King Hussein and Palestinian leaders pleaded for additional signs of U.S. seriousness in seeking peace, such as efforts to achieve a freeze on new Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, as called for by Reagan. Israeli Labor Party leaders privately urged U.S. pressure on Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s government to encourage a positive Israeli response to the U.S. initiative.

But the Administration backed off, saying that the United States would not pressure Israel. During the same period, however, the Administration did exert pressure on Congress and on Israel in behalf of its goal of selling arms to Jordan.

In February, 1985, Hussein and Yasser Arafat agreed on a joint initiative for negotiations, in which the PLO for the first time accepted the principle of “exchange of territory for peace”--the heart of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. At the same time the new Israeli unity government headed by Shimon Peres announced that Israeli forces would withdraw from Lebanon and that Israel would take steps to improve relations with Egypt.

U.S. diplomats in the Middle East viewed all three developments as very important in reviving hopes for progress toward wider peace negotiations. Israeli and Arab leaders who saw an opportunity for peace once again appealed to the United States for high-level diplomatic efforts to help achieve a breakthrough.

The Reagan Administration had other priorities. Administration officials were critical of Israel’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon, and they offered little tangible evidence that the improving of Israeli-Egyptian relations was a high U.S. priority. Nor would the Administration minimally agree to meet with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to explore next steps toward negotiations, despite Hussein’s pleas and Peres’ tacit acceptance of the idea for such a meeting.

In October, 1985, on the eve of the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Peres indicated Israeli flexibility toward a possible Soviet role in the peace process and challenged the United Nations to help get negotiations started. However, the Reagan Administration remained more concerned with excluding the Soviet Union than with getting a peace process going.

In February, 1986, the PLO offered explicitly to accept Resolution 242 in exchange for a U.S. statement supporting the Palestinians’ right of self-determination, to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza in confederation with Jordan. That formula for negotiations was accepted, at least privately, by a number of prominent Israelis. Yet the United States gave no serious consideration to the offer.

The Reagan Administration consistently rejected the advice of Arabs and Israelis who pleaded for more active U.S. diplomatic efforts for peace, claiming in part that the outcome was too uncertain and the political risks were too high. However, the Administration did risk its limited credibility with Arab leaders by increasing U.S. military-strategic cooperation with Israel, and it risked political confrontation with Israel over its public (and unsuccessful) effort to sell more-advanced arms to Jordan. We are only beginning now to learn what risks the Administration took in secretly authorizing major arms shipments to Iran during this same period.

In the past there has been a tendency to avoid public debate about U.S. policy in the Middle East for fear of appearing to undercut U.S. support for Israel. The misadventure in Iran now provides both a need and an opportunity for a critical reappraisal--what is that policy, and what should it be?--not only for the sake of U.S. interests but for Israel’s sake as well as for the Palestinians and all the peoples of the Middle East. Achieving peace in that region will be difficult. Without change in U.S. policy, it is impossible.