Contadora Can Work, if--

Two diplomatic efforts aimed at settling the crisis in Central America peacefully will begin this week--one pushed by the Reagan Administration, the other by the Contadora Group. Lamentably, Administration statements raise doubt that its peace initiative is sincere.

Philip C. Habib, President Reagan’s special envoy to Central America, is traveling through the region to explain a peace proposal worked out by President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica, Nicaragua’s immediate neighbor and the nation most threatened by a Sandinista military buildup because it has no army of its own. The Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and a support group made up of Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay) will begin its effort this weekend, joined by U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and the secretary general of the Organization of American States, Joao Baena Soares of Brazil.

It was initially reassuring to see Habib back on the job in Central America. A respected career diplomat with a reputation for smooth handling of complex negotiations, Habib had been pushed into the background last year while other Administration officials moved forward with a campaign to overthrow the Sandinistas covertly, using the contra rebels as surrogates. That shortsighted strategy seems to have stalled for the moment as a result of the Iranian arms scandal and Reagan’s decision to fire his covert-action cowboy, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North.

But Habib’s effectiveness is being undercut by hostile statements about Nicaragua made by Administration spokesmen like Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for Latin America. In several recent interviews Abrams has insisted that U.S. aid to the contras is necessary because the Sandinista regime in Managua responds only to military pressure. While conceding that the contras cannot defeat the Sandinistas, Abrams believes that only a continuation of guerrilla warfare can push Managua to the negotiating table.

Abrams’ rationalization of the war against Nicaragua illustrates the profound ignorance of history that underlies Reagan Administration strategy in Central America. The Sandinistas have armed themselves to the teeth not because they fear the contras but because they fear the United States and vividly remember past U.S. interventions in their country. Managua will not let down its guard to talk peace until the United States lets up on the pressure that Abrams thinks is so important.

With the Administration locked into this contradictory mind-set on Nicaragua, the Contadora Group is a more effective vehicle for working out a peace agreement in Central America. Latin Americans understand the concerns of Nicaragua’s neighbors, but they also know that the Sandinistas’ fears are not completely irrational. And, with their economic clout and moral authority, they can make both sides in a peace accord abide by its provisions. Contadora can work, but it won’t happen until the dirty little war promoted by the Reagan Administration is brought to an end.