Germany Tries to Stand Firm Once More

It is the kind of crisis for which no one is really prepared. The West German government, having just been reelected on a platform of optimism and confidence, is facing a challenge that the country has been spared for almost 10 years--that of terrorist blackmail. Two West Germans have been taken hostage in Lebanon to force the authorities in Bonn to release Mohammed Ali Hamadi, suspected of hijacking and murder, from his prison cell in Frankfurt.

In the meantime, Hamadi’s brother has also been apprehended and a large cache of explosives found. Yet the blackmail continues. And at this stage it is unclear how the government in Bonn will respond. Will it refuse any trade of innocent hostages for a murder suspect? Or will it give in to the threat leveled against its two captive citizens in Beirut?

The first option is the one practiced by previous Bonn governments in the fight against the Red Army faction, a gang of domestic terrorists, in the late 1970s. Then Bonn stood firm, even against threats of murder, and suffered the killing of hostages. Perhaps as a result, neither domestic nor foreign terrorist groups have taken German citizens hostage--until now.

The second option is that of appeasement, and it is the one chosen by practically all of West Germany’s major allies. A few years ago the British, fearing reprisals against their citizens in Libya, allowed the Libyan killer of a London policewoman to leave the country unharmed. France struck a deal with a bunch of bomb throwers from the Middle East to pursue their bloody business elsewhere, while successive Paris governments sought friendly relations with both Damascus and Tehran, their powerful sponsors, in order to secure the release of French hostages in Lebanon. Italy, after the Achille Lauro affair in 1985, seemed only too eager to let the man suspected of having masterminded the hijacking and the murder of an American passenger leave the country before the United States could apply for his extradition. Even Israel, which usually counsels toughness against terrorists, was willing to exchange more than 1,000 suspects for three Israeli soldiers in Arab captivity. And now the United States has joined the international club of sinners: In an attempt to free American hostages the Reagan Administration has provided arms to Iran--the very country that supports terrorist groups in Lebanon.

Despite all the lofty declarations concerning the need for Western govern-ments to stand firm and united against international terrorism, the moment when a bunch of Beirut thugs strike, it seems to be everyone for himself, no matter what the effects on the international community as a whole.

Of course, the dilemma that Western governments confronted with hostage blackmail are facing is, for all but the most callous, an agonizing one. Are the lives of innocents not worth more than the lives of murderers? If there is a chance to get them out, must it not be seized by any country, regardless of the loss of prestige and credibility? Moreover, there simply is no guarantee that firmness always will pay off; are those who advocate it merely suggesting a very bloody way of upholding all-too-proud principles?

These are serious questions, and they are being asked today in Bonn, too. While at this stage there is not much pressure on the West German government to answer them, the pressure will mount when the current soundings turn out to be fruitless. Already voices can be heard to the effect that, after all, the murder charge against Hamadi applies to an act that was committed on an American plane against an American citizen, while the only crime that the West German authorities can hold against him is the unlawful possession of explosives--a minor offense. Should two of our people die now and perhaps more tomorrow, some ask, because Americans want the man for more serious crimes?

Because of the corruption of Western standards in dealing with international terrorism, it has become more difficult for Bonn to resist the demands from Beirut on the point of principle. No Western government now has the moral authority to preach firmness to the West Germans. The temptation to try to escape from the crisis by following the example of their partners and friends will be felt strongly by Bonn. Any decision there to resist blackmail--and that means to risk the death of the two Germans in Beirut--will be a very lonely one.

Yet there is no respectable alternative. If the West Germans were to set Hamadi free to continue his murderous ambitions, perhaps the lives of today’s hostages in Beirut would be saved. But it would be in exchange for an unknown number of future victims, Germans included, once the Hamadis of this world get going again.

International terrorism, after all, is a common problem for civilization. If other governments fail to understand this and live up to it, it is no excuse for the Germans to do likewise. And yet if in the end they should not live up to such exacting standards, who would want to throw the first stone against them?