Reagan Faces a Gut Check on His Nicaragua Policy

The finest hour in Ronald Reagan’s entire life was the time when he lay facing death, stricken by an assassin’s bullet through the lung. His capacity to make a cheerful joke showed us what is in the man.

That night the NCAA basketball playoffs were scheduled in Philadelphia, and there was much confusion about whether to cancel them. The games went on, and a bulletin from Washington brought fans up to date. Asked how he was feeling, his interior flooding with blood, the President said from his hospital bed: “On the whole, I’d rather be in Philadelphia.”

Now, six years later, President Reagan faces another serious “gut check.” A year ago he failed such a test. His characteristic sentimentality, often endearing, led him to become too emotionally involved in the fate of American hostages in Lebanon. (Their relatives, along with many of us in the media, are terribly guilty for having subjected the President to unrelenting emotional blackmail during those days. “Do something,” he was begged.)

Sentimentality--a false compassion--led the President to abandon firm conservative principles: “Do not negotiate with terrorist regimes. Do not pay ransom for hostages.” Although his head knew the truth, his heart blinded him--a character flaw that he generally tries to keep in check.

But he then also revealed a second character flaw. (No one is without such flaws.) The President’s “instincts” are excellent, and he is a skillful communicator, but he often fails to think through the points that he wants to make, any further than is necessary. This can sometimes be an advantage, allowing for flexibility. But it can also be a sign of intellectual laziness.

As a result, the President’s strategic design often seems haphazard, ad hoc and improvised--not systematic, sustained and clearly organized. If this habit continues, Reagan will not leave behind a legacy of ideas, a coherent constellation of three or four insights that a later generation can systematically pursue. His legacy is likely to consist instead of a few scattered sentences, images and precepts--fragments of a mosaic, its inner design lost. This is very sad.

Now that Ronald Reagan has only 20 months left in office, one of the President’s more important initiatives--the promotion of democracy in Nicaragua--is likely to perish for want of a fully worked-out rationale.

The fundamental issue for the Reagan presidency is democracy. The Western Hemisphere is the most democratic hemisphere, and since Reagan took office the number of its democracies has expanded by 11. Jimmy Carter talked about human rights. Democracies that actually “secure these rights” have come into being under Ronald Reagan.

Meanwhile, Nicaragua has progressively become more Leninist day by day. Since Leninists cannot favor genuine democracy without abandoning their raison d’etre , they use the word to dupe those who do not want to face reality. So the President must carry this issue of democracy in Nicaragua, in Chile, in Cuba and elsewhere to Congress.

Today the political arm of the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is faltering; the editors of the New Republic and others are turning to jelly; classic isolationists of the Republican past are willing to throw in the towel; the “ contra connection” reminds everyone of the disaster in Iran. In short, the hour for surrender is approaching.

It is gut-check time for President Reagan. His mind, as well as his gut, is going to have to go to work.

Unlike an army, a free people does not travel on its belly. Heads upraised, it follows the light of intellect. The President must explain to the American people, systematically, why democrats must replace Leninists in Nicaragua.

Among such reasons are these: Leninists can abide only the fig leafs of democracy; Leninists suffocate all effective opposition; Leninist ideas about economics produce dependency on the Soviet Union; in return, Leninist regimes supply outposts for Soviet electronic surveillance and espionage; as a “good neighbor” policy, Leninist regimes train infiltrators and guerrilla fighters; since their economies do not work, Leninist regimes invariably form the largest armed forces in their regions (as have Cuba, Ethiopia and Vietnam); military expansion is the only thing that Leninist regimes do well.

A deal with Leninist Nicaragua seems to be tempting many. At the very least, those so tempted must be made to acknowledge its long-term implications--and on the record. They must be made to embrace the consequences, publicly and in advance.