Our Persian Gulf Role is Justified, Our Approach Correct

It is impossible to view any military incident involving the loss of American lives without thinking of the agony of Vietnam and the loss of the U.S. Marines in Beirut. It is almost inevitable, therefore, that the attack on the U.S. frigate Stark has raised issues concerning whether the United States should have forces in the Persian Gulf, whether these are the right forces for that part of the world, and whether our military forces are effective.

There are a number of answers to the question of why the United States should be in the gulf--the first being that we are the only Western power still capable of significant power projection into that area.

Despite 15 years of trying to find new oil sources, the gulf has a larger percentage of the world’s total energy reserves today than it did in 1973. Even by conservative estimates, it has more than 50% of all the world’s proven oil reserves.

It is true that America gets only about 0.8 million to 1.2 million barrels a day of oil from the gulf, out of its worldwide total of 4 million to 6 million barrels. The West and Third World nations, however, get 10 to 14 million barrels a day from this source. Any major interruption in the flow of oil through the gulf would force the other nations to compete with the United States, leading to major rises in oil prices and probably to a major global recession. Thus the gulf is an absolutely vital American strategic interest.

Equally important, U.S. military forces are in the gulf because an explosive war is taking place between Iraq and Iran that constantly threatens to expand into the southern gulf states. Already battlefield successes by a fanatic and hostile Iran have brought its troops within shooting range of Kuwait. There is now a real threat that Iraq’s defenses could at least partially collapse and Iranian troops could suddenly be on the Kuwaiti border.

It is absolutely essential for Kuwait to keep performing as a major transshipment point for Iraq, which has been cut off from the gulf. Thus any Iranian move that would end the transshipment function or cause the Kuwaitis to abandon their support for Iraq might be serious enough to trigger the very Iraqi defeat that the United States fears. Meanwhile, the Saudis have equal reason for fear and caution. They are being asked to fund much of Iraq’s defense, and their critical oil facilities are vulnerable to Iranian air and naval attacks and sabotage.

Further, the Soviet Union is actively trying to expand its influence over the Free World’s main source of oil imports. It has shown it is more than willing to replace the U.S. military presence in the region, and the potential leverage it could eventually gain over gulf oil could do immense damage to the West. Without keeping forces in the area, Washington could offer little assurance to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that they would be protected in the event of an Iranian victory over Iraq. Without such assurances, it is clear who the Kuwaitis and the Saudis would have to turn to.

Thus we cannot wait for a massive Iranian victory or the escalation of the war in the gulf to deploy our forces. If we do, we risk creating a disaster through our own inaction and making that disaster almost impossible to contain.

But are we using the right amount of force? Since 1980, we have had roughly the same limited military presence in the gulf: A small task force of six ships and five E-3A airborne warning and air control aircraft. In spite of constant Iranian rhetoric and threats, this force has been strong enough to force Iran to act with consistent caution. It has served to protect U.S. interests without any prior exchange of fire.

This force has also been small enough to avoid having to overtly take sides between Iraq and Iran and minimize the risk of military encounters with Iran. It has also minimized the inevitable charges by hostile states that the United States is “imperialistic” and that friendly regimes like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have become American “stooges.”

With luck, something close to the present force may still be large enough to convince Iran that the United States will protect tankers going to Kuwait that are flying the U.S. flag. If so, this will balance out similar Soviet support of Kuwait, help Iraq avoid defeat and reassure Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that they can count on U.S. support even if Iraq should lose the strategic city of Basra. Such U.S. efforts should be enough to reassure the oil industry and avoid panic buying and price rises. But we have also spent the last decade building up contingency capabilities to increase our forces in the region. We have a carrier task force outside the gulf, and the ability to rapidly deploy massive amounts of air power to Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and/or Turkey.

If we overreact, however, we risk creating the active military confrontation with Iran that we want to avoid. We risk a build-up race with the Soviet Union. If we do not act with caution and let others fire the first shot, we also risk trying to project power before friendly regimes have the clear cause that will allow them to counter the political charges of strong radical anti-U.S. regimes and political movements.

There are excellent political and military reasons to deploy a minimum of force and use it very cautiously. This, however, means we must put Americans in harm’s way, and ask them to act with great restraint. It means we cannot rely simply on automatic defenses and cannot shoot until some incident has occurred that gives us clear cause. The strategic situation in the gulf makes us use our military forces as a human trip wire and exposes them to the risk that they may have to die for their country and its vital strategic interests.

When reacting to the fact that men died doing their duty, we need to be extraordinarily careful when criticizing their mission, U.S. military planning or the overall effectiveness of U.S. military forces. We need to be even more cautious about calling for sudden withdrawals, sudden military build-ups and a sudden willingness to escalate our military involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. The fact is that the men on the Stark died for the right mission and as part of the right force, and did so in a climate where the United States acted with proper caution and restraint.