Bonn Has Reason to Fidget on Missile Deal

Kenneth Adelman, head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told a West German interviewer not long ago that West Europeans complain regardless of what Washington does. In his words, “They complain if we deploy missiles and they complain if we talk about removing them.”

Adelman’s comment was really aimed at the West Germans--and with reason. Of this country’s major European allies, none has been more vigorous over the years than West Germany in pressing Washington for progress on arms control. Yet Bonn is seemingly the main stumbling block to a U.S.-Soviet agreement that would remove all U.S.-made medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe--those aimed at West Germany as well as those pointed at the Soviet bloc from West German soil.

Bonn hasn’t said no--and given the pressures for agreement within West Germany itself, will probably give its grudging assent in the end. But Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s heart clearly won’t be in it.

It’s easy to write off Kohl’s trepidations as just another example of German angst , defined by Webster’s as a gloomy and often neurotic feeling of anxiety. After all, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has offered an attractive package that goes a long way toward accepting the U.S. negotiating position, which was developed in consultation with the NATO allies.

Moscow and Washington have more or less agreed to remove all medium-range missiles--those with a range of 600 to 3,000 miles--from Europe. Gorbachev has also called for elimination from Europe of shorter-range missiles, in which the Soviets have a virtual monopoly.

Since the package deal would require the Soviets to remove several times as many warheads as the United States, President Reagan is strongly tempted to say yes.

The West Germans are willing to accept an agreement on medium-range missiles although, like the other Europeans, they want Washington to insist on elimination of the missiles worldwide, not just in Europe. But unlike the British, Kohl still resists the Soviet proposals on shorter-range missiles.

Why is he such a worrywart?

Bonn’s misgivings may be excessive, but they are based on more than angst, and are in fact shared to a major extent by Britain and France, as well as by a respectable collection of U.S. defense experts and influential members of Congress.

The fundamental reality is that, whatever European political leaders may say for home consumption, most shrink from the very notion of a nuclear-free Europe.

One reason is cost. Countering the Soviet forces with purely conventional weapons would be enormously expensive--and Europeans are no more willing than Americans to pay the price.

Another factor is the deep-seated determination to avoid any war, nuclear or otherwise. World War II was a conventional conflict in Europe, but tens of millions of people perished in the conflagration.

Thus NATO strategy assumes that the best way of deterring the Soviets from launching even a non-nuclear assault on Western Europe is to keep them convinced that the end result would be nuclear war with America. And that is deemed to require a U.S. nuclear presence in Europe.

Deployment of U.S.-supplied missiles in the last few years had the unintended side effect, however, of reminding people that if war came, Europe would be a nuclear battleground. As a consequence, politicians--especially in West Germany--have found it convenient to pretend an enthusiasm for removal of nuclear weapons that they don’t really feel.

When Gorbachev unexpectedly agreed to their elimination, the West Germans, British and French all objected that such a deal should include a credible Soviet commitment to negotiate a balance in shorter-range missiles and conventional arms; otherwise, the military balance would tilt heavily in the Soviet favor.

Whereupon Gorbachev said, OK, we will get rid of the shorter-range missiles in Europe, too. Britain agreed, with reservations, but Kohl is still dithering.

The Reagan Administration is understandably impatient. A Euromissile agreement would do wonders for the President’s leadership image, badly tarnished by the Iran- contra affair. More important, it could lead to progress in the vital area of strategic arms reduction.

However, no one should be surprised that Bonn is disturbed by an agreement that would remove medium- and shorter-range missiles from Europe but allow battlefield nukes to remain in place--thus leaving West Germany, because of its exposed position, the only NATO country that would be guaranteed of nuclear destruction in event of war.

Nervousness over the prospective Euromissile deal goes beyond West Germany.

The French defense minister has called the potential agreement a “nuclear Munich.” Britain’s Lord Carrington, secretary general of NATO, said it could lead to the “denuclearization” of Europe, which he said would be “absolutely fatal” for the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the prospective agreement would leave many thousands of American, British and French warheads in place, talk of denuclearization may be premature. But the concerns are real. And reduction of nuclear missiles in Europe won’t make the world a safer place if the result is to unravel the Atlantic Alliance, of which West Germany is the European linchpin.

Everything considered, it would be wiser to move a step at a time.

Why not concentrate first on nailing down a medium-range missile agreement containing a Soviet commitment to negotiations aimed at a balance in conventional arms as well as shorter-range missiles and battlefield nukes? As has been proposed in several quarters, the final stage of cruise and Pershing-2 missile withdrawals could be made conditional on progress in these follow-up talks.

That way, the Europeans would not feel pressured to accept a hurry-up deal that could threaten their own security. There would be time to explore the ramifications of a nuclear-free Europe, and to see whether European and American voters can be made to see that if they really want to do away with nuclear weapons, they must be willing to pay the price for conventional forces strong enough to keep the Soviets on good behavior without the threat of nuclear extermination.