On Showing the Flag

The Reagan Administration is about to plunge more deeply into the turbulent and perilous waters of the Persian Gulf without a lifeline to assure that it won’t go under. In the next few weeks a plan to provide U.S. flag protection to 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers is expected to take effect. With that, U.S. naval forces will be committed to defending the ships of a country whose vessels have already come under attack from Iran. There is not a shred of evidence as yet that this commitment will have the active support of other gulf states or of America’s allies.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, determined to thrust ahead, boldly warns that any attack on a U.S. ship in the gulf would be answered “immediately or even prior thereto.” That presumably is meant to convey clear warning of a preemptive strike if Iran is even suspected of aggressive intent. The Iranian regime, suffice to say, thrives on this kind of external threat.

The reality--no secret to Iran--is that the U.S. military effectiveness is limited because the narrowness of the gulf precludes carrier operations there. Yet, as Weinberger acknowledges, air cover is essential to protect surface vessels. That means either that carriers must be stationed outside the gulf, severely limiting the range of their planes, or U.S. aircraft would have to be flown from bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Bahrain. That is what Weinberger wants. But the gulf states balk at allowing U.S. use of their bases. They are eager for U.S. protection, but not a U.S. presence.

Weinberger nonetheless seems intent on “projecting” American power, with or without the help of others, with or without solid reason to think this power could be effectively used. Unless the United States acts, he warns, the Persian Gulf could become “a Soviet lake.” This is nonsense. The threat in the gulf doesn’t come from the Soviet navy, which in any case has as much right to use an international waterway as does the United States. The threat, and the reason why the Navy is there, is for the security of oil supplies.

Western Europe and Japan depend on that oil. Yet, except for token British and French naval forces, the countries most affected seem quite happy to let the United States carry the burden of protecting gulf shipping. The Administration, though it has solicited help, seems quite prepared in turn to accept that burden unilaterally. This won’t do. If there is any such thing as a collective international responsibility, keeping the gulf open is it. The United States should insist on tangible help before it expands its role as the gulf’s guardian. The real risk is not that the gulf could become a Soviet lake, but that U.S. readiness to go it alone could produce a costly American humiliation.