Reaching for Compromise

Two weeks of violent anti-government demonstrations in virtually every major city in South Korea have forced the regime to concede that some political change may in fact be necessary. For the first time since he seized power in 1980, President Chun Doo Hwan has agreed to talk with Kim Young Sam, a major opposition leader. For the first time since Chun’s “irreversible” decision on April 13 to suspend negotiations on constitutional revision until after the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, there are signs that at least some ruling-party politicians see the wisdom of a more conciliatory posture. That would account also for Chun’s promise to release from house arrest Kim Dae Jung, another major opposition leader.

All this, of course, stops well short of guaranteeing that South Korea’s 42 million people will soon enjoy the full measure of democratic rights that they have always been denied. None of it, at the same time, can be expected to satisfy the students who have led the anti-government protests. But the students have always been more radical than the recognized political opposition, just as they are far more radical than the bulk of the populace. There has been a significant showing of middle-class support in behalf of demands for greater democracy; there clearly are definite limits to how much agitation people will tolerate. If sure signs of political improvement emerge, most South Koreans would probably want to give the process a chance.

The public debate now focuses on whether South Korea is to have a presidential or a parliamentary form of government, elected directly or indirectly by the people. But the real and fundamental issue is whether political power in South Korea can be feasibly shared. Power-sharing is not part of the Korean political tradition, where winners claim all the spoils and where compromise is regarded as evidence of weakness. Yet if South Korea is to have the stability on which continued economic progress depends, the question is not whether power can be shared--it must be--but how.

Stability can probably be imposed, for a time at any rate, by the iron hand of official repression. It can be more durably and effectively assured by a political consensus that allows for a greater popular voice in government and broader freedom of expression. Successive military-backed regimes over the last 26 years have used a variety of excuses to withhold these rights. The most insulting excuse is that the people are too inexperienced to be trusted with making sound political decisions. But Koreans are a highly-educated and mature people, grown restless and frustrated under an arrogant autocracy. They want change, and they deserve it.

The United States is caught between an unwillingness to insist on rapid democratic reforms, lest that encourage greater demonstrations that would undoubtedly invite more brutal repression, and the clear perception that unless real change comes soon South Korea’s economic progress and national security will both be imperiled. It has largely limited itself to urging Koreans to chart their own course toward greater democracy. But for that to occur a basic change in the Korean political mind-set must take place. The idea that power can be democratically shared, rather than autocratically monopolized, must finally be accepted by the regime and its major political opponents.