Gorbachev’s New Strength

Last week’s Central Committee plenum in Moscow was a crucial test of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s control of the Communist Party apparatus. The meetings presented an even more serious challenge to Gorbachev’s reform plans, which have been repeatedly called “radical” and “drastic.” But, to the mild surprise of Sovietologists, Gorbachev emerged from the plenum with renewed stature. While undoubtedly gained at much cost, his new strength will force new priorities not only on his nation but on the United States as well.

Many will acknowledge, but few can describe in detail, the power struggle that Gorbachev has endured over the past few days. That he left the plenum with hardly a scratch, however, casts real doubt on the presumed weakness with which he entered the session. In spite of the considerable obstacles still confronting his reforms, Gorbachev now seems to have the requisite power structure to implement changes previously unimagined in the Soviet pantheon of reform efforts. This means that this country must change its estimate of Gorbachev’s control over the Soviet economy.

Such a position, and its pitfalls, is familiar to the history of Kremlin politics. Nikita S. Khrushchev’s demise hinged on his marriage to a set of unworkable “harebrained schemes.” But Gorbachev learned from Khrushchev’s mistakes. And, like no Soviet leader before him, Gorbachev seems to appreciate the intricate and interdependent nature of the Soviet economy. His reform strategy relaxes Moscow’s control over industrial management, but does not leave those managers adrift without the guidance of a central plan.

Gorbachev’s ideas will still inspire controversy throughout the Soviet system. But as the Soviet leaders decide the future of their nation, so must the United States choose a response to Gorbachev’s initiatives. Although it is almost impossible to dictate Soviet behavior from abroad, America’s reaction to Gorbachev’s actions will register in the Kremlin. This country may face either a reinvigorated Soviet Union or one newly plunged into internal instability. To a small extent it can choose between the two. Does the United States want to see Gorbachev’s overhaul of the Soviet economy succeed? Already the idea of a convertible Soviet currency is no longer unthinkable. And recent joint-venture legislation provides a largely untested but seemingly viable channel for Soviet interests in the world economy. Can the United States do battle with a newly strong Soviet Union on both economic and military fronts? More interestingly, will one front eventually supersede the other? Indeed, either the success or the failure of Gorbachev’s tenure will force America to make choices.

New personalities and a new program do not a new nation make. But to Gorbachev’s advantage, his “revolution” seems not to originate solely from above or below. Washington should not underestimate his task, but neither should it underestimate his resources.